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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the evangelical ethics of Prof. Oliver O’Donovan in order
to explore the implications of his “evangelical realism” for theological anthropology, moral
knowledge and the concept of moral order. The Barth-Brunner debate regarding natural
theology provides a lens onto these issues. Theological case studies are used to test our
findings.
Chapter 1 provides an overture to these issues, paying attention to current ideas about
human nature and morality, and the growing influence of neuroscience and evolutionary
psychology.
Chapter 2 focuses on Resurrection and Moral Order, and elucidates the salient factors in
its outline for evangelical ethics.
Chapter 3 diagnoses the challenges which a dialectical epistemology presents to the
development of a doctrine of evangelical ethics.
Chapter 4 delves into O’Donovan’s treatment of the Barth-Brunner debate over natural
theology, and discovers therein an illuminating correspondence between O’Donovan’s ethics
and the concept of a human “capacity for revelation” (Offenbarungsmächtigkeit), which
became a hinge issue in the debate. This provides a helpful lens onto O’Donovan’s concept of
moral order.
Chapter 5 examines the intrinsic connection between the concept of moral order and the
epistemic role of faith. Kierkegaard’s treatment of the paradoxical aspects of faith as an event
of epistemic access figures prominently in this analysis.
Chapter 6 brings together the results of our analysis and applies them to the thesis that:
the transformation of persons lies at the heart of evangelical ethics. The cosmology of faith
emerges as a critical hermeneutical factor in the development of a doctrine of evangelical
ethics. We explore here the doctrinal implications for Trinitarian theology.
Chapter 7 draws out practical implications of our thesis. We see the central place of
prayer and worship in evangelical ethics, and point out implications for teaching. Lastly, we
show practical applications of our thesis by examining the bio-ethical issues of human
reproductive technologies, with special attention to O’Donovan’s work, Begotten or Made?

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11 THE QUEST OF EVANGELICAL ETHICS
Look at the proud!
Their spirit is not right in them,
but the righteous live by their faith.
Habakkuk 2:4 [NRSV]
Ethics as quest for a Point of Contact
This dissertation concerns the interaction of evangelical ethics with modern concepts of
moral order. We find Professor Oliver O’Donovan to be a valuable guide in this regard, for
his desire to put evangelical ethics on a secure and realistic footing that remains unabashedly
evangelical while engaging simultaneously in fruitful dialog with the ethics of our secular
age. It has become popular in western culture to conceive of religion as a suspect idea which
has outlived its usefulness. Imbued with a patina of authority based on the ostensible claim to
be scientific, modern biological and psychological concepts of the self vie with religious
concepts in shaping the pattern of our cultural imagination. By innuendo, then, if not by
explicit argumentation, today’s popular western culture looks skeptically upon theology,
especially dogmatics, as an appropriate vehicle for the conveyance of ethics. The difficulty
encountered in the effort to reconcile an evangelical ethics with secular views of the modern
moral imaginary is that faith is accused of being an “unscientific” and “closed-minded”
epistemological conversation-stopper. “Surely, no one wants to be a fideist”, says Bruce
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Marshall, “This objection exploits our deep conviction—surely correct and important, as far
as it goes—that in order to hold a belief in an epistemically responsible way (to hold it
rationally, rather than fideistically) we must be able to offer reasons for the belief.”1 Yet this
begs the question: what kind of reasons can these be, shaped and possessed as they are by
faith?2
Our thesis is that the transformation of persons lies at the heart of evangelical ethics,
because moral knowledge is bound inextricably with the event of faith. To understand faith as
a transformational event is of the essence in evangelical ethics, though it represents an
approach which seems to fly in the face of much thinking which passes for common
knowledge. The inseparable bond between faith and moral knowledge presents a challenge to
ethical discourse, raising the question of what it means for an ethic to be Christian, and “how
such an ethic could be heard beyond the boundaries of the Christian Church”.3 Expressing
concern that Christian ethics not be treated like a “faith-ethic” confined within the boundary
of an arbitrary closed circle of like-minded believers, and therefore rendered irrelevant
outside that closed circle, O’Donovan addresses the challenge of bringing evangelical ethics
into dialog with contemporary moral philosophy. He aims to chart a course of well-balanced
reason amidst the competing interpretive pressures of moral philosophy and theological
ethics.
In seeking to make contact with the precepts of the modern moral imaginary, and speak
with relevance in that dialog, O’Donovan develops some ideas about moral knowledge which
engender conflict with the confessional affirmations of evangelical faith. The crux of the
matter revolves around the concept of a “natural ethic” and the possibility of immanent,
natural access to moral knowledge. The challenges of this approach to ethics can be seen also
in the polemical arguments of Barth and Brunner during the first half of the last century.
O’Donovan cites that debate as a prime example of how easily confused theology can
become in the effort to locate a point of contact for moral knowledge.4 He aims to sort out
that confusion by applying his own style of epistemological realism. We shall discover
through our analysis that the Barth-Brunner debate presents a valuable lens onto
1 Bruce D. Marshall, Trinity and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000) 141.
2 Cf. Hauerwas: “The task of Christian ethics is to help us see how our convictions are in themselves a
morality”; Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (London: SCM Press,
1984) 16.
3 John E. Colwell, Living the Christian Story: the Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2001) 251.
4 The term Anknüpfungspunkt (“point of contact”) figures prominently in the controversy of the Barth-Brunner
debate; we shall explore this concept further in Chapter 4.
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O’Donovan’s work. He admires Barth’s epistemological rigor, and expresses sympathy for
Brunner’s approach to establish a point of contact for moral knowledge, yet finds them each
to have been confused by the ontological and epistemological issues in play. Through the
lens of this debate, we shall discover how the search for a “point of contact” in evangelical
ethics brings together the doctrine of revelation, theological anthropology, the dynamics of
faith, and the epistemic event of participation in the innertrinitarian life of God into a stormy
convergence of doctrinal implications.
A few preparatory remarks will prove helpful in setting the context for our investigation;
this opening chapter serves therefore as an overture to the analysis which follows, touching
upon the broad themes that will shape our investigation. First, what do we mean by
“transformation”? The answer to this question shall of course occupy the attention of later
chapters, but for the moment, I note simply that transformation pertains to the effect and
actualization of evangelical faith. Our meaning here must be informed by the biblical witness
to metanoia as referring to a change in the whole aspect of a person’s life, including
awareness, understanding, faith, spirit and behavior.5 The concept of the moral order is one
to which we come by faith—we are transformed by the renewing of our minds, our selves,
and the cosmogonies of our understanding.6 Therefore, whatever we know of moral order, if
it is to be understood rightly, it comes to us as transforming knowledge. The moral order,
though it precedes personal faith and understanding, also proceeds through the moments of
this transformation. To speak theologically of the moral order, therefore, is to speak of the
5 Rae has articulated the role of metanoia with more depth and clarity than we cover in the span of this
dissertation. He gets at the core issue for why transformation matters in the present context: “we cannot assume
therefore, that an epistemology which serves in science may also be the means of achieving cognitive progress
in respect of God”; Murray A. Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision of the Incarnation: by Faith Transformed (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1997) 141. Metanoia involves new access to revealed truth, as spoken in 2 Tim. 2:25: “God may
perhaps grant that they will repent and come to know the truth” (NRSV).
6 The language of Romans 12:2 encompasses personal transformation in all of these dimensions, and is not
limited strictly to the modern gloss “mind” for νοὸς, as translated in the KJV and many modern translations.
Gordon Fee shows that the ethical importance of Paul’s exhortation here (μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ 
νοὸς) requires to be interpreted in light of the personal transformation which occurs in and by the empowering
of the Holy Spirit: “[T]he ethics of eschatological salvation in Christ starts with a renewed mind…Only
dependence on the Spirit can enable one to know what is pleasing to God.” Transformation in this sense is thus
not merely a matter of human cognitive reason alone. It subsists in the transforming relationship of faith, as
effected in and by the power of the Holy Spirit. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson)
878. Some modern translations express the holistic nature of this transformation more fully; to wit: the New
Living Translation—“let God transform you into a new person by changing the way you think”; the New
Century Version—“be changed within by a new way of thinking”; and The Message paraphrase by Eugene
Peterson—“You’ll be changed from the inside out.”
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transformation of persons. We are either being transformed by the renewing of our minds,
which occurs in faith, or we presume to have found some other point of contact with the
ontological reality of the moral order—a presumption which also requires faith, though of a
different sort.
“Explaining Religion”
The presumption that there exists a point of contact with moral reality has long exercised
the attention of theologians and philosophers; our present age is no exception. If anything, the
presumption of epistemic access to moral reality has grown all the more prevalent in recent
decades. This presumption has gathered momentum through the beliefs that give shape to our
secular age.7 Pressure in this direction of interpretation—to view the moral order as an
objectifiable “something out there” which is accessible through some point of contact with
it—is indicated by the energy spent on a variety of proposals to explain the nature of ethics.
These proposals come from many directions, and with increasing audacity. Neuroscience,
evolutionary psychology and the human genome project all contribute an aura of scientific
credibility to theories that ground human nature in mechanistic, materialistic concepts. Ethics
is thereby constrained to be conducted within the premises of non-teleological evolutionary
processes based upon chance and necessity.8 As one indication that momentum in this
direction of interpretation is cresting, we can look to the scientific project titled (unusually
bluntly for a scientific dissertation), “Explaining Religion”. In late 2007 scientists from 14
universities began research to identify the biological causes of moral thinking and religion,
and to develop a theory of mind to accommodate their findings.9 The Economist reported
7 Charles Taylor gives a masterful rendition of the advent of the Modern Moral Order which shapes much
modern thought; Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007).
8 Jacques Monod developed famously the non-teleological import of evolutionary theory in Chance and
Necessity (New York: Knoph, 1971). Donald MacCrimmon MacKay offers a perceptive rebuttal to this view;
MacKay, Science, Chance and Providence, (The Riddell Memorial Lectures Forty-Sixth Series Delivered at the
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne on 15, 16, and 17 March 1977; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) 30-
39. Cf. MacKay’s Gifford Lectures published as Behind the Eye ed. Valerie MacKay (Oxford: Basil Blackwell
1991) 228-9.
9 The Oxford website describes the project in these terms. The researchers presume, apparently, that moral
thinking and religion are linked, if not synonymous—a presumption that turns out to be prescient in light of
what follows in this dissertation; though not, of course, for the reasons they would suspect. The 2-million-Euro
project is based at Oxford’s School of Anthropology. Details are available at:
http://www.anthro.ox.ac.uk/latest/news/article/date///explaining-religion-conference/.
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nonchalantly the reason for the scientific project: “Religion cries out for a biological
explanation”.10
We might describe the cosmogony which results from these influences as “evolutionary
ethics”.11 Some theorists claim that, given enough scientific evidence, all moralistic
behaviors can be explained within the terms of this non-teleological cosmogony, and
therefore the idea that morality somehow derives from a transcendent spiritual reality should
be considered incoherent, meaningless and outdated. This interpretation argues that
theological ethics represents an incoherent expression of reality, and should therefore be
considered to be merely a self-delusional state of mind that either serves the interests of an
animal’s genetic reproduction, or is a spandrel of those same evolutionary factors.12 Sobel
and Wilson, advocates of evolutionary psychology, represent this point of view—they find no
fundamental difference between the altruism of human beings and the reproductive cycle of
the trematode parasite Dicrocoelium dendriticum which takes the form of a “brain worm”
which bores into an ant’s nervous system.13 On this view, compassionate altruism and brain
worm parasitism each fulfill the same reproductive purposes.14 These views of human nature
pose a major question for theological anthropology in light of modern pressures of
interpretation: What is the conscience? Is it a natural capacity marked by intellectual powers,
perhaps even a genetically favored capacity carried in DNA? Is it an aspect of the
supernatural soul of a person? Or is it merely an artifact of the experience of consciousness—
10 “Where Angels No Longer Fear to Tread”, The Economist, 22 March 2008.
11 E.g., Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Pantheon) 327ff, and The Evolution of God (New York:
Brown, 2009) 77.
12 This makes altruism a challenging problem within evolutionary explanations. Richard Swinburne observes
that “Altruistic behavior is a central feature of animal behavior”; Swinburne, Evolution of the Soul (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1986) 219. In his attempt to reconcile altruism with evolutionary ethics, Swinburne illustrates
the degree of imagination required to do so: “A human race which is clever enough to have a morality will be
too clever to have for long that apparently incoherent morality which will give the best advantage in the struggle
for survival. It will, however, be clever enough to survive despite its more coherent morality being less than
perfectly suited for survival” (139ff). He cites the similar view of Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle (New
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981).
13 Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolutionary Psychology of Unselfish Behavior
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 18.
14 We should not be surprised then that Robert Wright’s conclusion extends the problem of altruism to the
problem of love. He concludes that love should be doubted, because “After all, love, like hate, exists only by
virtue of its past contribution to genetic proliferation”; Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Pantheon, 1994)
340-1. idea that ethical sensibilities are attributable to natural selection is an idea that can be traced back at least
as far as Darwin: “the following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal
whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts,… would inevitably acquire a moral sense of conscience,
as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed as in man”; Charles Darwin,
The Descent of Man, second edition (London: John Murray, 1875) 98.
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a name we give to feelings related to certain behaviors? Perhaps it is none of the above.15
Following Darwin’s lead, Frans de Waal offers an explanation currently popular among
evolutionary psychologists—
Conscience is not some disembodied concept that can be understood only on the basis
of culture and religion. Morality is as firmly grounded in neurobiology as anything else we
do or are.16
On this view, conscience is not a thing (i.e., ding an sich); but rather, conscience is a
property or phenomenological description of bio-physical states of mind related to behavior
in which the organism (a human being, say) perceives feelings of comfort or discomfort
which it perceives as being related to the decisions involved in behavioral choices. This
concept finds support in the vast and growing body of evidence for physicalist and biological
explanations of human behavior. Thus, evolutionary ethicists and even some theologians
have come to the conclusion that conscience, moral reasoning, religious faith and other
capacities of human consciousness are all to be conceived as phenomenological descriptions
of traits determined by objectifiable bio-physical states. It is hardly surprising therefore that
the Oxford consortium seeks to “explain” religion and moral reasoning in terms of bio-
physics and evolutionary psychology.
Perhaps more significant for our study here are the theologians who would seem to
endorse this same view. The primary difference between the theologians and the evolutionary
psychologists is that the theologians decline the seemingly obvious implication of their
physicalist conjectures: namely, that physicalism, simpliciter, equates to determinism, and
therefore presents an indubitably severe obstacle to orthodox doctrines of freedom, sin and
atonement. Of the several physicalist views of theological anthropology which have been
recently proposed,17 the version of non-reductive physicalism (NRP) presented by Murphy,
Ellis and Brown provides perhaps the clearest example of the issue being raised with respect
15 Indeed, John Webster shows that an evangelical concept of “conscience and the moral field” fails to be
defined by such categories. He points to the need for a “theological renovation of conscience”, with reference to
the tortuous paths of modern theological ethics; Webster, ‘God and Conscience’, Calvin Theological Journal 33
no 1 (1998): 104-24, 104.
16 de Waal cites the curious case of Phineas Gage, who in 1848 suffered a “hideous accident” which drove a
metal rod through his head, wiped out part of his brain, and left him with an altered capacity for moral
deliberation. Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) 216-7.
17 Marc Cortez, Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies (PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 2006)
12, presents a thorough taxonomy of these, including: Nonreductive physicalism (Van Gulick), Dual-aspect
monism (Jeeves), Constitutional materialism (Corcoran), Emergent monism (O’Conner) and
Reductionism/materialism (Dennett, Churchland, et. al.).
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to evangelical ethics.18 Since NRP presumes that all human behavior is based wholly in
physical, objectifiable and ultimately observable states,19 theological ethics and evolutionary
ethics can be reconciled on the basis of their shared ontological presumptions regarding
human nature and the moral order. The proponents of NRP consider this reconciliation of
theological and “natural” ethics to be a boon for dogmatics. I should like to examine that
claim carefully in the following chapters, paying particular attention to implications for
theological anthropology and trinitarian theology in general, in order to discern whether this
idea of reconciliation has imported epistemological presumptions at odds with evangelical
ethics.
Murphy, again representing the views of NRP, claims that moral reasoning can be
explained in terms of neurophysiology alone.20 Furthermore, she claims NRP “explains
neurobiologically why an approach to moral analysis and moral education based on narrative
accounts of virtuous lives should be more effective than its competitor [sic].”21 To conclude
that morality is a function of educated proficiency in narrating exemplary biographies seems
to leave gaping holes in Christological and pneumatological doctrines, if not an outright
denial of the very idea of evangelical ethics. Indeed, the proponents of NRP are correct to
notice that “It could be argued that the experienced sense of moral obligation is an illusion.”22
This result of NRP is not surprising, however, given that it begins from the same starting
18 See: Nancey Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Fortress,1996); Warren Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, eds., Whatever Happened to the Soul?
Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress,1998); Warren S. Brown,
“Neurobiological Embodiment of Spirituality and Soul”, in From Cells to Souls – and Beyond: Changing
Portraits of Human Nature, ed. by Malcolm Jeeves (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004); Nancey Murphy,
“Nonreductive Physicalism”, in In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem, Joel B. Green
and Stuart L. Palmer, eds. (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2005) 115-152; Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls,
or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown,
Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility
and Free Will (New York Oxford University Press , 2007).
19 Warren Brown, Conclusion: Reconciling Scientific and Biblical Portraits of Human Nature’, in Whatever
Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature, Warren S. Brown, Nancey
Murphy and H. Newton Malony, eds. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998) 213-228, 228.
20 Nancey Murphy, ‘Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues’, in Whatever Happened to the Soul
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998) 127-148, 142.
21 Ibid.
22 Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress,1996) 16. In this
regard NRP seems well suited to provide, ironically, theological encouragement to atheistic titles such as
Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006).
Chapter 1: The Quest of Evangelical Ethics 8
principles as evolutionary ethics regarding the need to explain moral reasoning in terms of
materialistic chance and necessity.23
NRP serves to illustrate the challenging doctrinal implications these new strands of
theology present for theological anthropology. In particular, we notice the implications for
the idea of conscience. Is conscience merely “the experienced sense of moral obligation”, and
therefore to be considered a mere illusion? To put the answer in a nutshell, proponents of
NRP describe conscience as an emergent property. Jeeves sums up the idea of emergence at
work in NRP theory—through evolutionary development, the biological complexity of
organisms increases to the point where “something approaching the nature of evidence for a
conscience emerges”. Thus,
[C]onscience is not some disembodied concept that can be understood only on the basis
of culture and religion. Again, to quote de Waal, “Morality is as firmly grounded in
neurobiology as anything else we do or are.”24
The idea here is that conscience and consciousness emerge as properties of any
sufficiently complex biological “thinking-machine”, which is of course a handy analogy in
the computer age.25 The idea of what it means to be human thus begins to take on properties
related to information-processing. This has implications for the doctrine of imago Dei,26 as
we shall see in the following chapters, for the computing analogy reinforces the idea that
23 Murphy and Ellis sound remarkably close to the intentions of the Explaining Religion project when they
position the rationale for their book as an effort to meet “the need for an objective grounding for morality”; On
the Moral Nature of the Universe (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress,1996) 1.
24 Malcolm Jeeves, ‘The Nature of Persons and the Emergence of Kenotic Behavior’, in Work of Love: Creation
and Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001) 83. Warren Brown emphasizes that “the
term “emergent” does not here refer to emergent entities or to new physical forces, but rather to emergent levels
of causal efficacy. On these grounds he is able to defend NRP as being merely the deductive conclusion of
“emergent monism”; Brown, ‘Neurobiological Embodiment of Spirituality and Soul’, in From Cells to Souls -
and Beyond, ed. by Malcolm Jeeves (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) 65. Jeeves prefers to state his own view in
terms of “irreducible intrinsic interdependence, which manifests duality without dualism”, in order to avoid
some nuances of Brown’s theory; Jeeves, ‘Toward a Composite Portrait of Human Nature’, in From Cells to
Souls - and Beyond, 241.
25According to Hoyle, the answer to “What are we?” is simple—“each of us is a complex electronic computer.”
Sir Fred Hoyle, Man in the Universe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) 31.
26 To describe conscience as an emergent property leads immediately to the suggestion that ethics is also a
function of emergence brought about through the highly specialized intelligence of Homo sapiens. In his Gifford
Lectures, Holmes Rolston, III supports this view, and he shows how it leads directly to serious implications for
the doctrine of imago Dei: “[T]here is a profound sense in which we humans in the twentieth century, in an age
of science, turning the next millennium, know for the first time who and where we are.” Rolston, Genes,
Genesis and God: Values and Their Origins in Natural and Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999) 213. Sadly, he also shows how the presumptions of evolutionary ethics can lead to poor exegesis.
From his view that altruism is an evolved trait rooted in Darwinian selection, he takes Deuteronomy 6:24-25 out
of context and cites it as an example of tit-for-tat thinking which serves the selfish genes of the Hebrews; 218f.
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what defines the essence of humanity (i.e., the humanum) is the capacity for rational thought.
If given sway in theological anthropology, this concept tends to imply that moral reason is a
sufficient (if not the sole) means of discernment of moral reality. This idea too will reappear
in the analysis to follow.
Dialog within our secular age
Already we can see the challenge that the intellectual momentum of our age presents for
communication of an evangelical ethic which can be understood as relevant. Our analysis will
therefore face the challenge of discovering how our thesis regarding evangelical ethics and
the transformation of persons (not merely of neurons) can engage in dialog with the current
strands of theology and science. This challenge seems formidable enough, yet the pressures
upon theological interpretation today do not come only from the direction of scientific
progress. There is a story to be told also of the tectonic movements in philosophy and the
cultural imagination. It’s not our task to tell that story here, but rather we shall take note of it
as we pay attention to the ways these movements of thought affect the analytical exercise
awaiting us in these pages.27 The modern idea of the “self” (and equally importantly, the
“Self” with a capital “S”) has serious consequences for the development of theological ethics.
Taylor provides a particularly useful analysis of how these modern conceptions of the self
express themselves within the social imaginary in terms of the “Modern Moral Order”
(MMO).28 On Taylor’s view the modern moral imaginary is shaped by the “disembedding” of
the self from the universe of meaning. No longer do identity and moral significance derive
from their context in the web of creation. Rather than living in an “enchanted” universe
dappled with meaning, we now live in the “disenchanted” universe, wherein each person is
defined as an autonomous self and left to their own devices to discover their identity and
discern moral reality.
The effect of these intellectual and cultural mindsets is to create an “epistemic-moral
predicament” caused by a shift in worldviews, which favors materialistic explanations of
27 Others have told the story of the intellectual and cultural imaginary with far more insight and beauty than we
could attempt—Charles Taylor, Jacques Barzun, Stanley Hauerwas, Anthony Thiselton and John Milbank, to
name but a few.
28 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007).
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reality and hermeneutical presumptions compatible with modern science.29 This shift has
spawned “a revolution in our understanding of moral order”,30 brought about through the
influences of new understandings of what it means to be a self, a human being, a pulsating
vessel of genetic information of sufficient complexity to display emergent phenomenological
properties such as consciousness, conscience, “soulishness”,31 and so on. The advent of the
MMO thus creates a new set of pressures for theological interpretation that are far removed
from the influences of those “embedded” in or “bestowed” upon “pre-Enlightenment
Christianity”.32
The emphasis of the MMO upon new concepts of the self affects theological ethics much
as it does secular moral philosophy. The modern concept of the self is however far from
monolithic in either secular or Christian thought; there exists a “large number of cultural
possibilities which compete for the self in the contemporary context”.33 Both are subject to
the new pressures to interpret moral reality in terms of the autonomous, rational self. As we
have seen already in the very few examples mentioned above, this fragmentation is as
widespread in Christian as in secular thought.34 Because ethics deals with ultimate values
and ultimate ends, epistemological presumptions play a crucial role in outcomes. Where you
begin is where you end. Thus, our analysis of evangelical ethics will need to keep a weather
eye upon the hermeneutical fronts driving the development of theological doctrine, in order to
29 Taylor, A Secular Age, 366.
30 Taylor, A Secular Age, 157.
31 This is the term of choice for NRP proponents who wish to avoid reference to the “soul” in any form that
would lend ontological significance the idea. While proponents of NRP do not presume that science can ever
prove that the soul does not exist, they do intend to show that rather than having ontological reality, “soul is
manifest in the potentialities, characteristics, or attributes that allow humans to be related to others, to the self,
and to God”; Warren S. Brown, ‘Conclusion: Reconciling Scientific and Biblical Portraits of Human Nature’, in
Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress,
1998) 225. On this view, it is better to use ‘soulishness’ as an adjectival noun rather than soul as a nominal
reality. Jeeves identifies the distinctive component of “soulishness” as being “the capacity for social
relationships [which] is itself, according to evolutionary theory, an evolved capacity…different from those of
our nearest, nonhuman primate relatives.” Jeeves, ‘Mind Reading and Soul Searching in the Twenty-first
Century’, in From Cells to Souls - and Beyond (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) 27.
32 See Taylor, A Secular Age, and Linda Woodhead, ‘Theology and the Fragmentation of the Self’, International
Journal of Systematic Theology 1 (1999): 53-72, 61.
33 Woodhead, op. cit.
34 David Brooks sums up the prevailing sense of confusion over the location of the moral self: “There still seem
to be such things as selves, which are capable of making decisions and controlling destiny. It’s just that these
selves can’t be seen on a brain-mapping diagram, and we no longer have any agreement about what they are”;
“The Morality Line”, New York Times, 19 April 2007.
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identify any epistemological presumptions which might be tacitly imported into explanations
of the moral order.35
There are two salient hermeneutical pressures at work here, each of which is propagated
by the impetus of the disembedding of the self from the universe. First, in the new
“disenchanted” universe, self-understanding comes no longer through the personal feeling of
connection with God’s creation—enchanted, as it is, by virtue of its being the source and
context of all meaning—but rather, concepts of identity and moral significance in the
disenchanted universe are now presumed to be self-determined. That is to say, our
cosmogony of meaning has become grounded within a self-derived conception, rather than an
objective and pre-existent ontology.36 The disembedded self thus becomes the autonomous
creator of its own identity, as well as the progenitor of its own moral reality. This has the
effect of suggesting that morality exists merely in the mind of the beholder. Thus, human
capacities of discernment and reason come to dominate the moral imagination. If this
capacity is, in turn, considered to be dominated by personal religious experience, it can lead
to a voluntaristic form of divine-command morality.37 In keeping with the scientific mindset
of our secular age, however, this personal discernment is typically considered to function
through the exercise of the human capacity of reason. In either case, the autonomy of the
disembedded self places a premium upon individualism.
Second, the disembedding of the self suggests that the universe may be treated as an
objective (or at least, objectifiable) reality, which is, ontologically speaking, separate and
distinct from the self. By extension, this means that the structures and orders of the universe
may now be presumed to be accessible through the human powers of discernment and reason.
This emphasis upon the objectivity of reality also reinforces nicely the dominant scientific
heuristic of the age, and it speaks in favor of a point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt).
35 Woodhead, op. cit., 69, offers insightful examples to demonstrate that “the contemporary debate about
selfhood is an intra-Christian as well as a secular one”; therefore the fragmentation thesis deserves careful
nuance.
36 Douglas Porpora has studied empirically the loss of meaning experienced in our present-day culture and finds
it to emanate from just such a disconnection from a sacred ontology. He comes to the conclusion that: “our
cosmic disorientation is itself a consequence of an emotional disconnection from the sacred. It is a consequence
of our estrangement both from a certain range of emotions and from a vocabulary through which those emotions
might be understood”; Porpora, Landscapes of the Soul: The Loss of Moral Meaning in American Life (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 153.
37 Colin Gunton rightly names the embarrassing issue stemming from the construal of theological ethics as being
determined at the whim of personal experience: “How do we avoid the charge of arbitrariness, of sheer
assertion?”; ‘No Other Foundation: One Englishman’s Reading of Church Dogmatics, Chapter v’, in Reckoning
with Barth: Essays in Commemoration of the Centenary of Karl Barth’s Birth (Oxford: Mowbray, 1988) 61-79,
74. Gunton links this charge to Barth’s emphasis upon “the fundamental reality of … our indwelling in Christ”,
65.
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Thus, individualism and the objectification of moral reality are the twin offspring of the
disembedded self and the disenchanted universe. The synergy between these outcomes
produces a new pressure in the direction of immediacy for moral knowledge. That is to say,
access to moral knowledge is presumed to be a personal matter not requiring mediation by
God or any other party. This effect holds true whether morality is considered to be a personal
and subjective matter existing within the mind of the beholder, or an objective reality which
is “out there”. In either case, the very concept of revelation becomes an embarrassment to the
academic discipline of theology as practiced in our secular age.
Sense and nonsense
This is why Colin Gunton is right to begin his treatise on revelation by asking the
question, “Why are we embarrassed by the concept?”—the concept of revealed religion, that
is.38 Gunton explains that ever since Hegel, “theology has been dominated by quests for
different forms of immediacy”.39 Revealed religion has become an embarrassment. This is
the predicament imposed upon theology by the precepts of the moral imaginary in our secular
age. Theologians are therefore placed in the challenging and embarrassing predicament of
being asked to “say something theological”, which as Hauerwas points out, is a challenge in
the form of a question that doesn’t believe in the possibility of a cogent answer. The implied
challenge is this: “Say something theological in a way that convinces me that you are not
talking nonsense.”40 The question is phrased so as to rule out the possibility of an answer, for
the presumption is implicit—there can be no such thing as revealed truth, because our
modern moral imagination disdains (if not rejects outright) revealed truth. Robert Wright
represents the view of contemporary secular humanism when he concludes matter-of-factly:
“The fact that there’s a moral order out there doesn’t mean there’s a God.” 41 The clear
implication is that revelation is superfluous to moral knowledge.
38 Colin Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) 2.
39 Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation, 3-4.
40 Stanley Hauerwas, “On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological”, in Revisions: Changing Perspectives in
Moral Philosophy, ed. by Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame,
1983), 16.
41 Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Pantheon, 2009) 434. He concludes of the Abrahamic faiths:
“Certainly things are looking bad for the traditional claim that they’re religions of special revelation”, 432).
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This is the intellectual climate of our culture into which theology speaks today. If we are
to agree that the moral order is out there, how then are we to speak with any credibility of
Christian ethics and dogmatics, which are based in special revelation? How are theologians to
respond to these many and various pressures in the direction of replacing revelation (and
especially special revelation) with various forms of immediacy with respect to the moral
order? Thus we see that the issue of epistemic access to the moral order lies at the heart of
evangelical ethics, for the euangelion proceeds by faith. This same controversy over
epistemic access figured prominently in the Barth-Brunner debate of the previous century.
Though that debate is categorized famously as a disagreement over the concept of natural
theology, the crucial issue concerns epistemic access to revealed truth. As we shall see, one
particular concept which emerges from that debate deserves our focused attention here—
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, a concept pertaining to the human capacity to perceive moral
order, and the capacity of the creation to reveal moral order. These ideas figure centrally in
the Barth-Brunner debate, and we shall see how they cast a useful lens onto the course of
O’Donovan’s evangelical ethics. By means of this focal point, we shall examine the mutual
implications of theological anthropology and evangelical ethics. This examination will shed
light the questions surveyed above, for it is here that all roads seem to intersect—
neurobiology, evolutionary psychology, the social imaginary, and the epistemological
presumptions of dogmatics, faith, revelation and the creeds all intersect in evangelical ethics.
High-water marks of polemics & deep waters of epistemological
presumptions
In our analysis, we shall need to pay scrupulous attention to the epistemological
presumptions contained within the development of doctrine pertaining to a point of contact
for knowledge of the moral order. This is for the simple reason that the very concept of such a
point of contact is itself an epistemological presumption.42 In terms of polemical energy, I
can identify two high-water marks which involved debate over the concept and possibility of
42 Gunton warns wisely of the need to avoid fundamentalism, by checking epistemological presumptions at the
door: “What is foundationalism? Broadly speaking, it is the belief that there must be universal and common
epistemic foundations for anything claiming to be thought, or authentically ‘scientific’, foundations moreover
which are determinable in advance of any particular object of enquiry.” Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation,
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) 48.
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an Anknüpfungspunkt for theological ethics. The first is the Barth-Brunner debate of the Nazi
era, from whence sprung their invectives regarding the possibility of an Anknüpfungspunkt
and the meaning of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, the Barmen Declaration, and the great stream
of follow-on references, both in their own works, as well as in the works of many
commentators who took up the standards on both sides of the so-called debate over “natural
theology”. The rubric “natural theology”, adopted by so many commentators to refer to the
famous “debate” can be perhaps a bit misleading, for although Brunner and Barth did indeed
disagree over the viability of “natural theology” (theologia naturalis), they focused their
remarks upon the underlying issues: doctrines of grace, revelation, imago, and the question
whether there is a point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt), which pertain to the epistemological
premises upon which a theologia naturalis might be constructed.43 Barth gets to the real
issue of the debate quickly—
[W]e must learn again to understand revelation as grace and grace as revelation and
therefore turn away from all “true” or “false” theologia naturalis by ever making new
decisions and being ever controverted anew.44
The debate over natural theology does not center on the question of whether order is
discernible within the creation (or “cosmos” or “universe”, if you prefer to avoid cognates of
the verb “create”).45 On this point the Psalmists and New Atheists can all agree: yes, order is
there. The more interesting question is rather: on what basis do you claim epistemic access to
ethical understanding of the moral order? The real problem in the Barth-Brunner debate is
the doctrine of revelation which undergirds the concept of a theologia naturalis. How you
answer that question will determine your doctrine of revelation, which in turn has
implications for doctrines of theological anthropology, Christology and pneumatology, as we
shall soon see. Barth thus captures the essential issue at hand—a doctrine of revelation as
grace has implications for the event of personal transformation (i.e., “being ever controverted
43 Brunner titles his closing section of Natur & Gnade, “The Significance of Theologia Naturalis for Theology
and the Church”, and Barth picks up in his response, “Nein!” where Brunner left off, by intoning, “But my soul
is innocent of ever even having dreamt of the idea that it was a task of our theological generation to find the way
back to a ‘true theologia naturalis’!” Nein! 70.
44 Nein! 71.
45 Ontological issues related to the structure of the universe, including its moral order, could be addressed within
a theology of nature, without challenging Barth’s appeal to “revelation as grace”. McGrath, for one, has made
respectable strides in this regard, though when he claims to offer a “Trinitarian natural theology”, he has
substantially redefined the term from what concerned Barth and Brunner in their debate of theologia naturalis.
McGrath’s Trinitarian natural theology functions more like a theology of nature. Alister McGrath, A Fine-Tuned
Universe (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009).
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anew”) as a component of moral knowledge, and as an indicator of the shape of the moral
order. As we have seen in the preceding analysis of the pressures upon direction of
interpretation, the tendency is to replace revelation by one or another theory of immediacy as
comprising the means of epistemic access to the moral order. Barth has stated crisply what he
determines to be the decisive factor—to understand revelation as grace and grace as
revelation, and the implications of this doctrine for personal transformation. The implications
of Barth’s view will feature prominently in our analysis.
The second high-water mark in polemics has occurred just recently here at the turn of the
millennium. The current spate of arguments pits the so-called “New Atheists”46 against just
about everyone else. The New Atheism proclaims religion to be a fatally flawed and
dangerous delusion—an unfortunate, deadly, and even “evil”, spandrel of the evolutionary
process. We need say no more about this new strain of exhortation (or “meme” as the case
might be) other than to note how it generates yet one more pressure in the direction of non-
teleological interpretation. The New Atheists can claim to draw support from the pretext that
the MMO is based in the hermeneutic principles of the objective physical sciences. They
claim, presumptively, that whatever moral order is contained within the structure of the
universe and the humanum, these can be considered with certainty to be accessible to the
innate, universal, natural powers of human reason.47
Pressing on into evangelical ethics, with Oliver O’Donovan
In the midst of the fractious intellectual climate of the moral and cultural imaginary,
Oliver O’Donovan speaks with an interesting voice as a teacher of moral philosophy and
Christian ethics who is not ashamed of the Gospel. He directly confronts the challenge to
“say something theological” in the midst of these pressures. This is, in fact, his stated goal,
which is why he has sometimes been somewhat unfairly accused of endeavoring to promote
46 This is the moniker widely applied to the proclamations of Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, and
Christopher Hitchens. Greg Epstein offers a variant of this view, expressing sympathy for the New Atheism, yet
he proposes Humanism as a better type of atheism, because on his view Humanism avoids nihilism. Epstein,
Good Without God: What a Billion Nonreligious People Do Believe (New York: HarperCollins, 2009). Cf.
Taylor refers to the new “hard-line materialistic atheism”; A Secular Age, 676.
47 For a quick assessment of the New Atheists’ preaching, see Alan Germani, ‘The Mystical Ethics of the New
Atheists’, The Objective Standard 3 (2008): . Germani demonstrates, by non-theological, yet philosophical
reasoning, that the message of the New Atheism is “hopelessly non-objective.”
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Christendom (an endeavor that, as Hauerwas opines, “almost borders on the absurd”48),
because in the eyes of our secular age, Christian faith is all the more tarnished as a result of
accusations directed against the overweening pride of Christendom. O’Donovan parries the
accusations of fideism which come from all sides of the debate over the concept of the moral
order. He insists that theological ethics must be pursued intellectually in sympathy with the
purposes of metaphysics, and yet remain intrinsically and unabashedly evangelical. In this
endeavor, he claims to be guided by “systematic rather than apologetic factors.”49 He seeks a
path of well-balanced reason through the mixture of interpretive pressures, and tries to remain
in dialog with the voices of this secular age. Moreover, he is not afraid to take on the hard
questions which crop up regularly in our newspaper headlines, all the while striving to
espouse the values of Christendom without embarrassment.50 He has written cogently and
explicitly on just war theory, nuclear deterrence, procreation technology and sexual ethics,
for example. All this makes O’Donovan’s work most interesting in light of the questions
raised by our thesis, both in theological subject matter and with attentiveness to the pressures
of interpretation.
Our analysis will focus on Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical
Ethics (1986, 1994),51 widely considered O’Donovan’s seminal work on the subject of
evangelical ethics. O’Donovan has followed R&MO with The Desire of the Nations (1996)52
and Ways of Judgment (2005),53 completing an ad hoc trilogy of sorts, as he sharpens his
focus upon political theology and political ethics, and builds upon the foundation laid in
R&MO. Two compendiums of articles combined with O’Donovan’s responses to his partners
in dialog have also appeared, and these also focus on O’Donovan’s political theology and
political ethics, paying relatively scant attention to the issues of personal transformation and
48 Hauerwas, with James Fodor, ‘Remaining in Babylon: Oliver O’Donovan’s Defense of Christendom’, in
Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1997):199-224, 199.
49 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (2nd ed.; Leicester,
England: Apollos; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994) viii.
50 To wit, this closing line from Bonds of Imperfection: “We may well shed tears for the nation-state and lament
the fragility of its good”, Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, Bonds of Imperfection: Christian
Politics, Past and Present (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) 320.
51 Hereafter, R&MO, referring to the second edition.
52 Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996). Hereafter, DN.
53 Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgment (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 2005). This monograph is taken from
The Bampton Lectures, 2003. Hereafter, WJ.
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theological anthropology which concern us here.54 R&MO therefore occupies a prime place
of importance in our analysis, and augmented by several of O’Donovan’s other monographs
and articles.
While O’Donovan has drawn wide attention for his work in evangelical ethics and
political theology, the implications of his evangelical ethics have not been particularly well
pursued in the directions indicated by our thesis. Bretherton55 and Burger56 have each written
extensively on O’Donovan’s concept of moral order, and touch upon the themes that concern
us here, but neither of them has recognized the depth of the issues we will be analyzing here;
nor have they dealt fully with the implications of his epistemology, which he labels
“evangelical realism”, for theological anthropology. No other studies of O’Donovan’s
evangelical ethics have analyzed specifically the mutual implications of his method and the
development of a doctrine of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit.
While Burger titles his chapter on O’Donovan “Moral Reality”, he does not really
explain what that means, digging into neither the ontological implications for theological
anthropology, nor the epistemological method employed. Nor does Burger effectively address
the significance of O’Donovan’s emphasis on moral reality for the doctrine of “being in
Christ”. He states this emphasis clearly enough, but then moves quickly past it without
drawing connections to doctrinal implications for theological anthropology. Still, Burger has
done a good service by providing a careful reading of O’Donovan in order to expose the
strengths and degrees with which O’Donovan plays upon the various notes that comprise the
multi-dimensional concept of “being in Christ”. Burger also covers the Scriptural references
appropriate to his analysis in a full and effective way. Sadly, however, he leaves unexamined
the significant eschatological implications of O’Donovan’s concept of “being in Christ”, not
least, the significance this carries for moral reality and the concept of the moral order.
Bretherton’s interests complement Burger’s. While Burger is interested in the ontological
significance of “being in Christ”, which figures prominently in O’Donovan’s realism,
Bretherton is more interested to address the epistemological pressures entailed in dialog with
the secular age. As we shall see, these deserve to be considered together. Bretherton’s goal is
54 Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, Bonds of Imperfection: Christian Politics, Past and
Present (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004); Craig G. Bartholomew, et al., A Royal Priesthood? The Use of the
Bible Ethically and Politically: A Dialogue with Oliver O'Donovan; Scripture and Hermeneutics Series, 3
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2002).
55 Luke Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness: Christian Witness Amid Moral Diversity (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
2006).
56 Hans Burger, Being in Christ: a Biblical and Systematic Investigation in a Reformed Perspective (Eugene,
OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008).
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to “develop a coherently theological account of whether Christians can resolve ethical
disputes with their non-Christian neighbours in the contemporary context.”57 He uses
O’Donovan’s evangelical ethics to critique MacIntyre’s more philosophical ethics, in pursuit
of the question, whether Christian ethics can find common ground with other ethics in an age
of relativism.58 Bretherton has read O’Donovan closely.59 He exegetes O’Donovan’s
evangelical ethics in detail, paying particular attention to the distinction O’Donovan makes
between “the ontology of creation” and “the epistemological issues of how we know that
order.”60 In this regard, Bretherton comes much closer to the issues of concern in my thesis,
yet he does not follow them through to discover their implications for systematic theology.
He seems rather to endorse O’Donovan’s realism without further critical analysis of its
implications. Bretherton concludes logically from his reading of O’Donovan that the
economic Trinity is active in “conversion” as the event in which morality is understood
coherently. Thus, his conclusion is clear: all other modes of understanding—other than the
active cognition grounded in the light of “who Jesus Christ is”—are incoherent. Nonetheless,
Bretherton goes on to say something that sounds strikingly contradictory:
O’Donovan understands nature to have an unmediated authority and Divine authority to
be the only secure means by which to determine normative moral thought and action…61
How can it be that on the one hand, awareness of “who Jesus Christ is” (or at least
awareness that this is the operative question) is the sole criterion for coherent understanding,
and yet on the other hand, nature has “unmediated authority”? Is this not a systemically
inconsistent approach to knowledge of the moral order? This is precisely the question we
must pursue further here.62
57 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 61.
58 Bretherton Hospitality as Holiness, 72.
59 Bretherton devotes a full chapter of his dissertation to “Oliver O’Donovan and the distinctiveness of Christian
ethics”; Hospitality as Holiness, 61-91.
60 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 64. Cf, “clarification of ontological and epistemological issues in ethics
underpins one of the central thrusts of O’Donovan’s work.” Rather than analysis of this thrust, Bretherton
seems to accept it rather uncritically and commend O’Donovan for “separating the ontological from the
epistemological issues”; 64-5.
61 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 70.
62 To give Bretherton due credit, he does propose an answer to these questions. With apparent concern to clarify
what he means by these conflicting statements, Bretherton goes on to explain that there are two types of
morality—“Morality of itself is grounded in the creation or natural order. Moral action is not”; Hospitality as
Holiness, 70. Bretherton adds an additional clarification: “The term ‘morality’ refers to the moral order as a
totality”; 70. But does not ‘the moral order as a totality’ contain both the moral subject as well as moral action?
Perhaps Bretherton is proposing here some other ethereal or idealized view of morality as a conception above
and apart from the real-life moral deliberations and actions with which we struggle in our daily lives. If so, this
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Outline of dissertation
I shall begin by examining O’Donovan’s outline for evangelical ethics, paying close
attention to R&MO. Chapter 2 presents a detailed analysis of his view of the moral order,
producing a distillate of the key strands from which a dogmatic statement of moral reality
could be developed, consistent with his presentation of moral reality and moral knowledge.
Chapter 3 builds upon this groundwork by identifying the implications which arise from
O’Donovan’s critical methodology—“evangelical realism” is his term for it. Here we begin
to see the issues take shape which stem from the direction of the pressures of interpretation to
which he responds. These include the perils of naturalism and the risk of arbitrariness that he
wishes to expunge from the vestiges of divine command theory and which he finds to linger
ominously in the wake of Kierkegaard and Barth. In response to these challenges,
O’Donovan articulates the significance of “participation in Christ” as a lynchpin for his
method, and we shall pay more attention to the implications of his doctrine here as we view it
in terms of the Barth-Brunner debate.
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, analyzes its role in the Barth-
Brunner debate, and draws out the implications of O’Donovan’s realism by comparison with
the theological anthropologies of Barth and Brunner. I close this chapter with a case study
based on O’Donovan’s comparison of Barth with O’Donovan’s mentor, Paul Ramsey. This
case study addresses O’Donovan’s concern over “why there was no analogue to the
humanum assumptum in his [Barth’s] political theory.”63 Here we see the implications of
O’Donovan’s realism come more clearly into focus.
Chapter 5 examines the intrinsic connection between the concept of moral order and the
epistemic role of faith, which presents a challenge to O’Donovan’s program of realism. It is
here that I diagnose the effect of O’Donovan’s realism in terms of “cutting the
Kierkegaardian Knot”. This pertains to O’Donovan’s effort to avoid paradoxical elements of
faith which he perceives as working at cross purposes to his evangelical realism. Again, a
would appear to be a movement away from evangelical ethics, and into metaphysics. In this regard, Bretherton
takes his lead from O’Donovan: “It is a matter of finding the right qualification for one’s general rule of action”;
R&MO, 96. Cf. “The form of the moral life will be that of an ordered moral field of action on the one hand, and
of an ordered moral subject of action on the other”; R&MO, 183; cf. xiv, 119, 127.
63 O’Donovan, ‘Karl Barth and Ramsey’s “Uses of Power”’, Journal of Religious Ethics 19 no 2 (1991): 1-30,
27.
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case study closes the chapter as a practice of applying the insights gained by the analytical
work of the chapter.
Chapter 6 brings together the results of my analysis to present the thesis in full
consideration of all the issues examined. This chapter pays special attention to the role of
faith and the event of metanoia in the perception of the moral order and the acquisition of
moral knowledge. Here we see that the cosmology (i.e. cosmogony) of faith emerges as a
critical hermeneutic factor in the development of doctrine pertaining to evangelical ethics.
Finally, the concluding Chapter 7 draws out practical implications of our thesis. We see
the central place of prayer and worship in evangelical ethics, and point out implications for
teaching. Lastly, we show practical applications of our thesis by examining the bio-ethical
issues of human reproductive technologies, with special attention to O’Donovan’s work,
Begotten or Made?
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2 THE CONCEPT OF MORAL ORDER
Love is the lesson which the Lord has taught.1
Edmund Spenser, Amoretti. Sonnet 68.
In Pursuit of Moral Reality
How is the reality of the moral order within the cosmos to be conceived? Is it objectively
immanent and ontologically absolute, standing impassibly aloof and unaffected by the
particular vantage of any observer? Or does it move and shift in the psychological and
noumenal depths of human experience, emerging ultimately as a subjective and personal
perception? The current prevailing winds of subjectivity, whipped up as they have been by
modern individualism, create a distinct pressure in the direction of relativism based in the
popular presumption that reality exists, like beauty, solely “in the eye of the beholder”. Our
modern inclination is to be a “buffered self”, as Taylor calls it; that is, a self buffered from
1 O’Donovan sums up the penultimate chapter of R&MO with this Spenser verse, 244.
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the fideistic constraints of a greater spiritual reality.2 This modern inclination “to conceive
ourselves as free individuals first”, rather than to locate self-understanding of identity and
morality within the greater reality of an “enchanted universe” as the source and context of
meaning, has profoundly and irrevocably altered our understanding of the moral order. Taylor
refers to this revolution as “the great disembedding”,3 because our concepts of self and
morality are no longer infused with meaning by virtue of being embedded within a universal
spiritual reality. The impact of this revolution in self-understanding is that moral judgment
becomes a merely personal matter, subject to the whims of personal experience rather than
standing firm as an objective reality which is ontologically prior to our experience of it.
Relativism thus becomes the bane of the modern buffered self, once objective concepts of
reality are rejected out of hand as being fideistic fictions. O’Donovan sums up the
predicament—
‘Relativism’, as the word is commonly used, is simply an aspect of voluntarism. It is a
posture of skepticism adopted in deliberative moral thought, in which we declare that
there is , in principle, no rational resolution available to our deliberations: … [there is]
nothing more than a bare choice, a raw exercise of the will… caught in the relativist
impasse.4
The relativist impasse is a direct result of the inclination of the modern “buffered self” to
locate meaning in subjective personal experience, rather than in the overarching context of a
transcendent and objectively knowable reality. In the extreme, relativism can become so
radically existential as to lapse ultimately into a solipsism that denies the possibility of
meaningful discourse in theological ethics. O’Donovan captures aptly the sense of the
buffered self wherein this radical individualism deconstructs the notion of an objectively real
moral order:
I have not understood the objectivity of my good, given to me in the order of the
universe as a reality which I can only acknowledge and welcome. At the heart of my
anxiety is the voluntarist supposition that my good is something which I create or evoke
for myself.5
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007) 146ff.
3 Taylor, A Secular Age, 131ff. O’Donovan respects the conception of the Tudor Reformers regarding the
division of church and state. In contrast, “the modern demarcation of a whole secular sphere of life, where the
word of God does not rule as of right but finds access only indirectly, shaping the conscience of certain
participants” may well “do more violence to the wide-ranging claims of the apostolic gospel than did the
mediaeval and Reformation attempts to abolish the line of separation entirely.” 39 Articles, 99-102.
4 R&MO, 220.
5 R&MO, 250.
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Existentialism is the root of the problem, not because it presents any challenge to the
objective reality of the moral order per se, but rather because it can lead to interpretations
which obscure the moral order behind a smokescreen of subjectivity. In the extreme case, this
kind of existentialism leads into voluntarism, which defeats the effort to articulate a
foundation for ethics based on the objective reality of moral order within God’s creation. The
problem with voluntarism is that by emphasizing personal choices determined through
irrational faith at the core of moral discernment, it can render moot the effort to ascertain
objective knowledge through rational thought.6 In the worst case, this type of subjectivity in
ethics constrains meaningful discourse to function within a “closed circle” of like-minded
individuals who share in common the same esoteric “faith-ethic”.7 O’Donovan rightly names
the danger of building ethics upon such an infirm foundation:
The voluntarist artifice yields evil consequences if it is mistaken for a statement of cold
truth.8
Voluntarism thus supplants rational moral deliberation, and finds its impetus in the
apparently arbitrary and inaccessible personal experience of each observer’s private
“spontaneity of mood and emotion”,9 thus rendering the entire project of evangelical ethics
moot, because it subjugates efforts to communicate moral truth to the authority of esoteric
and personal ideas: “opted into by those who so choose, irrelevant to those who do not
choose.”10
It is against these prevailing winds of subjectivism that O’Donovan works to erect the
edifice of evangelical ethics as an unshakable objective reality capable of stopping the
vicissitudes of voluntarism.11 This he does by developing a doctrine of the moral order as
being objectively accessible to human reason. Yet he does so with a nod to the objective-
subjective antithesis, as he pays careful attention to the “antithesis of voluntarist and
6 Nigel Biggar recognizes this as the difficulty with Barth’s ethics: “the real problem with any concept of divine
command such as Barth’s is that it transcends rational assessment.” Biggar, The Hastening that Waits: Karl
Barth’s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) 24.
7 O’Donovan traces the formulation of this approach to Kierkegaard; R&MO, 16 (see Chapter 5).
8 R&MO, 49. Cf.: “When these voluntarist traditions are embodied in Christian devotion, they make for great
scrupulousness and lack of evangelical freedom”, 262.
9 R&MO, 119.
10 R&MO, 16. “Western moral thought since the Enlightenment has been predominantly ‘voluntarist’ in its
assumptions”, Ibid.
11 Voluntarism has continued to draw O’Donovan’s attention in more recent works, e.g., O’Donovan, Common
Objects of Love (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002) 15.
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rationalist understandings of morality”.12 He highlights the potential for error within each of
these opposing approaches, as well as the need to incorporate elements of both approaches if
we are to steer a safe course between them.13 Rationalism and voluntarism thus present
themselves as the Scylla and Charybdis of theological ethics, through which O’Donovan aims
to steer safely a course of realism to avoid running aground on either the rocks of rationalism,
or sinking in the whirlpools of voluntarism. O’Donovan refers to these dialectically opposed
poles as two complementary languages of theological ethics: “What the two languages do is
to draw our attention to different and complementary aspects of moral claims as we encounter
them.”14
Let us briefly define these two ‘languages’ of ethics. Voluntarism is the language of
ethics rooted in the divine command and its subjective experience. This offers a deontological
view of ethics wherein the role of the person as moral agent is to discern God’s commands
and act on them. This is, of course, a subjective experience, rooted in the agent’s relationship
with God. This view recognizes rightly the “aboriginal metaphysical fact that human reason
is not transcendent”15; that is to say, theological ethics will always contain an element of
mystery due to the supernatural dominion of God who exceeds human comprehension.16
Rationalism, on the other hand, provides a corrective to an overly subjective approach.
To the extent that objectivity is the opposite of subjectivity,17 the rational analysis of
objective facts will provide a corrective to irrational, subjective interpretations of personal
experiences. On O’Donovan’s view, the rational approach is rooted in a teleological
conception of ethics, where “teleological” is defined in terms of “pointing to any kind of
propriety or order within the world.”18 Thus,
12 R&MO, 137.
13 R&MO, 139. O’Donovan’s keynote address at The Grandeur of Reason conference (Rome, September 2008)
also touched on this antithesis. Benedict XVI, in his appeal to university faculties, emphasizes likewise these
same twinned errors which can derail the integration of faith and reason; Address to the University of
Regensburg, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections”, 12 September 2006.
14 R&MO, 139.
15 R&MO, 136.
16 Cf. “At best, of course, knowledge of the whole must be knowledge of a mystery.” R&MO, p. 49.
17 These terms are used as opposites in a particular metaphysical sense. As Barth has shown, “objective” and
“subjective” are not strictly opposites when they refer to knowledge of God, the “terminus a quo [and]
presupposition of all Christian doctrine”. Thus Barth holds these terms not to represent mutually exclusive
epistemologies, but rather to function in collaboration with each other; CD II.1, p. 179.
18 R&MO, 138.
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‘Teleological’ ethics, on the other hand, derives from the ontological conception of God
as the summum bonum, in which it was the task of moral reasoning to recognize and
respond to the ordered structures of being and good.19
Here then is the challenge O’Donovan sets for himself in his project to construct an
outline for evangelical ethics—to pursue a path of epistemological realism that navigates the
twin perils of voluntarism and rationalism, all the while pursuing “the task of moral reasoning
to recognize and respond to the ordered structures of being and good.” Implicit in this
statement we discern already a predilection to articulate moral reality in ontological concepts
of ordered structure, as an antidote to the winds of voluntarism which drive hapless voyagers
into the deconstructing vortex of voluntarism.
Love: the shape of evangelical ethics
The Gospel at the heart of evangelical ethics will not be so easily reduced to ordered
structures of ontological description. There is necessarily an irreducible mystery contained
within the evangelical witness, because the form and content of the Gospel are given in the
shape of a divine love—
Love is the overall shape of Christian ethics, the form of the human participation in
created order. It is itself ordered and shaped in accordance with the order that it
discovers in its object, and this ordering of love it is the task of substantive Christian
ethics to trace.20
Thus the task of evangelical ethics is to articulate the “ordering of love”. Love is the first and
last word. O’Donovan thus identifies the task of Christian ethics as being the pursuit of
“ordered structures of being and good”, as well as of love as “human participation in created
order”. Apparently the path of realism must maintain simultaneous consistency with the
ontological categories of ordered structures as well as the existential expressions of
participation in the mysterious love of Christ which forms the heart of the gospel and the
overall shape of Christian ethics.
19 R&MO, 138.
20 R&MO, 25-26. Cf. his closing sentences(264): “However much our moral decisions strive for clarity, they are
never unambiguous or translucent, even to ourselves. But – and is this not the gospel at the heart of evangelical
ethics? – it is given to them by God’s grace in Christ to add up to a final and unambiguous Yes, a work of love
which will abide for eternity.”
Chapter 2: The Concept of Moral Order 26
To describe morality in terms of love as being “the lesson the Lord has taught,” as
Spenser does in the sonnet quoted above, is to beg the questions: What kind of lesson is this?
And how is this lesson learned? There is unavoidable tension in this lesson taught by our
Lord—the inescapable tension of faith which trusts in the final and eternal redemption of our
moral failures.
O’Donovan paves the way toward answering these questions by pointing to the
resurrection as the key to making sense of the moral order. He sums up the radical direction
of his book in the claim that the resurrection is the unifying concept and overriding concern
of ethics—
No account of the Christian moral life can be adequate unless it is allowed to point
forward to the resurrection.21
The reason resurrection emerges as the principle lens onto the question of evangelical ethics
is because of the unique witness it provides in looking both forward and backward at the
same time. This ability to look through both ends of the telescope at once gives witness to the
tensions inherent in the gospel command of love. The Resurrection holds together the ethical
tensions of the Gospel—between sin and redemption, and between objective order and
subjective experience—without breaking. Witness to the Resurrection fulfills both the
Gospel’s kerygma of hope and the pronouncement of judgment. In this way the resurrection
bridges the gap between fallen creation and vindicated creation:
The resurrection of Christ, upon which Christian ethics is founded, vindicates the created
order in this double sense: it redeems it and it transforms it. … So it is that Christian
ethics, too, looks both backwards and forwards, to the origin and to the end of the
created order. 22
O’Donovan clearly recognizes the transformational capacity of resurrection to look both
forward and backward in time simultaneously, and he demonstrates its pivotal importance for
the construction of an evangelical ethic. He shapes his outline for evangelical ethics
according to the skeletal structure provided by the resurrection in witness to the tandem acts
of redeeming (looking back) and transforming (looking ahead) the creation.23 In this manner
21 R&MO, 249.
22 R&MO, 56, 58.
23 O’Donovan also expresses this polarity of perspectives in terms of ‘creation ethics’ vs. ‘kingdom ethics’—
“When I wrote Resurrection and Moral Order I was concerned to overcome the confrontation between
advocates of ‘creation ethics’ and of ‘kingdom ethics’, and I claimed that, in the resurrection of Christ, where
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he can develop a doctrine which reveals the transformational power of the resurrection, gives
shape to the ontological reality of the moral order, and reveals the teleological order present
in the creation.
In the process of developing this outline, O’Donovan does not skirt the epistemological
difficulties inherent in such a pursuit. He identifies the questions which arise from the
polarity of a creation full of structured moral order, yet held in abeyance pending its
eschatological transformation. I shall analyze these difficulties in the following chapters, but
first we need to continue to trace the particular emphases of O’Donovan’s approach.
Eschatological transformation
As the resurrection points forward to the teleological fulfillment of the creation, it
redeems, restores, and confirms the order which God has established in the creation. Looking
backward from this eschatological vantage, we can view the resurrection as confirmation of
God as the summum bonum whose promise to restore his creation gives self-authenticating
proof of its inherent goodness and order. The resurrection thus invests teleological
significance in the creation, and for O’Donovan the key point here is to ratify the structure
and coherence of the moral order as being good from the very beginning—
[T]he resurrection of Christ directs our attention back to the creation which it vindicates.
But we must understand ‘creation’ not merely as the raw material out of which the world
as we know it is composed, but as the order and coherence in which it is composed. …
to speak of this world as ‘created’ is already to speak of an order.24
Thus, the resurrection demonstrates that the natural order given to the creation at its
inception persists and survives, despite the stain of sin, and it maintains continuity with its
teleological fulfillment as realized in the resurrection. O’Donovan refers to this process of
fulfillment as “eschatological transformation” which “rules out all the other conceivable
creation is restored and fulfillment promised, ethics had a foundation which embraced the partial truths of both
these points of view”; R&MO (2nd edition), xv. He claims to end this unconstructive debate by choosing to begin
ethics from the resurrection, which has the bi-directional capacity to “sometimes emphasize the newness,
sometimes the primitiveness of the order that is there affirmed. But it will not be tempted to overthrow or deny
either in the name of the other”; 15. Cf. O’Donovan’s earlier assessment of the kingdom-creation divide in
ethics: “We would be foolish to allow ourselves to be polarized in this way…”; O’Donovan, ‘The Natural
Ethic’, in Essays in Evangelical Social Ethics, ed. David F. Wright (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1978) 30.
24 R&MO, 31.
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eventualities” ensuing from the Fall, including corruption, disintegration and “meaningless
flux”.25 Eschatological transformation thus fulfills God’s purpose in the very fabric of nature
itself. Given that human beings are also formed of this fabric, this implies that we may
understand something of the moral order by understanding human nature (and to this
enormous issue we shall return in later chapters).
The resurrection thus gives witness to the unifying work of the Holy Spirit in connecting
the present reality with the new heaven and earth to come. All things are held together in
tension—the continuity and discontinuity between the present and the future, as well as the
fallen nature of creation and its redemption—all await eschatological transformation.26
O’Donovan builds his outline for evangelical ethics upon this capacity of the resurrection to
bridge these polarities without erasing or diminishing the immeasurable disjunction between
this present world and the world to come.27 As O’Donovan shows, the resurrection provides
the essential theological link between redemption and vindication, and he takes this witness
to eschatological transformation as warrant to describe the ontological reality of moral order
as established in the creation, and to develop the ethical principles which communicate that
order. Eschatological transformation thus demonstrates that the resurrection looks in two
directions at once: backward into the creation, as well as forward to its ultimate fulfillment.
What can and must we say about the moral order based on this view?
One reality: objective reality
Based on the warrant given by the resurrection to look backward from the vantage of
eschatological transformation, O’Donovan chooses to begin from the first page of R&MO to
25 R&MO, 55. Cf. O’Donovan’s remarks on the teleological import of “eschatological expectation”: “Within
Christianity one cannot think or speak about the meaning of the world without speaking also of its destined
transformation”; O’Donovan, ‘The Natural Ethic’, 26.
26 Luke Bretherton credits O’Donovan’s “eschatological framework” with being able to “account for the
continuity and radical discontinuity between this age and the age to come… and thus for the continuity and
discontinuity between Christian and non-Christian approaches to morality”; Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness:
Christian Witness Amid Moral Diversity (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006) 87. Bretherton shows good insight into
O’Donovan’s doctrine of “eschatological teleology”, but he does not develop the consequences of O’Donovan’s
epistemological realism (see Chapter 7 of Hospitality as Holiness).
27 On this view we do not interpret Paul’s language regarding the ‘futility’ of the creation (Romans 8:20) as
indication that the present creation must pass away, only to be replaced by a better creation; but rather the whole
creation will be redeemed; cf. R&MO, 55. This raises a question to be taken up in the following chapters: How
is the doctrine of new creation (cf. Isa. 66:22; 2 Pet. 3:13; Rev. 21:1) to be integrated with O’Donovan’s
doctrine of objectivity and continuity of the created order with the new heaven and new earth?
Chapter 2: The Concept of Moral Order 29
assert the validity of Christian ethics as a reasoned approach toward discernment and
description of the “ordered structures of being and good” which have existed within the world
from the beginning. O’Donovan finds warrant within Christian faith to assert the ontological
reality and absolute structure of the moral order woven into the fabric of the creation—
The order of things that God has made is there. It is objective, and mankind has a place
within it. Christian ethics, therefore, has an objective reference …in accordance with this
order …In this assertion we can find a point of agreement with the classical ethics of
Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics …ethics as a close correlate of metaphysics.28
Thus the search for moral order may take confidence in the objective reality of its epistemic
goal. The moral order is there. Its ontological presence within the creation may be stated
assuredly as a steadfast and unassailable doctrine of evangelical ethics. This assertion is not
threatened by the subjective, existential limitations of our human experience, whether
conceived in terms of spirituality, religion, psychology, or otherwise. O’Donovan offers no
quarter for critiques which would make the objective reality of the moral order contingent
upon subjective experience.29 Any such critiques are refuted as being unrealistic, on account
of their abandonment of the objective reality of the creation in deference to a hidden reality
cloaked in the subjectivity of individual experience. He argues that any such contingency
leads to “absolute disorder” due to a flawed metaphysics which devolves into an incoherent
nihilism—
If some [reality] A and some B were related neither teleologically nor generically in any
respect whatsoever, there would be two unconnected universes, which is to say, no
universe at all.30
In the modern era, the predominant challenge to this view has come from the direction of
existentialism in a form which emphasizes subjective reality as the only reality we can
experience. This existential view identifies subjective reality as the epistemic goal of our
ethical and spiritual response. O’Donovan demonstrates how this view of subjectivity
undermines any attempt to construct an evangelical ethic, because it infects the ontological
28 R&MO, 17.
29 R&MO, 11. To clarify his concern here, we may look to his earlier essay where he explains: “It is one thing to
say that until the Word became incarnate, man could discern no meaning in nature; quite another to say that
until the Word became incarnate nature had no meaning. Revelation is the solution to man’s blindness, not to
nature’s emptiness.” O’Donovan, ‘The Natural Ethic’, 26. The point is that reality is there, regardless of how, or
how accurately, we perceive it.
30 R&MO, 32.
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implications of eschatological transformation with the psychological implications of
subjectivity, resulting in a sure descent into disorder and relativism. This error he attributes to
the
…Idealist polarization of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’, in which object and subject lose
their primary relational sense… and become overweighted with psychological and
ontological implications.31
Such idealism is not coherent within an evangelical ethic, because it separates reality into two
opposing realms: one which is objectively true, and the other which is subjectively
experienced. As a result, the discussion of objectivity is rendered moot, and thus unable to
convey the ethical content of the Gospel in the form of assured principles of ontological truth.
Accordingly, O’Donovan argues that this idealist view will not suffice for statement of an
evangelical ethic, because it fails to affirm the objective reality of the moral order realized
through eschatological transformation. Thus an evangelical ethic must be built upon the
foundation of the objective reality of the created order as a truth which extends throughout
all times, and is not simply a disjoint new reality which is being held in abeyance until some
future time at which it will emerge in a transformed, and ultimately complete form.
Recognizing how easily an idealist view of the subjectivity of human experience can
distort the objective reality of the Gospel, O’Donovan is careful to explain how an
evangelical ethic will necessarily circumscribe the meanings of ‘subjectivity’ and
‘objectivity’ in the context of moral reasoning. Any apparent differences between subjective
and objective realities must be confined to the realm of the personal perspective of the
observer; these differences do not reflect the ontological structure of the created order. To
ascribe any more substantial content to subjective reality is to slip into the errors of
“misleading Idealist implications”.32 Thus to speak coherently of reality, we must conclude
that there is precisely one universal objective reality which contains all subjective
apperceptions of itself:
The ‘subjective reality’ is… no different reality from the ‘objective reality.’ It is the one
reality, the reality of a world redeemed…33
31 R&MO, 102. O’Donovan here notes that he follows “a lead given by Karl Barth” in his understanding of the
relational definition of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ within the trinitarian concept. This supports O’Donovan’s
view that subjectivity is defined by the relationship of the moral agent as a subject who responds in freedom to
God, others and the world.
32 R&MO, 106.
33 R&MO, 109.
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The objective order of creation therefore contains subjective experience. Subjective
experience is not an independent reality; rather, it is an experience formed by, and occurring
within, the unity of the one objective reality: the creation “includes us and enables us to
participate in it.”34 He thus defines our experience of subjective reality as participation in the
moral order.35
This doctrine of objective reality extends also to the concept of moral ‘rightness’. Based
on the premise that the structure of the moral order exists independently of human perception
of it, O’Donovan claims that the moral attribute of being ‘right’ can be applied to moral
choices and behaviors, in accordance with general rules which stand as ontological realities
independent of subjective knowledge:
Moral deliberation… is a matter of finding the right qualification for one’s general rule of
action, which will recognize the truth about the circumstances in which one has to act.36
Are we therefore to understand ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as being categorical attributes to be
assigned to moral actions, regardless of how our capacity to discern the structure of the moral
order might be affected by the limitations of subjective human experience? O’Donovan
seems to move in this direction, as he cements the connection between objective truth and
right decisions. He demonstrates the practical application of such a connection by affirming
the belief that the Bible may be read as a source of “a comprehensive moral viewpoint”
providing witness to objectively real moral principles:
…We read the Bible seriously only when we use it to guide our thought towards a
comprehensive moral viewpoint… We must look within it not only for moral bricks, but
for indications of the order in which the bricks hold together.37
This reference to “moral bricks” suggests the possibility that theological ethics might be
reducible to a codified set of universal principles, as if the moral structure of the universe
could be parsed in discrete units. After all, O’Donovan explains that “the items in a code
34 R&MO, 101.
35 O’Donovan exegetes Phil. 2:13 helpfully in this regard, to show that our experience of freedom as moral
subjects is real; yet our free response remains, as Augustine articulated, always subject to God’s initiative, 102.
Cf. 76, “Morality is man’s participation in the created order.”
36 R&MO, 96. Italics in the original. Cf. p. 216: “When we deliberate on something we are about to do, or
…have done, we have, in the final analysis, a single point to resolve: is it, or was it, the right thing to do?”
37 R&MO, 200.
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stand to the moral law as bricks to a building”, and “this has an immediate bearing on how
we read the Bible”38; however, thus would be a superficial reading of O’Donovan’s intent. He
is walking the fine line here of insisting upon the objective reality of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
actions, while at the same time acknowledging that the criteria of judging ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
are not reducible to the status of explicit objectifiable principles, as though they were free-
standing tracts in a moral code. There would seem to be an exception to every moral
principle; thus, “be there ten of them or six hundred and thirteen” rules or moral bricks in a
moral code, they would have no meaning unless there be also a comprehensive moral
viewpoint to prevail over them and provide them with an interpretive context. To arrive at
such a comprehensive moral viewpoint is no simple matter, for such a viewpoint (as well as
the epistemic access it provides onto the moral order) can be neither derived from, nor
reduced to, objectifiable principles.39 It requires wisdom to make sense of moral reality—
“Wisdom must involve some comprehension of how the bricks are meant to be put
together.”40 This would seem to be the perennial challenge of ethics and dogmatics, which
begs the larger question: from where does such wisdom descend? Before we can adequately
address that question in light of O’Donovan’s realism, we shall continue to identify the
salient features of his outline.
Holding in abeyance the question of wisdom, we may sum up the importance of
objectivity for O’Donovan’s doctrine by noting it asserts the existence of right action, and
furthermore, that it implies the possibility and freedom to choose the right action in any given
situation as an expression of “the universal character of all Christian life”. In support of this
conclusion, O’Donovan points to Paul’s confession of “one Spirit, one Lord, one God” [1
Cor. 12:3-6] as an affirmation of this universal character, revealed in the diversity of gifts,
activities and vocations which comprise Christian lives.41 In the same way, O’Donovan reads
Paul’s chapter on love [1 Cor. 13] as a confirmation that no matter how wide a variation we
may see in Christian lives and vocations, they all serve as windows “through which the
universal character of all Christian life may appear.”42 Thus, love represents the universal
structure of the moral order within God’s creation:
38 R&MO, 200.
39 R&MO, 199f.
40 R&MO, 200.
41 R&MO, 222
42 R&MO, 222.
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Just as the variety of voices within the church are unified in a common confession, ‘Jesus
is Lord’, so the variety of forms of life are unified within a common form of life
according to God’s order, the life of love.43
Having established love as the core reality representing the universal character of all
Christian life, O’Donovan is quick to recognize the need to guard against the currents of
idealism which lead into non-evangelical misinterpretations of the universal character of love.
To sever love from its source in the incarnate truth of “the historically concrete figure of
Jesus of Nazareth”44, and to treat it as a universalized ethical principle, is to take a non-
evangelical misstep away from the objective reality of the moral order. This cannot be
permitted within an evangelical ethic, because it leads into Christological errors. To take a
step in the direction of defining love as an abstract, universal principle, is to
… step outside the limits of Chalcedonian Christology. This would have one of two
results. Either we would settle for a static Nestorian theism, in which the object of our
love was, in truth, simply the divine principle… or, more characteristically of the modern
period, we would embrace a monophysite humanism, …the emerging idea of a divinized
humanity.45
An evangelical ethic cannot countenance such a move, because the Gospel is grounded in
physical history, not in metaphysical principles. This presents a challenge to the formulation
of a doctrine which states evangelical ethics in terms of objective reality, for the claim of
objectivity implies applicability to all times and places—in other words, to be universally
applicable. Yet the historical foundation of the Gospel speaks of a unique non-repeatable
historical person in Jesus of Nazareth. How is this challenge to be resolved? Again,
O’Donovan asserts the witness to the Resurrection as the key to holding this tension together.
By virtue of the bi-directional vantage of eschatological transformation, he links the
eschatological hope of redemption with the objective shape of the moral order, and thus
suggests that evangelical witness to transformation avoids the misstep of conceiving of love
as an abstract, universalizing principle:
43 R&MO, 222.
44 R&MO, 242.
45 R&MO, 242.
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[T]he love of Christ cannot be conceived in such a universalizing way but must be
viewed eschatologically, as the form which our moral obligations have taken in these last
days, at the climax of God’s redemptive work. 46
This requirement to view moral obligations from the eschatological vantage point of
historical climax guards against the un-evangelical idea that love can be expressed as an
abstract principle, but by the same stroke, the emphasis of historical particularity also begs
the question: How are we to understand the role of history and the reality of time within the
context of moral order and eschatological transformation? How are we to conceive of the
moral order as revealing a universally applicable ontological structure, if it remains in some
sense incomplete as it awaits its ultimate transformation? We turn next to these questions.
Historicism overruled by teleological order
Historical reality raises the classic question of how to resolve the tension between
“already” and “not-yet” in the doctrine of eschatology. Do the unfolding events of history
yield evidence merely of the already established moral order? Or do events unfold in a
process of fulfillment through which the moral order, though not yet complete, is emerging?
The tension inherent in the views of history as being both a temporal work-in-progress,
and also an extra-temporal, eschatologically complete reality, poses what O’Donovan calls,
“the unanswered question of creation, the question of what its temporal extension means.”47
In answer this question, he again invokes the concept of eschatological transformation, as
realized in the resurrection. This question regarding the significance of temporality gets to the
heart of the issue of transformation, because in order to avoid a false dichotomy, two
opposing views must be held together in tension: (a) the view that the transformation is
awaiting teleological fulfillment, and is thus unfolding as a historical process occurring in
time; and (b) the view that transformation is already complete in the resurrected Christ.
Again, O’Donovan notes the crucial capacity of the resurrection to hold these opposing poles
46 R&MO, 242. While O’Donovan here demonstrates the need to ground the moral order in the historical reality
of Jesus, so as to guard against falsely universalizing love as a principle, he is also sensitive to the opposite
errors of historicism, which would deny the universal character of the moral order by searching for meaning
within history itself. Thus he rightly warns of the need to preserve “Christian universalism” by making clear the
distinction between the Christ of history and the universal telos that Christ has brought into history by his birth,
66.
47 R&MO, 55.
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together in tension without breaking, by affirming both the forward- and backward-looking
views of reality necessary to hold these poles together in tension. He calls this ‘evangelical
realism’,48 and stresses the importance of sustaining the dual aspect of the resurrection in this
regard:
The important thing is not which of these two aspects of the resurrection we emphasize
at any moment, but that it does properly have both aspects; origin and end are
inseparably united in it. The humanity of Adam is carried forward to its ‘supernatural’
destiny precisely as it is rescued from its ‘sub-natural’ condition of enslavement to sin
and death.49
Both the supernatural destiny of Adam and the humanity of Christ are at stake here. To
emphasize either of the two poles—either supernatural destiny or sub-natural enslavement—
at the expense of the other, is to invite error by diminishing the role of Christ as the “last
Adam” [1 Cor. 15:45]. Here again, we see the essential role of the resurrection in maintaining
the coherence of an evangelical ethic.50
Having outlined his realist approach, O’Donovan addresses the counter-arguments which
pertain to his doctrine of teleological order. He identifies ‘historicism’ as the variety of error
which has most frequently emerged in modern controversies.51 At root, historicism springs
from a view of the creation as an imperfect, incomplete reality that is moving through history
toward its eventual completion in the eschaton. This view of history may offer a coherent
teleology, in that it sees history as the unfolding will of God as he fulfills his plan to create
the new earth and new heaven, but it brings with it a troubling depiction of the moral order as
a “work-in-progress”—i.e., a flawed and incomplete reality that hurtles through time and
space as it evolves toward its fore-ordained end or telos.52 O’Donovan finds this view
48 This is the term O’Donovan uses to describe his approach to theological ethics, R&MO, xviii.
49 R&MO, 57.
50 O’Donovan employs the bi-directional vantage of the resurrection as the lynchpin which holds natural and
supernatural humanity together as poles in tension. This demonstrates his dialectical approach to realism: “We
must say that life from the dead is present in the risen Christ, and that the resurrection of all the dead must
follow—and yet not follow as a necessity immanent within history itself, but simply as the implication of his
accomplishment. Unless the dialectic between the accomplished end of history and the immanent shapelessness
of historical events is sustained, then Christ becomes, as it were, swallowed up into history, reduced to the status
of a merely formative figure, “noteworthy”, as Kierkegaard complained about the Hegelian view, ‘because of
his consequences’.”; 39 Articles, 124.
51 “The turn of modern thought towards what is usually called ‘historicism’ is no all-pervasive.” R&MO, 58.
52 O’Donovan drives home his concern with historicism as he critiques “those liberation-theologies which most
blatantly subject the theological enterprise to the sectional perceptions of a single cultural group”; R&MO, 91.
The problem is that by resorting to particular and circumstantial moments in historical experience, these
theologies can be compromised by granting access to any and all forms of “cultural accommodation”. On this
score, he questions Brunner, noticing how his position in Justice and the Social Order supports a flavor of
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inadmissible for an evangelical ethic, because it positions history, rather than the transcendent
reality of the Gospel, as the source of meaning for the moral order. These forms of
historicism tend to undermine the attempt to construct an evangelical ethic, by denying the
concept of the moral order as a transcendent and objectively real structure extant from the
beginning of creation:
If there is no locus of value outside history, then history must provide its own critical
movements from within, so that the kingdom of God becomes a form without content,
an empty ‘end’…53
In other words, if the original creatio ex nihilo did not produce a complete, teleologically
perfected moral order, then we would have no basis for assurance in seeking right moral
action as an ever-present possibility within the moral order, and we would therefore be left
with no alternative but to include arbitrary interpretations of history as bona fide evidence of
the teleological process that reveals the moral content of existence. Thus, as a consequence of
its failure to ground the concept of the moral order within the eschatological reality of the
resurrection,54 historicism fails to sustain the objective reality pertinent to an evangelical
ethic—namely, a transcendent, universal order:
Classical Christian thought proceeded from a universal order of meaning and value, an
order given in the creation and fulfilled in the kingdom of God… Historicism denies
that such a universal order exists.55
O’Donovan thus proceeds to suggest that the moral order of the universe is teleologically
complete and eschatologically fulfilled.56 The moral order is not evolving or in any way
Christendom that upset Barth in the midst of the turbulent 1930s; R&MO, 90. O’Donovan amplifies his point in
reference to the “Southern school” of liberation theology, noting that an emphasis upon “the historical processes
of society” can deprive ethics of authority, with the result that “It degenerates into little more than a rhetoric of
scepticism” DN, 9f. He drives home the point with these rhetorical questions: “Does history need
‘transforming’, or only to be acted into with creaturely integrity? Is knowledge by which human beings ‘recreate
the world and shape themselves’ really knowledge any more, or simply will?” DN, 13.
53 R&MO, 73.
54 O’Donovan points out that while historicism validates the presence of a teleological order within creation, it
errors by failing to describe “the Christian view of history as ‘eschatological’ and not merely as ‘teleological’.”
R&MO, 64. Similarly, historicism’s “social thought fails equally for lack of a strong eschatology”, 71.
55 R&MO, 67. In support of his claim that the transcendent structure of the moral order proves universally
applicable, O’Donovan argues that “morality must transcend time-place particularizations. An action of kind X
must be good in any time or place, regardless of who does it, when or where of the principles of right action”,
39.
56 Hans Burger interprets O’Donovan well on this score: “The resurrection is not only the restoration of
mankind, but also of the created order and of the entire creation.” For O’Donovan, eschatological
transformation means that the entire creation has been restored, and is complete, because “The eschatological
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contingent upon history to reveal its teleological content. This is no way constrains God’s
freedom to operate in history and reveal teleological order through historical events. The
point is that the moral order itself is not derived from these historical events; rather, the moral
order exists with a “completeness which is already present in the universe.”57
O’Donovan emphasizes the completeness of the moral order within the natural creation
by finding any theory of “continuous creation” untenable in light of Genesis 2:2.58 On this
view, God deemed the original creation to be complete, and we may rest assured that the
moral order does not evolve through any process of history:
Creation as a completed design is presupposed by any movement in time. Its teleological
order, expressed in the regular patterns of history, is not a product of the historical
process, such that it might be surpassed and left behind as history proceeds further
towards its goal.59
In answer to any opposing interpretations of passages such as John 5:17—“My Father is
working still; and I am working”—which might open the door to theologies of on-going
creation, O’Donovan draws a distinction between on-going creation and “manifestation” of
the “wholeness” of the creation. On this view, the works of Jesus and the Father make
“manifest” the objective reality within the created order. Thus, O’Donovan rules out the
prospect that God could be acting within creation to augment or move the moral order along
in a process of teleological completion; rather, he interprets Jesus and the Father to be
performing acts which “manifest” or “vindicate” the “completeness of God’s creation” which
has existed since the beginning, as attested in Genesis 2:2.60
To make sense of this conclusion we must see how O’Donovan draws the distinction
between ideas of “process”, on the one hand, and “transformation”, on the other; the former
takes place within temporal history, and the latter transcends history. Transformation takes
gift was given once and for all in Christ. The present existence of the children of God is ‘a mode of existence
which is already ours, yet not fully clear to us, and which is, before it can be our mode of existence, Christ’s
mode of existence.’” Hans Burger, Being in Christ: A Biblical and Systematic Investigation in a Reformed
Perspective (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008) 471, 485-6. Burger quotes R&MO, 260.
57 R&MO, 62.
58 R&MO, 61.
59 R&MO, 63. Italics in the original. For this reason O’Donovan objects to Thielicke’s statement that “our
Christianity is never something complete and finished but is constantly in process of becoming”, 145.
60 R&MO, 62. Similarly, O’Donovan objects to “[t]he modern faith in ‘continuous creation’” which he detects in
liturgy and theology, 61. Further to this point, O’Donovan argues that in order to safeguard the traditional notion
of authority in political theology, history must be viewed as a demonstration and “vindication of creation order
as a basis for rational action”; DN, 19. In opposition to a view of God as working still in acts of creation which
would pertain to the moral order, O’Donovan claims that “the history of divine rule safeguards and redeems the
goods of creation”; DN, 19.
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place on a separate plane of existence, as it were; it represents a “higher grace” which
transcends the constraints of historical time.61 Thus we can see the logic in O’Donovan’s
view of the moral order as a transcendent and objective reality which is not contingent upon
any historical process or movement through time in order to arrive at its teleological
conclusion. Its teleological order is already complete, even if not yet fully revealed or fully
apprehended. On this view, the moral order has existed as an eschatologically fulfilled reality
within the creation throughout all time, and it serves as the context within which history
unfolds. By means of this distinction between process (defined as temporal action in terms of
historical time), and transformation (defined as a transcendent reality outside of time
representing the ultimate vindication of the created order), O’Donovan is able to claim that
the moral order is complete, whole, and impervious to the relativizing influences of
historicism or subjectivity.62 Thus he preserves what he considers to be the classical
foundation of Christian ethics:
… a universal order of meaning and value, an order given in the creation and fulfilled in
the kingdom of God, an order, therefore, which forms a framework for all action and
history…63
Ontological priority
Having articulated the character of the moral order in terms of eschatological
transformation, objective reality, and teleological order, O’Donovan turns next to the
question of epistemology—how is it that we come by this knowledge of the moral order? He
deliberately postpones this epistemological question, in order to take it up as a calculated
“pause for reflection”,64 which follows articulation of the ontology of the moral order. He
explains why discussion of epistemology must necessarily be held in abeyance until the
objective reality of the moral order has been apprehended—the epistemological questions
61 R&MO, 64. Similarly, O’Donovan insists that “there must be order which is not subject to historical change…
otherwise history could only be uninterpretable movement”, 45.
62 O’Donovan elsewhere reiterates this point, and refers to the objective reality of the “whole moral vision”
provided within the Christian faith, and describes the practice of ethics as the speech and acts of “interpreting
the world into which we must act in the light of that moral vision”; O’Donovan, Liturgy and Ethics, vol. 89, ed.
Michael Vasey (Grove Ethical Studies; Bramcote: Grove, 1993) 5.
63 R&MO, 67.
64 R&MO, 76.
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cannot be addressed a priori for the simple reason that it is impossible to define any
epistemological premise without introducing a belief system, whether tacitly or explicitly,
into the development of dogmatic content. As O’Donovan explains, “there is no neutral
account” of moral thought which could provide a starting point for discussion of the moral
order.65 Any attempt to begin the discussion by sorting out the purely epistemological
questions fails, because truth claims regarding epistemology will necessarily bring with them
presumptions of belief. These presumptions are ‘smuggled goods’ in the sense that they have
not been examined, judged and found worthy according to an absolutely objective
epistemological standard. No such standard exists, of course, which is why O’Donovan
insists upon a clean separation of ontology and epistemology, in order to avoid this hazard.
He thus prescribes a lexical ordering in which awareness and cognizance of the objective
reality of the moral order must come first, before the questions of epistemology may be
considered. Thus, the method of O’Donovan’s realism requires that discussion of the
ontological reality of the moral order must precede and take priority over reflection upon the
means by which we acquire epistemic access to the moral order:
Our epistemological pause… quite properly follows on what we have learnt about the
created order and its fulfillment, for epistemology is a reflexive, not an absolute,
intellectual operation.66
It would seem that by relegating the questions of epistemology to the status of
afterthoughts which must follow the ontological doctrine of the moral order, O’Donovan
intends to avoid any charge of fideism that might accuse him of having imported tacit
dogmatic beliefs into his ethics. But does this stratagem avoid fideism, or does it merely
cloak its fideism in the disguise of the objective reality which it ascribes presumptively to the
moral order?67
O’Donovan defends his position with respect to the objective reality of the moral order
by asserting that the reality of the moral order is simply there; it is there for all to apprehend,
and whatever errors or deficiencies might impede or cloud our knowledge of the moral order
65 R&MO, 77.
66 R&MO, 76. Italics in the original. Cf. O’Donovan’s discussion of Christological doctrine: “We may approach
this question in two stages, epistemological and ontological” (149).
67 By way of example, we can see how ontological priority sets the stage for O’Donovan’s discussion of “just
war theory”, as he sets out the foundational principles of the topic: “First, God’s peace is the original
ontological truth of creation”; O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003) 2. Whether such statements of ontologically prior principles are reasonable or unreasonable, and whether
they are objective or fideistic, depends on the context of faith in which they are presented.
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are attributable to our limitations as human observers, and do not in any way detract from the
assurance that the order is there. Thus, by subordinating the epistemological questions to the
ontological, O’Donovan is able to posit the generic, universal reality of moral right and
wrong in any and all circumstances, regardless of the conditions pertaining to the individual’s
epistemic access to moral knowledge.
This is not to suggest that O’Donovan neglects the epistemological questions pertaining
to the fallen condition of human reason. To the contrary, he recognizes the need for Christian
doctrine to address these questions, and he makes four claims with respect to the nature and
limitations of moral knowledge:
1) Moral knowledge pertains to the totality of things in their relations to one
another;68
2) Moral knowledge is existential; i.e., it occurs “from within” the moral order as
“the subject participates in what he knows”;69
3) Moral knowledge arises “from man’s position in the universe”, and is therefore
“inescapably compromised by the problem of fallenness”;70 and,
4) We remain always “ignorant of the end of history”;71
In these limitations we can see the inescapable consequences of the fall. Human
knowledge is existential; that is to say, formed within and limited by our imperfect vantage as
observers and participants in the moral order. There is no Archimedean point from which we
might observe the creation in order to discern its structure with perfectly objective clarity.72
Until the day of the eschaton, it seems our moral knowledge must remain incomplete,
provisional and shrouded in mystery.73 Given the mystery of it all, and heeding the advice of
Qoheleth regarding the vanity of seeking to understand human existence, what hope may we
68 R&MO, 77.
69 R&MO, 79.
70 R&MO, 81-82. Cf. “But given the fact that the world is fallen and is perceived only by fallen minds…”;
O’Donovan goes on to point to the necessity of eschatological fulfillment of Christ to bring about full
knowledge, 55-56.
71 R&MO, 82.
72 As O’Donovan notes, “the skeptical Koheleth” of Ecclesiastes searched in vain for such a vantage point, and
so shall we all aspire in vain to “comprehend it all”, R&MO, 79f.
73 “Such knowledge must always have an incomplete character… The whole can be known only as a mystery
which envelops us, into which our minds can reach only with an awareness that there are distances and
dimensions which elude us.” R&MO, 79. Cf. 49, and 81: “It is, by its very nature and not by accident,
provisional knowledge.” O’Donovan acknowledges that natural epistemic access is incapable of arriving at
anything more than a flawed and “fragmentary knowledge of the way things are”, 89.
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attach to our striving after moral deliberation and learning? O’Donovan has a ready answer to
that question—our hope is secured because the ordered structure of being and good is there,
as an objective reality, no matter how fragmented and provisional our discernment might be.
Ontological priority thus provides the corrective O’Donovan needs to shore up our
confidence that moral knowledge does not become mired in ambiguity as a result of our
necessarily existential “position in the universe”, which is “inescapably compromised” by our
status as imperfect participants.74 The purpose of this corrective is to sustain the realism by
which O’Donovan aims to determine “good or bad, right or wrong, by virtue of a reality ‘out
there’”, and thus to avoid the degeneration of theological ethics into “voluntarism, relativism,
emotivism, subjectivism, etc.”75
This has implications for deliberation and moral learning. Relying upon the assertion that
right and wrong exist as part of a reality that is ‘out there’, we may conclude that there will
exist in every circumstance the challenge as well as the possibility to perceive rightly the
structure of the moral order which informs moral deliberation and action. As moral persons
therefore, we should aspire to learn and apply moral knowledge with better skill. This leads
to the paraenetic conclusion: “mental striving is essential if knowledge is to be knowledge.”76
O’Donovan rightly notes that such striving will forever reach for, but never attain, the
horizon of completeness; nonetheless, we must continue to strive on toward the goal, for this
is the essence of what it means to be human.77 By putting the epistemological questions in
second place, behind the objective reality of the moral order, O’Donovan is thus able to
conclude:
74 O’Donovan protests against any such ambiguity or “ethical underdetermination” in his critique of Hans
Ulrich’s theological ethics (Wie Geschöpfe leben, 2006), which are based in the “theologico-ethical …
experience of the theological self, acting consciously as God’s creature before God”. Ulrich’s view suggests that
theological ethics must be grounded in “man’s conversion” as a participant who discovers and experiences the
moral order through relationship with God. This union of ontological and epistemic realities is incompatible
with O’Donovan’s ontological priority, and so he asks and answers rhetorically: “how is the theologian himself
to become part of what he describes? Surely we need a discipline that will help us gird up our loins!”
O’Donovan, ‘The Object of Theological Ethics’, Studies in Christian Ethics (2007): 203-14, 205, 211. Given
that O’Donovan has stated the core of evangelical ethics in terms remarkably similar to Ulrich— “Morality is
man’s participation in the created order”, and “moral illumination does, in its fundamental form, involve
conversion”, R&MO, 76, 92—we should expect the exhortation to gird up our loins to apply with equal serious
to both Ulrich and O’Donovan.
75 O’Donovan, ‘The Object of Theological Ethics’, 210.
76 R&MO, 49.
77 “We remain beings for whom knowledge is the mode of their participation in the universe”; R&MO, 87.
“Moral ‘learning’ is all the time ‘thinking’. It is the intellectual penetration and exploration of a reality which we
can grasp from the beginning in a schematic and abstract way, but which contains depths of meaning and
experience into which we must reach”, 92.
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Knowledge which admits discontinuity as anything other than a challenge to be
overcome has in principle abandoned the task of being knowledge…”78
This means that our striving after moral knowledge is not in vain. This is the thrust of
O’Donovan’s realism—it protects against the cloud of suspicion that accompanies critiques
based upon the subjectivity of human experience. For this reason O’Donovan is able to say
metaphorically that moral truths stand “as bricks to a building”, and therefore “wisdom must
involve some comprehension of how the bricks are meant to be put together.”79 Such a
concept of ontological priority suggests that humans must possess, in some sense, the
capacity to acquire moral knowledge in spite of the epistemological challenges described
above with respect to existential knowledge. This construes the moral order as being in some
sense accessible to human nature, without being contingent upon any endowment of faith,
doctrine or scripture to facilitate epistemic access to its structure.80 O’Donovan describes this
aspect of the moral order as a “natural ethic”81 and goes on to observe that “Secular man can
observe the same indications of order as anyone else.” 82 Of course the “secular” observer of
moral order will necessarily fail to discern the true context of the moral order, and will
completely miss its evangelical content; nonetheless, the moral order remains in some sense
immediately accessible to the secular observer via human nature. This follows logically from
the concept of ontological priority, because O’Donovan’s methodical realism affirms
objective knowledge of the ordered structures of the creation. The logic behind this argument
rests on the premise that the ontological and epistemological issues can be neatly separated
and addressed sequentially. On O’Donovan’s view, confusion results if the lines between
78 R&MO, 49f.
79 R&MO, 200.
80 John McIntyre offers a helpful insight as to why we should not rush to conclude from the idea of ontological
priority that humans have a natural capacity to discern moral truth, or any other revealed truth: “[I]f God is to
communicate with us, then his communication must eventually be convertible into verbal, conceptual,
propositional form. But we are not thereby affirming that the source of the communication is verbal, or even that
God’s response can be atomized into discrete thoughts. On such matters we have to remain agnostic.” This
agnosticism rightly serves to undermine the presumption of epistemological arrogance which seems implicit in
the idea that the ontological priority of the moral order means that moral truths can be “atomized into discrete
thoughts”, as O’Donovan suggests metaphorically by his reference to “moral bricks”. McIntyre, Theology after
the Storm: Reflections on the Upheavals in Modern Theology and Culture, ed. Gary D. Badcock (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1977) 209.
81 R&MO, 16f. O’Donovan argues that the ontological reality of moral order provides grounds for an “ethic of
nature”, i.e., an “objective order to which the moral life can respond”, 19.
82 R&MO, 35.
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ontology and epistemology are blurred.83 He cites this as a primary failing in the Barth-
Brunner debate with respect to natural theology, and suggests that his own form of realism
can sort out the confusion.84
But how can we best differentiate the ontological and epistemological issues cleanly?
How is ontological priority to be maintained in the face of the peril it invites with respect to
naturalism? We see now that O’Donovan’s claim to pursue evangelical realism85 apparently
hinges upon the requirement of ontological priority. At root, O’Donovan’s realism may be
expressed as the requirement to conjoin and hold in tension two essential, yet opposing, polar
commitments: (1) on the one hand, the ontological priority of the moral order ensures access
to “moral knowledge as a natural function of man’s existence”86; and yet on the other hand,
(2) “the order of reality is not truly known at all”, because “there is no self-contained cosmic
intelligibility” of the creation as creation.87 What kind of knowledge is this then, which
arises as a natural function of human existence, and yet remains ‘not truly known at all’?
How can moral knowledge be both known and yet unknown at the same time? There is
necessarily a bit of mystery remaining in this type of realism (as O’Donovan duly noted at the
outset in the four parameters named above), yet he is not content to let the matter of
evangelical ethics end here, shrouded in a mystery that prevents further articulation; rather,
he intends to peer into this mystery at least far enough to outline the path forward to the goal
of outlining the structure of an evangelical ethic. We now see that success in this goal
requires an epistemological realism robust enough to maintain the polarity “between
revelation in the particular and created order in the universal”88 without collapsing. The
question remains however: what form must such knowledge take?
83 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 64-65, sees correctly that “This clarification of the ontological and
epistemological issues in ethics underpins one of the central thrusts of O’Donovan’s work; its attempt to restore
the concept of ‘the natural’ and the doctrine of creation within Christian ethics.”
84 O’Donovan diagnoses the Barth-Brunner debate in these terms: “[T]he ontological and epistemological issues
were never properly differentiated”; R&MO, 86.
85 R&MO, xviii.
86 R&MO, 88. Cf. 20, where O’Donovan also states the nub of the epistemological problem: “This nature
involves all men, and indeed, as we shall see later, does not exclude a certain ‘natural knowledge’ which is also
a part of man’s created endowment. And yet only in Christ do we apprehend that order in which we stand and
that knowledge of it with which we have been endowed.”
87 R&MO, 88. In supporting this latter commitment O’Donovan says: “If one term of that relation [i.e.
knowledge of the Creator] is obscured, the universe cannot be understood”, 88. In this context he sounds
sympathetic to Barth’s language about “the image of God in man [being] not merely ‘defaced’ but ‘lost’” (89).
88 R&MO, 85.
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3 IMPLICATIONS OF O’DONOVAN’S
EVANGELICAL REALISM
Sustaining the polarities within evangelical ethics
In this chapter we shall look more closely at the ramifications of O’Donovan’s pursuit of
“evangelical realism”. At its core, this realism seems driven by a desire to follow a mediating
path capable of holding polarities in tension—specifically those tensions which invigorate the
dichotomy of “creation ethics” vs. “kingdom ethics”. We can see this mediation at work in
his expression of sympathy for both the “realist versions of Natural Law theory”, as well as
for the “realist” inclinations which he attributes to T. F. Torrance’s “scientific theology”.1
This is indeed a robust realism, as seen in its ability to ratify aspects both of Aquinas’ natural
law theory, as well as of Torrance’s ‘scientific theology’ which departs decidedly from
Thomism.2 The antithetical poles of discernment represented by Aquinas and Torrance
1 R&MO, xviii, 77, 85. Cf. T.F. Torrance, Theological Science (London, New York: Oxford University Press,
1969), Chapter 1.
2 Torrance sums up the problems with natural theology in terms of the “Latin Heresy”, to wit: “to seek
knowledge of God from what he has created out of nothing, would be to operate only from the infinite distance
of the creature to the Creator, where we can think and speak of God only in vague, imprecise and negative
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demonstrate O’Donovan’s purpose in pursuing a course of evangelical realism—to hold
polarities in tension. This is the overarching function of his architectonic. O’Donovan seems
ever mindful to preserve and defend the tension in his suggestion of natural epistemic access
to the moral order. His architectonic serves therefore to uphold the ontological priority of the
moral order, and at the same time, to avoid the peril of naturalism that departs from an
evangelical understanding of the role of revelation and faith in the apprehension of truth.
O’Donovan sees no insurmountable paradox here, but rather a polarity which is part and
parcel of the Gospel—
This polarity between an exclusive knowledge and an inclusive object of knowledge,
between revelation in the particular and created order in the universal, must be carefully
defended.3
This polarity revolves around the role of revelation in the acquisition of moral
knowledge. On O’Donovan’s view it would be false to suggest that the horns of this dilemma
are mutually exclusive—i.e., we do not have to make “the unacceptably polarized choice
between an ethic that is revealed and has no ontological grounding and an ethic that is based
on creation and so is naturally known.”4 While O’Donovan wants to affirm that “Revelation
in history is certainly the lynchpin of Christian epistemology”,5 this does not apparently make
it the lynchpin for a doctrine of the moral order. Revelation is one thing, and the reality of
nature is another, or so it would seem:
It is one thing to say that until the Word became incarnate, man could discern no
meaning in nature; quite another to say that until the Word became incarnate nature had
not meaning. Revelation is the solution to man’s blindness, not to nature’s emptiness.6
We see this tension also in “the irreducible duality between the freedom of God to act
particularly in history and the generic ordering of the world which is reflected in morality.”7
O’Donovan’s realism requires this polarity to be sustained, and held in tension. Its collapse
terms”; T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990) 213.
The problem lies not in the logic or metaphysics of natural theology per se, but rather in its independence from
evangelical witness, which results in “an arbitrary movement of thought”, 150.
3 R&MO, 85.
4 R&MO, 19.
5 O’Donovan, ‘The Natural Ethic’, 26.
6 O’Donovan, ‘The Natural Ethic’, 26.
7 R&MO, 45.
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cannot be permitted.8 This capacity to affirm both revelation in the specific and the universal
structure of the moral order in general is the fundamentally important criterion of
O’Donovan’s “evangelical realism”.9
On O’Donovan’s view, the collapse of the polar commitments required of evangelical
ethics leads invariably into one or another form of idealism.10 Examples of the dire
consequences of this collapse fill the pages of R&MO—to cite but a few of these, we find
O’Donovan warning against the errors of: modern idealism (238), pantheistic idealism (248),
humanism (37), technological humanism (237), monophysite humanism (242), scientism
(52), rationalism (133), nominalism (49), historicism (58), Gnostic dualism (63),
conservatism (185), consequentialism (187), legalism (261), antinomianism (263), moralism
(262), relativism (220), Kierkegaardian voluntarism (16), pantheism as a potential by-product
of Kierkegaard’s Christian voluntarism (39), Nestorian theism (242), Hegelian idealism (36)
and Hauerwas’s crucimonism (xv). O’Donovan categorizes these various ~isms chiefly in
terms of rationalism (inclined to continuity with the natural order, security and reason) and
voluntarism (inclined to discontinuity, instability and subjectivity). He points out how each of
these idealisms tends toward varieties of humanism, and thus they meet at “the antipodes”.11
This concern over collapsing polarities and their tendency to meet at the antipodes of
humanism (as seen in modern cultural “liberalism”, for example) continues to motivate
O’Donovan’s more recent work. To cite but one example: in Church in Crisis he elucidates
the tension between Protestant and Catholic perspectives as indicative of the type of
weakness which befalls moral theology when it allows the poles of evangelicalism to
collapse—
In making this conjunction its object, liberalism assimilated a Protestant construction of
Christian existence in missiological terms. In assuming it already present and needing
only to be affirmed, it assimilated a Catholic, doxological one. Yet the conception is
neither Protestant nor Catholic. Both the eschatological frontier between this world and
the next, important to Protestants, and the ontological frontier between the Creator and
the creature, important to Catholics, are collapsed.12
8 There are two fundamental ways for the polarity to collapse: either by condoning one of various forms of
idealism, or by reengaging “the debate between the so-called ‘ethics of the kingdom’ and the ‘ethics of
creation’; R&MO, 15. Cf. xv, where O’Donovan expresses his desire to overcome the unfruitful debate between
these two views.
9 O’Donovan describes his own “evangelical realism” in contradistinction to the “high-church moral programme
of Hauerwas”, R&MO, xviii.
10 E.g., “misleading Idealist implications”, R&MO, 106.
11 R&MO, 133. Cf. 181.
12 O’Donovan, Church in Crisis: The Gay Controversy and the Anglican Communion (Eugene, OR: Cascade
Books, 2008) 8.
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Wherever O’Donovan looks, he sees an inescapable tension within evangelical theology, and
rightly so, for there is indeed a chasm between God’s being and our experiential knowledge
of him. Kierkegaard characterized this chasm as the “infinite qualitative difference”;
O’Donovan states it as “the proper tension between the transcendence and the incarnate
nearness of God, [without which] there can simply be no gospel at all.13 He looks back on
the Tudor Reformers with admiration for their diligence to hold the polarities together in “a
very nearly perfect balance”.14 He attributes their fine sense of balance to their courage in
facing into the “discomfort between objectivity and subjectivity: the objectivity which must
be ascribed to sacramental grace, and the subjectivity implied in the role of faith in
appropriating it”, without shying away from the task.15 O’Donovan would seem to be a
present-day inheritor of this courageous tradition, for he presses on in search of this finely
tuned balance, ever diligent to articulate the twinned tensions of ontological order and the
epistemic role of faith.
The peril of naturalism
O’Donovan is quick to recognize the liminal appearance of naturalism which stems from
his statement of tension between “revelation in the particular and created order in the
universal”. He recognizes both the value and the risk inherent in the concept of a ‘natural
ethic’, and expresses both sympathy and trepidation at that prospect:
[W]e have avoided using the classic term ‘Natural Law’ in the course of our exposition
of created order, and will continue to avoid it, despite points of strong sympathy between
our account and the more realist versions of Natural Law theory.16
13 39 Articles, 20. Thus, there is a “tension between subject and predicate that must be preserved in any
statement of the gospel”, 21.
14 O’Donovan attributes this balance to the Reformers’ desire to hold Old Testament Law in tension with the
Gospel. He reads Cranmer’s Article 7 in light of a “historical dialectic” which functions as a bi-directional
fulcrum through which the “gospel of Christ” mediates both “the contingent social order”, as well as “the
universal good”. This might be reading more into Article than Cranmer intended, but it demonstrates
O’Donovan’s search for perfect balance through dialectical concept of historical vantage; 39 Articles, 64. In his
comments on Article 9, O’Donovan similarly praises Augustine for offering a balanced approach “to embrace
the complementary aspects of human evil… encouraging each aspect to interpret the other”, 73.
15 39 Articles, 129.
16 R&MO, 85. In response to some reviewers of R&MO, O’Donovan argues that the book was not “a cover for a
return to a ‘natural ethic’”; DN, 19.
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Sympathy and trepidation—these represent yet one more set of the irreducible polarities
symptomatic of O’Donovan’s course of realism. His sympathy for Natural Law theory
extends only as far as can be traveled without departing from the evangelical affirmation of
Christ as the incarnate Word. Yet he avoids the term “Natural Law” in order to avoid the
inference that moral goodness is self-evident in the form of axiomatic principles
“authenticated by their universal self-evidence alone.”17 The crucial qualification in
O’Donovan’s statement lies in the word “realist”, by which we may understand that he has
sympathy for only those interpretations of Natural Law which remain compatible with the
evangelical message of Christian faith. This begs the question: what are the appropriate
qualifications which must be placed upon Natural Law theory to render it “realist”? It would
seem that O’Donovan’s criteria here require us to validate the capacity of “secular man” to
observe the moral structure of creation as it exists in nature. But how are we to sustain this
natural witness to ethics without departing from the evangelical witness of the resurrection of
Christ as the foundation of ethics? If “Revelation in history is certainly the lynchpin of
Christian epistemology”,18 as O’Donovan advocates, then how is objective reality to be
discerned apart from the event of revelation? There is a fundamentally unavoidable tension at
work here, one pole of which exerts a gravitational force in the direction of naturalism, based
in the presumption that the created order carries within itself authority to authenticate
knowledge of universal significance. The battle to sustain the polarity of revelation and a
“natural ethic’ in tension would be lost if ever “Natural Law” were to be conceived as a self-
evident source of truth and moral authority. How does O’Donovan avoid this peril of
naturalism? He clearly recognizes the threat naturalism presents for an evangelical ethic, and
he insists that knowledge of the created order must be “vindicated by God’s revelatory word
that the created good and man’s knowledge of it is [sic] not to be overthrown in history.”19
He goes on to identify the indelible bond which holds together the polarities of evangelical
realism:
Such knowledge, according to the Christian gospel, is given to us as we participate in the
life of Jesus Christ. He is the point from which the whole is to be discerned, ‘in whom
17 O’Donovan cites John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, as evidence of this interpretation of Aquinas
and almost “all subsequent natural law thinking.” R&MO, 85, 86.
18 O’Donovan, ‘The Natural Ethic’, 26.
19 R&MO, 85.
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are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Col. 2:3)… True knowledge of the
moral order is knowledge ‘in Christ’.20
The key phrase here is: given to us as we participate in the life of Christ. This reliance
upon Christ as the source of moral knowledge defends against the peril of naturalism. But
what does “in Christ” mean in this context? O’Donovan warns that it must not subscribe to an
ethereal, abstract “universal Logos”, for that would grant warrant to a self-authenticating
version of Natural Law theory. He speaks rather in terms of participation in the life of “the
Logos made flesh in the first century AD, crucified under Pontius Pilate and raised again on
the third day”.21 His realism aims therefore to affirm two opposing directions of
interpretation in the creedal confession: we are to see Jesus as the historically incarnate truth,
as well as to see the extra-historical and universal objective reality of the orders of creation,
by virtue of their ontological priority.
The conditions for moral knowledge: love & obedience
As with the bi-directional witness of the resurrection, O’Donovan’s concept of
participation in Christ here seems to entail a similarly bi-directional view of the doctrine of
incarnation. On the one hand, our participation in Christ may be viewed as participation in
that which is natural—the well-ordered universe created through Christ; and on the other
hand, our participation is in that which is supernatural—through faith in Christ which occurs
only via special revelation. This requires an evangelical ethic to proclaim two polarities with
respect to moral knowledge: (1) the universal objective truth within the moral order is
accessible to human knowledge, at least in part; and (2) “true knowledge of the moral order is
knowledge ‘in Christ’”, which is “given to us as we participate in the life of Jesus Christ.”22
Thus the project of separating the ontological and epistemological issues would seem to
hinge upon how we understand the epistemic contingencies of what it means to participate in
the life of Jesus Christ. O’Donovan acknowledges that this participation is the key which
unlocks the deeper meaning of the moral order by revealing Jesus Christ as the source,
20 R&MO, 85. As O’Donovan aptly puts it, the error lies in etherealizing the meaning of ‘in Christ’ in such a
way that faith is grounded in “a universal Logos” rather than in the “Logos made flesh in the first century AD”.
21 R&MO, 85.
22 R&MO, 85.
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content and shape of the eschatological love which forms the heart of ethics. And how does
this participation take place? By living in obedience:
Knowledge of the natural order is moral knowledge, and as such it is co-ordinated with
obedience. There can be no true knowledge of that order without loving acceptance of it
and conformity to it, for it is known by participation and not by transcendence. 23
Moral knowledge thus requires “loving acceptance” of the natural order. If we take this
requirement in the sense of faithful obedience and conformity to the gospel and the new-old
commandment taught by Jesus,24 faith in him would seem to be a necessary component of
moral knowledge. Indeed, the requirement of participation in the life of Christ would seem to
call for obedient response, offered freely and in faith, as a necessary condition for loving
acceptance of Christ and the moral order that he embodies. O’Donovan would seem to be
ratifying this conception of participation in Christ as the foundation for moral knowledge
when he says:
The true moral life of the Christian community is its love, and its love is unintelligible
except as a participation in the life of the one who reveals himself to us as Love, except,
that is, as the entry of mankind and of the restored creation upon its supernatural end.25
To make loving obedience to Christ a pre-requisite of moral knowledge would seem to
make faith and participation in Christ necessary conditions for epistemic access to the moral
order.26 This would however be too hasty a reading of O’Donovan, for he stops short of
equating ethics with faith or worship or theology, because he discerns within those equations
the lamentable confusion of the epistemological and ontological issues. He does not deny the
epistemic role of faithfulness; yet he does not construe moral knowledge to be contingent
upon evangelical witness.27 In recognition of the tension in his statement of loving
23 R&MO, 87.
24 E.g., Matt. 22:37-40; John 13:34-35; 1 John 2:7, 4:21.
25 R&MO, 246.
26 If interpreted in this vein, O’Donovan’s statement of the epistemic contingencies of moral knowledge sound
eminently consistent with Barth’s insistence that dogmatics and ethics are inextricably bound together in the
event of revelation; CD I/2, 790. Webster notes well Barth’s consistency in this regard: “Christian dogmatics is
inherently ethical dogmatics. … Dogmatics, precisely because its theme is the encounter of God and humanity,
is from the beginning moral theology… He does not bifurcate freedom and nature”; John Webster, Barth’s
Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998) 8.
27 While O’Donovan identifies explicitly the criterion of worship for true knowledge—“knowledge is tied up
with the faithful performance of man’s task in the world, and that his knowing will stand or fall with his worship
of God and his obedience to the moral law”; R&MO, 81—he does not make knowledge contingent upon
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acceptance as the requirement for moral knowledge, he identifies the dialectical tension in the
question of how obedience factors into the epistemic requirements for moral knowledge:
How, then, we must ask, if true knowledge of the whole is co-ordinated with obedience,
can there be such a knowledge available to disobedient man?28
O’Donovan offers no immediate answer to this question, other than to insist upon the bi-
directional vantage of his evangelical realism which upholds the objective reality of the moral
order against the risk that it might collapse under the pressure of the experiential and
subjective aspects of “loving acceptance” and obedience. Beyond his repeated reliance upon
participation in Christ as a solution to the dialectical tension between natural and revealed
knowledge of the moral order, he pays surprisingly little attention in R&MO to its
implications for theological anthropology, Christology and pneumatology.29 O’Donovan
does refer to “being-in-Christ” once in the context of explaining “how the freedom realized in
our subjectivities by the Spirit is the same freedom as that which Jesus first achieved in his
subjectivity—‘objectively’ from our point of view.”30 Thus we see that participation (or
‘being’) in Christ binds us ontologically to the moral status of Christ, so that we participate in
his subjectivity, and his moral freedom, without making our own moral knowledge
contingent upon the subjective experience of faithful participation in Christ. Again we can
see O’Donovan’s concern to affirm the objective status of moral knowledge—in this case
interpreting participation in Christ as something to be recognized “‘objectively’ from our
point of view.” But this introduces another paradoxical question—how can we view our
subjective moral freedom in Christ objectively, as O’Donovan claims? His answer is that by
recognizing Christ’s subjectivity as preexistent to our faith, our own subjective experience is
subsumed within the eternal and preexistent moral life of Christ who has vindicated human
moral freedom once and for all. We inherit the moral freedom of the first Adam, which is
evangelical faith, for that would undermine the authority of lex, iustitia, and ordo as the fundamentally
important strands of moral knowledge. Thus, he concludes that worship is to be added to this triad as “the fourth
strand [which] is not a constitutive element of political authority alongside the other three.” WJ, 142; cf. DN, 47.
28 R&MO, 82.
29 Hans Burger notices correctly that “Although O’Donovan does not explicitly reflect on the concept of ‘being
in Christ,’ it is evident that the concept of ‘representation’ is very central to his Christology if not the central
concept. The matter of ‘being in Christ’ is also present, although he does not often use the words ‘being in
Christ’.”; Burger, Being in Christ: A Biblical and Systematic Investigation in a Reformed Perspective (Eugene,
OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008) 477-8. In O’Donovan’s behalf however, I must also acknowledge that he does not
position R&MO as a work of systematic theology. His titular claim to “an outline for evangelical ethics” is
appropriate, and reminds us to pay attention to his epistemological method in our reading, rather than to expect
to find dogmatics pertaining to systematic theology.
30 R&MO, 24. Burger makes note of this reference, Being in Christ , 478.
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fulfilled in the last. Our participation in Christ is therefore participation in an objective reality
that has existed for all time, as O’Donovan explains:
The gift of subjective freedom must already be an aspect of our being-in-Christ, not
merely a precondition of or a consequence of it. Before the Spirit gives us this freedom it
is Christ’s freedom… we must characterize Christian freedom as participation in Christ’s
authority within the created order.31
By conceiving of human moral freedom as a participation in the authority of Christ
“within the created order”, O’Donovan would guard against the possibility that participation
in Christ might be interpreted as an impenetrable mystery which obscured knowledge of the
moral order behind a smokescreen of subjectivity, leaving it ultimately undetermined.
O’Donovan aims for a realism which will rule out interpretations of faith as an irrational and
mysterious ‘leap’ which renders moot the effort to ascertain objective knowledge through
rational thought.32 If rational moral deliberation were to be impugned by the apparently
arbitrary and inaccessible impetus of each observer’s private “spontaneity of mood and
emotion”,33 the entire project of evangelical ethics would be at risk: rather than standing
solidly as an objective reality within the creation, the moral order would then exist only in the
realm of esoteric and personal ideas, “opted into by those who so choose, irrelevant to those
31 R&MO, 24. Burger shows good insight into O’Donovan’s doctrine here—“a moment of union is not
necessary within O’Donovan’s conceptuality. Representation, participation together with the concepts of
judgment, authority and faith suffice to explain the salvation of humanity”; Burger, Being in Christ, 500, cf.
477-8, 515. For Burger, ‘representation’ implicates the objective reality of Christ as the representative last
Adam who makes atonement for us and binds us into moral reality and all reality; ‘union’ on the other hand,
refers to our mystic, experiential and subjective union with Christ, which of course O’Donovan does not want to
implicate as being a precondition for epistemic access to moral reality.
32 Concern to avoid existentialist interpretations of divine command theory as being too “particular and
unpredictable” drives O’Donovan’s critique of Barth’s ethics; R&MO, 87. Nigel Biggar recognizes how a
perception of irrationality can arise from Barth’s ethics: “the real problem with any concept of divine command
such as Barth’s is that it transcends rational assessment.” Biggar, The Hastening that Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) 24. This perception stems from superficial reading of statements such as this: “They
[i.e., orders and realms of ethical knowledge] are not universal ethical truths, but only the general form of the
one and supremely particular truth of the ethical event which is inaccessible as such to the casuistical grasp”;
CD III/4, 29. The charge of irrationality however is spurious, as it misses the full import of Barth’s relational
epistemology. Biggar goes on to show that just because “God’s command cannot be articulated in terms of
principles or rules that hold from one situation to another”, this does not rule out normative ethics, nor does it
result in irrational, arbitrary moral deliberation; Biggar, ‘Hearing God’s Command and Thinking about What’s
Right: With and Beyond Barth’, in Reckoning with Barth: Essays in Commemoration of the Centenary of Karl
Barth’s Birth (Oxford: Mowbray, 1988) 103f.
33 R&MO, 119.
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who do not choose.”34 O’Donovan’s realism must avoid these extremes, of course, in order
to maintain its balance.
Avoiding the peril of divine command ethics
O’Donovan’s exegesis of ὑπακοή (hypakoē) helps us see how he expects his evangelical
realism to rule out those aspects of divine command theory which he finds unsavory.35 While
there is a sense in which the concept of ‘obedience’ does apply appropriately to this biblical
word in a practical sense, it is an inexact translation. After all, “obedience”, simpliciter, might
conform to a voluntarist-leaning divine command perspective, which O’Donovan would like
to avoid. In order to counter-balance the subjective and emotive aspects of personal
imagination and experience which might be incorporated within the concept of obedience to
divine command, O’Donovan requires that obedience must be understood in a “cognitive
sense”.36 He thus maintains that proper exegesis requires the meaning of ὑπακοή be “split
into two distinct elements, ‘hearing’ and ’doing’”, the co-ordination of which requires
cognitive attentiveness. By this he means to emphasize the rational engagement of the moral
subject with the moral order. Thus, to participate in Christ is to make a rational assent to the
available evidence, and participation in Christ is therefore to be defined as a rational,
obedient response to his authority.37 Thus, sin must be defined in terms of the cognitive
aspect of participation:
The disjunction of hearing and doing, or of reason and will, is sin. It is the failure of man
to make the response that is appropriate to him as a free rational agent.38
34 O’Donovan finds this pernicious misconception prevalent: “Western moral thought since the Enlightenment
has been predominantly ‘voluntarist’ in its assumptions”, R&MO, 16. We may presume that this widely held,
yet erroneous, perception of irrelevance motivates O’Donovan’s discourse, as he begins the first page of his
Preface by sharing the difficulty he has experienced as a professor of moral philosophy encountering “the blank
faces of my students”, whom we might presume to be under the influence of this misconception, vii.
35 Cf. O’Donovan’s exegesis of Romans 1:5; 6:16; R&MO 110.
36 R&MO, 110. He cites James 1:22 for support, since it carries the admonition “do not be deceived”. Also in
support of this reading, he translates 1 Peter 1:22 as “attentiveness” to the truth, in order to convey the
“cognitive content” of obedience.
37 In this way O’Donovan intends to repair the breach he discerns in Barth’s moral theology due to its emphasis
on divine command. He offers this critique of Barth, with respect to a perceived lack of moral responsibility to
objective reality: “All this left him with a formal account of the theological basis of ethics which, depending
exclusively on the divine command – interpreted in the existentialist way as particular and unpredictable –, was
far too thin to support the extensive responsibility for moral deliberation which he would claim in practice and
sometimes even defend in theory”; R&MO, 87.
38 R&MO, 111.
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This cognitive aspect of obedience to moral authority has important implications for the
doctrine of sin. First, it means that sin is not so much to be understood as a “lack of
knowledge”, but rather to be more precise, sin is “misknowledge”.39 O’Donovan’s point here
is not that humans, as fallen creatures, have lost their ability to perceive and know the moral
order; but rather, their perception is false—it is mis-knowledge.”40 This distinction between
mis-knowledge and “lack of knowledge” (i.e. ignorance) requires some careful parsing to
achieve a fine nuance—the claim that mis-knowledge does not correspond to a loss of the
human capacity to perceive the moral order, would seem to imply that even in the fallen
condition of sin, ignorance of the truth does not put a person into a state of un-knowing with
respect to moral truth. Thus, the capacity to know the truth seems to remain intact, at least in
some sense. We might therefore understand sin as a failure of cognition which results in a
type of knowing that misses the mark.41 The failure inherent in mis-knowledge does mean,
however, that true understanding of the moral order has been lost, as O’Donovan concludes:
Knowledge of the moral order is a grasp of the total shape in which, if anything is
lacking, everything is lacking.42
This would seem to beg the question, if “everything is lacking” in natural access to moral
knowledge, on account of the presence of sin, how could this be called moral knowledge?
Likewise, how could it be called moral knowledge? To suggest that “everything is lacking” in
this unredeemed status of moral knowledge would seem to imply that faith becomes an
essential prerequisite to knowing anything at all about the moral order. In answer to this
objection, O’Donovan wants to say that although “true” understanding requires divine
revelation, nonetheless, mis-knowledge is still an engagement with the moral order, because
“knowledge is, and always has been, man’s order of participation in the universe.”43
39 R&MO, 88. Speaking through Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard comes to a similar conclusion in defining sin as
untruth, Kierkegaard and Howard V. Hong; Edna H. Hong, Philosophical Fragments (Princeton: Princeton
University, 1985) 15.
40 To explain what he means by “mis-knowledge”, O’Donovan references the Barth-Brunner debate over the
idea “that the image of God in man was not merely ‘defaced’ but ‘lost’”; R&MO, 89. O’Donovan maintains that
the epistemological implications of this debate require greater nuance than Barth and Brunner were able to
achieve. For an insightful study of Brunner’s distinction of the terms ‘defaced’ and ‘lost’, see Trevor Hart,
Regarding Karl Barth: Essays toward a Reading of His Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999) 153.
41 This interpretation compares well with the literal biblical meaning of sin (ἁμαρτία, אטח) as a “missing of the
mark.
42 R&MO, 89.
43 R&MO, 89. “[R]evelation catches man out in the guilty possession of a knowledge which he has always had,
but from which he has never won a true understanding. It shows him up… as a man who has ‘suppressed the
truth’ in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18)”, R&MO, 89. O’Donovan thus implies that the first chapter of Romans
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By relying upon this cognitive capability as the essence of what it means to be human
O’Donovan intends to avoid the risk of confusing the epistemological premises of faith with
the ontological primacy of the moral order. As we have seen, O’Donovan points to
participation in Christ as the key to resolving the existential tension which lingers in his
articulation of moral knowledge vs. mis-knowledge. This is why the resurrection serves as
the necessary foundation for an evangelical ethic—Christ vindicates our fallen moral
knowledge, and completes what is lacking therein. In Christ’s resurrection we see God
vindicating the moral order, and by participation ‘in Christ’ we may gain the ability to know
that order. Without the witness of the resurrection to eschatological transformation, and the
bi-directional vision of the resurrection, we would have no valid reason to trust in the
doctrine of ontological priority as a justification for a ‘natural’ ethic.44
Implications for theological anthropology
The correlation between cognition, obedience and knowledge at the core of human
identity, together with the claim that access to the moral order occurs through participation in
Christ, raises some important implications for theological anthropology. O’Donovan
recognizes that one radical implication of this doctrine is to define human persons in terms of
the capacity for knowledge:
Knowledge is the characteristically human way of participating in the cosmic order. Man
takes his place … by knowing the created beings around him in a way that they do not
know him… To know is to fill a quite specific place in the order of things, the place
allotted to mankind.45
supports his view that natural access to knowledge can lead to moral knowledge. In contrast to this
interpretation, I would suggest that Paul’s conclusions with respect to the outcome of natural knowledge of the
created order(s) might invite less sanguine readings of the viability of natural knowledge—“since they did not
see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done. They
were filled with every kind of wickedness, evil…” (Rom. 1:28f).
44 And not just the resurrection, but the incarnation also must provide the same bi-directional vantage if
O’Donovan’s realism is to sustain this tension in moral knowledge. In some ways, the incarnation seems even
more crucial to O’Donovan’s realism, because it is in the incarnation of Christ that human mis-knowledge (i.e.,
sin) is justified as being an engagement with the ontological reality of the moral order.
45 R&MO, 81. Yet sin (disobedience) disturbs the fulfillment of human identity and destiny, and so O’Donovan
offers the necessary qualification: “man’s place in the universe… has not been faithfully occupied… Knowledge
will therefore be inescapably compromised by the problem of fallenness, the defacement of the image of God,
and by the fallen creature’s incapacity to set himself right with good will and determination.”R&MO, 81-82. Cf.
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As a corollary to this understanding of “the place allotted to mankind”, there are certain
implications for the doctrine of revelation. In order to maintain the influence of the moral
order as being impervious to any descent into relativism which might stem from existential
subjectivity, he is careful to state explicitly that participation in Christ does not make
knowledge of the order of the universe a matter solely contingent upon special revelation—
Thus it [order in the universe] remains accessible to knowledge in part. It requires no
revelation to observe the various forms of generic and teleological order which belong to
it. An unbeliever or a non-christian culture does not have to fail entirely to respond to
this knowledge in action, disposition or institution. So much must be said about moral
knowledge as a natural function of man’s existence.46
Accordingly, human nature is seen to possess some capacity to discern moral order, and
likewise, the universe is seen to possess some capacity to reveal moral order. Furthermore,
these capacities are to be understood as being realized apart from any specific event of
revelation. Given O’Donovan’s comments about the state of mis-knowledge that pertains to
the fallen condition of humans in the absence of divine revelation, how is the mis-knowledge
pertaining to these natural capacities to be reconciled with the true content of the moral
order? This question leads to discussion of the Christological implications.
Adopted into equality in Christ?
Confronted with the fragmentary and provisional quality of our moral knowledge, we
must rely upon the bridgework which participation in Christ provides if we are to span the
distance created by the problem of “misknowledge” that results from sin. In Christ alone we
p. 55-56. To define the ontological essence of human beings in terms of a cognitive capacity for knowledge
brings troubling implications for the humanity of embryos, infants and the mentally impaired, as Barth points
out in his rejoinder to Brunner regarding “new-born children and idiots. Are they not children of Adam? Has
Christ not died for them?” Nein!, 89. Joan Lockwood O’Donovan cites this counterargument by Barth in her
analysis of Brunner’s doctrinal move to define a ‘formal’ imago Dei in terms of the capacity for knowledge, and
comes to the well reasoned conclusion that Barth’s statement of the imago—as being defined in relational terms
of “the Word revealed in Jesus Christ as the epistemological and ontological foundation of human being”—is to
be preferred over Brunner’s “formal concept of the humanum as rational self-determination”; Joan E.
O'Donovan, ‘Man in the image of God: the Disagreement between Barth and Brunner Reconsidered’, Scottish
Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 433-459, 458.
46 R&MO, 88.
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escape these bonds. Christ alone—creator and vindicator of the moral order—incarnates
“right” moral action as an ever-present, immediate possibility in all circumstances.
O’Donovan thus describes participation in Christ as the ontological reality which binds our
fragmented, provisional and partial knowledge with his perfect moral authority—
[W]e need not be afraid to speak even of an equality of perspective with the Son of God,
in that the New Testament refers to our ‘adoption as sons’, and to Christ as ‘the first-
born among many brethren’ (Rom. 8:23, 29). But at the ontological level we must say
something stronger: Jesus is not only a witness to the restored moral order, however
indispensable; he is the one in whom that order has come to be. God has willed that the
restored creation should take form in, and in relation to, one man. He exists … as the
one in whom it is summed up. To participate in the new creation is, not provisionally
only but for ever, to participate in Christ – in an equality with him, certainly, since we
have been adopted into his relation to the Father, yet never interchangeably.47
Were it not for the benefits of participation in Christ, the limitations of humankind’s
“inescapably compromised” moral vision would perpetually shroud our moral deliberation in
the miasma of sin, and our ethical discourse would fail to escape the vicissitudes of
voluntarism; but because Christ embodies the completeness and perfection of the moral
order, we gain immediate access to that perfection by virtue of our adoption into his kingdom
family, which adoption in some sense makes us equal with him. Thus, “to participate in
Christ” is to stand as equals with Christ, in some sense, with respect to participation in the
moral order. This reality emerges from God’s freedom in choosing to adopt us into an equal
relationship with Christ. Awareness of this relationship grants us warrant to trust with
confidence that by acting in faithful obedience to Christ, we are participating in, and bearing
witness to, the moral order summed up in him. This is the bold, even scandalous, claim of
evangelical ethics. But how far may we push the idea of equality in this statement with
respect to the ontological reality of the moral order? Does this equality pertain only to the
relationship of faith in which cognitive assent to the authority of Christ obtains? Or does this
equality also apply to the human condition of non-believers, based upon O’Donovan’s
argument that moral knowledge is, to some extent at least, “a natural function of man’s
existence”?48 Here we see how the Incarnation of Christ emerges as a foundational principle
in O’Donovan’s realism. By understanding Christ as the representative who sums up and
completes mankind’s cognitive, obedient response to the moral order—once-and-for-all, for
47 R&MO, 150.
48 R&MO, 88.
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all humankind—the ontological priority of the moral order may be considered a
Christologically necessary doctrine. We can see this Christological emphasis upon
representation in O’Donovan’s interpretation of the Anglican Reformers—
The compelling force of the Reformers’ answers is that they reintroduce the forgotten
middle-term in the relation of God and the soul: the effective agent of God and the
representative of man, Jesus Christ, whose work of salvation is complete and decisive,
the last word to which nothing can be added… already proposition and answer, thesis
and antithesis, all in one.49
The once-and-for-all finality of Christ’s incarnation thus binds all human flesh to the
primal structure of the moral order embedded within the creation. O’Donovan’s evangelical
realism is grounded in this binding. We can retrace the logic: Christ is preexistent and eternal;
Christ incarnate is objectively real; Christ binds humankind to himself; and, “nothing can be
added” to this moral significance of Christ as the representative of all humankind. Thus, the
objective reality of Christ mediates and secures moral knowledge as “a natural function of
man’s existence”. QED, or so it would seem. Upon the rigor of this logic O’Donovan’s
appeal to the epistemic import of a ‘natural ethic’ would seem to hinge. I shall end this
chapter by identifying some challenging implications of this evangelical realism.
Challenges ensuing from O’Donovan’s evangelical realism
While O’Donovan’s approach seems to offer a promising apologetic for the ontology of
the moral order, it engenders some challenges as a statement of the epistemology of moral
knowledge. The challenges stem generally from the difficulty of sustaining the tension
between the presumed objectivity of a ‘natural ethic’, and the subjective experience of faith
in which true evangelical understanding obtains. This engenders challenging Christological
and pneumatological questions, with serious implications for theological anthropology. Of
course we must recognize that O’Donovan has not set out to develop a systematic theology,
but rather, an outline for evangelical ethics; nonetheless, these implications deserve thorough
attention if the method of his realism is to be termed “evangelical”.
49 39 Articles, 78. Hans Burger cites this reference in support of his reading of O’Donovan’s Christological
emphasis upon Representation, Being in Christ, 454, n9.
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First, there is the challenge of avoiding subjectivity in statements of moral knowledge. As
O’Donovan has shown, subjective experience is formed and occurs within the one objective
reality of the universe. Therefore the ontological reality of the ordered structure of the
universe, and the moral order within it, cannot in any sense be contingent upon an
individual’s subjective experience. Given the necessarily existential, flawed and fragmentary
nature of our human knowledge however, the agency of the Holy Spirit is necessary to
redeem moral knowledge and behaviour—
Again, when we speak of the Christian moral life as lived in the Spirit, we declare that this
life is itself part of the divine self-disclosure, and as such points us forward to the goal of
that self-disclosure. The Holy Spirit, outside of whose field of operation the Christian
moral life is unthinkable, is a signpost to the future, ‘the earnest of our inheritance
pointing to the redemption of God’s possession’ (Eph. 1:14).50
To say that Christian moral life is unthinkable apart from the activity of the Holy Spirit
would seem to suggest that a “natural ethic” alone fails to provide epistemic access to the
moral order. Are we to presume therefore that the Holy Spirit is at work in redeeming the
fallen understanding which derives through a “natural ethic”? How does this happen outside
of faith as a necessary component of epistemic access to the moral order?
Second, there is the challenge of formulating an evangelical doctrine of sin and moral
knowledge within the parameters laid out by O’Donovan’s realism. If sin is defined as “the
disjunction of hearing and doing, or of reason and will”,51 this would seem to imply that
obedience to the gospel (“loving acceptance”, in O’Donovan’s phrase) were essential for
cognizance of, and response to, the moral order. Yet, O’Donovan’s realism demands that the
mis-knowledge which results from sin does not equate to a loss of the human capacity to
perceive the moral order. This suggests that acts committed in a state of mis-knowledge (in
the form of ignorance or the disjunction of reason and will) may somehow—accidentally and
unintentionally, perhaps—result in right moral behavior, by the activity of the Holy Spirit.
This would seem to pose a contradiction to the role of the Spirit as agent of divine self-
disclosure. Furthermore, this raises challenges for how we are to understand participation in
50 R&MO, 247.
51 R&MO, 111.
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Christ as the key to moral knowledge. Christ’s life is moral because of his loving obedience
to the Father, not because his mis-knowledge was somehow redeemed by the Holy Spirit.52
Third, there is the challenge of avoiding any implication of the on-going work of the
Spirit within the teleological order of creation. As we have seen, O’Donovan concludes that
the moral order of the universe is teleologically complete and eschatologically fulfilled; it is
not evolving or contingent in any way upon history to reveal its teleological content. This
doctrine of teleological order ensures for the moral order a “completeness which is already
present in the universe”.53 This would seem to make moral law akin to scientific law in the
sense that each is an objectively knowable reality external to the mind of the observer.
Theology might thereby be considered an experimental science on a par with physics.54 As
such, moral theology could be considered a scientific pursuit in which moral reality is “out
there” to be prodded and probed to reveal its inherent truths—
Moral ‘learning’ is all the time ‘thinking’. It is the intellectual penetration and exploration
of a reality which we can grasp from the beginning in a schematic and abstract way, but
which contains depths of meaning and experience into which we must reach.55
If moral learning is all the time “thinking”, conceived as an intellectual operation, where
does conversion fit into the process of moral learning? And does this relegate the Holy Spirit
to a teaching role? Given that moral knowledge comes to fruition only through participation
in Christ, this idea of moral learning as an intellectual exercise would seem to conflict with
the miraculous event of conversion and the on-going role of the Spirit in discernment of
52 In his cogent analysis of sin and morality, Ivor Davidson presents the issue succinctly: “Jesus has no relation
with some other person called God the Son: Jesus is God the Son”; “the obedience of the incarnate Son is
grounded in inner-divine relations of giving and receiving”. If we are to participate in the moral life of Christ
then, we will be participating not by virtue of an unwitting correspondence to some other person or ontological
reality, but rather by cognizant relationship sustained in the inner-divine relations of the Trinity. Davidson,
“Pondering the Sinlessness of Jesus Christ: Moral Christologies and the Witness of Scripture” (2008: 391-2).
53 R&MO, 62.
54 Moltmann engages this idea with good insight, for while he sees value in conceiving of theology as being
experimental—“a theologia experimentalis, an experimental theology”—this refers to the interactive aspect of
exploration as a participation in the universe, and not as a doctrinal statement of moral reality as being an
ontologically external, self-contained and complete reality to be studied from an objective vantage point. Thus,
Moltmann draws a helpful distinction between experimental theology and experimental physics—theologically
speaking, “reality is not only hidden, but is itself not yet there… ‘the whole’ is not an eternal reality… reality is
itself at stake in the process of history.” Jürgen Moltmann, Science and Wisdom (London: SCM, 2003) 7, 14.
55 R&MO, 92. Cf. “Obedience must be thoughtful obedience… Moral instruction is directed to what we ‘do,’ but
nobody ‘does’ anything without thinking”; O’Donovan, ‘The Moral Authority of Scripture’, in Scripture’s
Doctrine and Theology’s Bible, eds. Markus Bockmuehl and Alan J. Torrance (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2008), 165-175, 175.
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moral truth. These are rightly conceived not as mere intellectual human achievements, but
rather as miraculous works of the Spirit—
Conversion… is an event in which reason and will together are turned from arbitrariness
to reality, an event which is ‘miraculous’ in that there are no sufficient grounds for it,
whether rational or voluntative, within the subject himself.56
Furthermore, this miraculous event is not a mere one-off moment of illumination, but an
on-going process of continual activity by the Spirit, in the relationship which sustains faith as
a continuing event of continuing conversion in the life of the believer.57 Yet in view of moral
learning as an intellectual engagement with the ontological reality of the moral order, it
would seem that the miraculous event of conversion must be conceived as being wholly
inconsequential to the structure of the moral order;58 otherwise, the order would be in some
sense an emergent, dynamic reality incorporating the event of conversion.59 To sustain the
concept of teleological completeness O’Donovan must rule out the concept of “continuous
creation” which would give the structure of the creation a dynamic aspect untenable on view
of his realism—
Classical Christian theology took trouble to distinguish between the ideas of ‘creation’
and ‘providence’. … The modern faith in ‘continuous creation’ is merely the latest form
in which forgetfulness of this dialectic between order and contingency betrays itself.60
56 R&MO, 113.
57 Thus, O’Donovan recites the opposing pole of tension in moral knowledge: “moral learning… must begin…
with the initial conversion of the mind in repentance… it must be constantly renewed in repentance as well”;
R&MO, 93.
58 Michael S. Northcutt serves as an example of the oversight that can result from an uncritical reading of
O’Donovan’s doctrinal implications for pneumatology. Northcutt cites R&MO (107) approvingly in support of
his conclusion regarding moral learning as an intellectual process aided by the Spirit: “The Spirit enables our
moral agency by enlightening our minds to the reality of sin, and by removing the veil that sin placed over our
minds”; Northcutt, ‘Being Silent: Time in the Spirit’, in The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2004): 414-26, 425. He thus accepts O’Donovan’s concept regarding the role of the Holy Spirit as
enlightening the intellect and rational moral sensibilities, yet without noticing that implicit in this enlightening
there also occurs the personal transformation of awakening to life in Christ, and this is also initiated through the
agency of the Holy Spirit in the same event which brings enlightened understanding and metanoia.
59 O’Donovan acknowledges the event of conversion as an on-going, continual event—“Faith, therefore, is
always open to repentance… It is renewed and sustained, not out of the agent’s established character but by
continual conversion.” R&MO, 256. Nonetheless, his realism excludes the dynamism of this continuing event
from contributing to the structure of the moral order, for that would impinge upon the doctrine of its objectivity.
In a contradictory (or dialectical) statement, O’Donovan also suggests that the order of creation is contingent
upon our worshipful participation in it—“Our very joy places us within that order, and by our gladness the
ordered creation of God is made complete”; DN, 182.
60 R&MO, 61. Elsewhere, O’Donovan alludes to continuing creation as a “depressing conception of Manichaen
character”; DN, 143. Cf. O’Donovan’s critique of the idea of incarnation as an on-going event of mystic union
between believers and Christ: “Being party to the positive conjunction of God and world is the distinct form of
Chapter 3: O’Donovan’s Evangelical Realism 62
Thus, acts of providence are deemed not to be creative, at least not in the sense of
creation ex nihilo; else, “continuous creation” would in some sense be happening in the out-
working of God’s providence. There is a dialectic point of view necessary to combine this
statement of teleological completeness with the on-going miraculous work of the Spirit.61
This dialectical view of the moral order as being both complete, and yet contingent upon the
work of the Spirit, suggests that certain boundaries must be placed around pneumatological
doctrine in order to limit the role of the Holy Spirit to revelation of the objective reality of the
moral order and the ‘right’ moral choices which comprise it.62 The effect of these limits is to
rule out any activity of the Spirit which would imply either: (a) incompleteness in the
ontological reality of the moral order, or (b) historical process as an integral component of the
moral order. This puts O’Donovan’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit under significant stress, for it
would seem to limit the role of the Spirit to the illumination of an external objective reality,
to the exclusion of inner-divine relationality as a continually new and miraculous event upon
which the moral order remained contingent. We might thus rephrase this pneumatological
issue as the challenge of excluding the epistemic role of the Holy Spirit from the ontology of
the moral order.
theosis offered to believers in liberal theology”; O’Donovan, Church in Crisis, 8. Polkinghorne offers a helpful
corrective to a strident rejection of on-going creation when he points out that a “notion of continuous creation
may be expected to go beyond a deistic upholding of the universe in being”; in other words, the flat-out
rejection of on-going creation tends to collapse into deistic natural theology based upon the presumption that
God is no longer at work in creation. This leads to a doctrine of “the God of natural theology alone, who is
simply the ground of cosmic order”; John Polkinghorne, The Work of Love: Creation and Kenosis (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001) 96.
61 This dialectic can be seen in O’Donovan’s statement of conversion as both an on-going event and a single
event: “In [a] sense it is true to say that conversion happens not once but many times. Yet it is always the one
eschatological reality, … the one decisive transformation; so that we may say, and more profoundly, that
conversion happens only once, and that each successive turning back claims and reclaims the one decisive
encounter”; R&MO, 258.
62 These limits come into conflict with the active role of the Holy Spirit in the miracle of conversion, and the
redemption of reason as an element of new creation. Alan Torrance discusses the epistemic significance of
transformational work of the Spirit in ‘Can the Truth Be Learned? Redressing the “Theologistic Fallacy” in
Modern Biblical Scholarship’, in Scripture’s Doctrine and Theology’s Bible; Torrance, Alan J., and Markus
Bockmuehl, eds. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008): 143-63. Torrance demonstrates the “dynamic
presence of God and God’s creative reconciling of our minds” as epistemological necessities for theology and
ethics, 151.
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Conclusion
Given the challenging questions raised by O’Donovan’s path of evangelical realism, we
might ask at this juncture to what extent he has succeeded in achieving the balance he desires
between the various polarities. Similarly we might wonder how well this path of realism
succeeds in sorting out the confusion of the epistemological and ontological questions which
O’Donovan ascribes to the Barth-Brunner debate. After all, O’Donovan admits that a purely
natural route to knowledge will lead to a failure to grasp moral knowledge, a failure which he
refers to as a “misknowledge” in which “everything is lacking.” This sounds strikingly
similar to Barth’s conclusion that there is no natural point of contact which provides
epistemic access to knowledge of the moral order,63 yet O’Donovan argues that this
conclusion stems from epistemological confusion. By looking more intently into that debate
in the next chapter, we shall shed light on these issues.
63 Barth argues that the “repair” of the “point of contact” in the human imago Dei which leads to epistemic
access to knowledge of the true God “consists in a miracle performed upon man,” a miracle in which
‘“material” aptitude’ for such knowledge is ‘the most impossible thing in the world’, Nein!, 94. O’Donovan
similarly notes the necessity of miracle to redeem human reason: “Repentance must go hand in hand with faith,
which is the proper stance of reason when it attends to an object which it cannot transcend or contain”, and
“Conversion…is an event in which reason and will together are turned from arbitrariness to reality, an event
which is ‘miraculous’”, R&MO, 113.
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4 POINT OF CONTACT: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE BARTH-BRUNNER DEBATE FOR
MORAL KNOWLEDGE
γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής, πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης
Romans 3:4
There comes a decisive turning point in Resurrection and Moral Order at the end of
“Part One: The Objective Reality”. Having set forth his view of the created order, its
objectivity and fulfillment, O’Donovan turns his attention to the rules of engagement, as it
were, which pertain to moral knowledge, in a chapter described as “a pause for reflection”.1
In this chapter he aims to sort out the epistemological questions which arise from the
recognition that in the case of evangelical ethics, moral knowledge does not subsist within an
objectifiable conceptual structure which can be expressed as a set of principles, but rather
evangelical moral knowledge “is also, and perhaps more importantly, a function of its
object”.2 Indeed. How can we speak meaningfully of moral knowledge as an objective truth
accessible to natural reason, when that very truth is known solely in and through Christ?
Whatever can it mean to speak of moral knowledge as objective truth, if we hold its meaning
1 R&MO, 76.
2 R&MO, 76.
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to be embodied in Christ, communicated via the euangelion, and understood through
participation in Christ?
“What kind of knowledge can this be…?” This is the question O’Donovan realizes he
must confront before continuing to discuss the subjective aspect of moral knowledge which
occurs through participation in Christ. This question leads him directly into a discussion of
the epistemological conditions applicable to knowledge of the moral order, and here he
makes a most insightful comparison between his own concern for the objective-subjective
synthesis of moral knowledge,3 and the Barth-Brunner debate:
In the great theological attack upon Natural Law which was spearheaded earlier this century by
Karl Barth, we can only regret that the ontological and epistemological issues were never
properly differentiated. In his pursuit of an uncompromised theological epistemology Barth
allowed himself to repudiate certain aspects of the doctrine of creation (such as “ordinances”)
which ought never to have fallen under suspicion. Emil Brunner, for all his unclarity over the
epistemological issue, deserves credit for having understood this.4
What is it about Barth’s “attack upon Natural Law”, and the resultant repudiation of
certain doctrines of “ordinances” that concerns O’Donovan so? In order to answer this
question, we shall need to delve into the core issues of the Barth-Brunner debate as they
pertain to O’Donovan’s concern for the epistemological ground rules of moral deliberation
and moral knowledge. We shall discover via this analysis that the crux of the matter is how
we are to understand the human capacity to perceive the shape of the moral order as revealed
through the creation. The big word coined by Brunner to address this very issue is
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit—literally, “capacity of (or for) revelation”, which requires careful
exegesis, because it can refer ambiguously to either a human attribute (capability or
capacity), or to an attribute of the revelatory powers of nature.
The irony of this three-way dialog between Brunner, Barth and O’Donovan is that all
three are driven in some sense by the same polemical impulse—to oppose the relentless
interpretive pressures of 20th-century secularism which steer the modern moral imaginary in
the direction of secular humanism. In the case of Brunner and Barth, this concern came to the
fore in the context of the ugly and terrifying social and political movements of Nazi Germany
in the 1930s.5 The historical context helps explain the intensity of their debate. As
3 For further reference to O’Donovan’s concern for the objective-subjective synthesis, see R&MO, 102.
4 R&MO, 86-7.
5 For as much as our present analysis confines our attention to the antagonism of the Barth-Brunner debate, it is
well worth remembering that their end-of-life gestures of reconciliation might well serve as the better ethics
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O’Donovan points out, the driving force behind the Barth-Brunner debate is not so much the
doctrine of natural theology per se, but rather the implications that doctrine brings for moral
knowledge, and hence, the intensified importance of the church’s theological response to the
political pressures of the day.6 In confronting those dire political pressures, Brunner seeks to
uphold the rubrics of Christian morality against the tide of secular humanism by emphasizing
the responsibility as a determinative characteristic of human nature. His doctrine thus serves
to shore up the theological underpinnings of human dignity as being realized in responsibility
to the moral order. This leads him to develop the problematic assertion of a “formal” image
of God contained in human nature, in order to explain moral responsibility as a component of
human nature in correspondence with the “ordinances” of creation. Barth rejects the
implications of Brunner’s doctrine for ethics and theological anthropology, insisting rather
upon a Christo-centric moment of encounter at the heart of ethics. O’Donovan finds each of
their approaches to require further nuance; nonetheless, he holds in common with both of
them the desire to repudiate the drift of our secular age into humanism. In O’Donovan’s case,
the primary concern is to expunge theological ethics of pernicious arbitrariness and
voluntarism. He judges Barth’s doctrine somewhat problematic on this score, due to its
emphasis upon the divine command—
All this left him [Barth] with a formal account of the theological basis of ethics which, depending
exclusively on the divine command—interpreted in the existentialist way as particular and
unpredictable--, was far too thin to support the extensive responsibility for moral deliberation
which he would claim in practice and sometimes even defend in theory.7
The positions of all three converge upon the interpretive issue of what it might mean for
there to exist a point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) for moral knowledge. Analysis of this
issue will therefore serve as an effective lens onto the implications of O’Donovan’s
lesson to be gleaned from their association. For deeper insight into the issues of the debate and its context, see
T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990); John Webster,
Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); Gary Dorrien, The
Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology without Weapons (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2000); George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2000); Bruce McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997);
John W. Hart, Karl Barth v. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution of a Theological Alliance, 1916-
1936 (New York: Peter Lang, 2001); John C. McDowell, ‘Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and the Subjectivity of the
Object of Christian Hope’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 8 (2006): 25-41.
6 R&MO, 90. Cf., Moltmann notes perceptively that natural theology was not so much the impetus of their
debate, as the political repercussions of the actions of the pro-Nazi ‘German Christians’. Jürgen Moltmann
Experiences in Theology: Way and Forms of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000) 80f.
7 R&MO, 87.
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evangelical realism. We shall begin our analysis by delving into the anthropological and
epistemological implications of Brunner’s doctrine, and then turn to consider Barth’s reply,
Nein! Finally, we shall apply our findings to a case study which demonstrates O’Donovan’s
effort to sort out the ontological and epistemological issues. This study is based in his
analysis of the relationship between doctrines of ordo essendi and ordo cognoscendi.
Part I: Analysis of Brunner’s doctrine of Anknüpfungspunkt
The famous “debate over natural theology” reached a polemical zenith of sorts with the
publication of Brunner’s Natur und Gnade and Barth’s reply, Nein!8 In these pamphlets
Brunner and Barth confront one another directly on the doctrinal issues of revelation, the
orders of creation, the imago Dei and moral knowledge. Brunner defends herein his doctrine
of the point of contact—his “Lehre vom Anknüpfungspunkt”,9 yet it is his comprehensive
monograph on theological anthropology, Man in Revolt, in which we find his most sustained
presentation of the doctrine of Anknüpfungspunkt.10 In the several Appendices to this opus,
Brunner sets forth explicitly his doctrines of Anknüpfung, the imago Dei and natural theology
with deliberate academic rigor. Following Natur und Gnade by three years, the book
comprises Brunner’s definitive response to the vociferous rebuttal he received from Barth’s
angry reply in Nein!11 Brunner puts plainly his desire to settle the debate once and for all by
articulating more thoroughly those aspects of his doctrine of theological anthropology which
figured so prominently in his debate with Barth—
With the publication of this book I hope that I have redeemed the promise made in the foreword
to the second edition of Natur und Gnade, namely, that only a completely theological
anthropology, … will be in a position, without causing new misunderstandings, to show clearly
my concern, as against Karl Barth, namely, man’s responsibility.12
8 The two signal works from 1934 have been published together in the slim volume, Natural Theology (Eugene,
OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), hereafter “NT”, which comprises Brunner’s Natur und Gnade (hereafter, “NG”) and
Barth’s reply, Nein!
9 This is the phrase Brunner uses in NG, 19 (NT, 32).
10 English translation of Der Mensch im Widerspurch (1937). Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian
Anthropology (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), hereafter MiR.
11 Barth begins Nein! bluntly with an “Angry Introduction” (70). Brunner, for his part, denies holding any angry
feelings, and says the whole matter was due to a misunderstanding that he could take “fairly lightly”; NT, 15.
12 MiR, 11. Cf. p. 527, where Brunner again refers to this book as an attempt to address Barth’s Antwort.
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Interestingly, Brunner identifies “man’s responsibility” as the hinge issue in the debate.13
Brunner’s concern here corresponds to O’Donovan’s definition of the distinguishing
characteristic of “man’s position in the universe” as being the possession of knowledge, and
hence, the capacity to do so.14 This leads him to accuse Barth of a form of divine command
ethics which deprives humans of the responsibility which comes from free moral agency.15
Why does this issue play such a central role in Brunner’s doctrine, but not Barth’s? The
answer lies in Brunner’s concern to affirm human dignity at the core of what it means to be
human. He saw this as a flaw in Barth’s position—that Barth’s doctrine disparages human
dignity and freedom inevitably in order to make room for the initiative and freedom of God.
“Brunner accuses Barth of overwhelming and annihilating the human”, as McDowell
observes with wry precision.16 Accordingly, Brunner frames the central question which will
guide his opus on theological anthropology: Was ist der Mensch? 17 This simple question
serves as the lodestone for Brunner’s movement along his course toward a statement of true
and genuine humanity.18 It also serves notice of what will become a point of contention with
Barth—the question of whether this is the proper starting point. To begin from the human
side of the question is to invite an anthropocentric, as opposed to a Christocentric, doctrine.
Thus, Brunner has chosen to begin the development of his doctrine of theological
anthropology from a perspective distinctly different from Barth’s.19 From Brunner’s point of
view, an emphasis on the human side of the question might be seen as a corrective issued out
of concern that the polemical thrust of Barth’s “theocentricity” places such attention upon
13 Cf. NT, 25, 31, 56, 59.
14 R&MO, 81.
15 O’Donovan, ‘The Moral Authority of Scripture’ in Scripture’s Doctrine and Theology’s Bible, eds. Markus
Bockmuehl and Alan J. Torrance (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008) 165-175, 169.
16 John C. McDowell, ‘Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and the Subjectivity of the Object of Christian Hope’,
International Journal of Systematic Theology 8 (2006): 25-41, 27. Barth, in contrast, “makes his theology dance
to the rhythms of perichoretic improvisation.”
17 This question repeatedly engages Brunner, in numerous works; e.g. his chapter on “The Mystery of Man” in
Our Faith likewise begins, “What is man?” Brunner, Our Faith, trans. by John W. Rilling (London: SCM Press,
1959) 34.
18 This is my paraphrase of Brunner’s subtitle: Die christliche Lehre vom wahren und vom wirklichen
Menschen.
19 Barth looks back upon the tendency of evangelical theology in his lifetime to lose its direction and become
“religionistic, anthropocentric and… humanistic” by dint of its overriding concern to focus on the “external and
internal disposition and emotion of man”, as opposed to a focus on Jesus Christ as “the Revealer of them both
(God and man, that is)”; Barth, The Humanity of God (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960) 39, 47. Cf. T.F.
Torrance’s summation of this problem as recognized by Barth: “theology… lost a grip upon its own essence as
Christian theology and became basically anthropocentric”; T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical
Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990) 30-31.
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divine initiative that human freedom is consequently eviscerated, and even perhaps left out of
theological anthropology altogether.20
The humanum as that special “something”
This concern to counterbalance Barth’s emphasis upon “theocentricity” and divine
command leads Brunner to exposit a concept of human nature, or humanum, which can
sustain the weight of moral responsibility without being rendered inconsequential by the
overwhelming weight of divine initiative. Again, there is a parallel to be seen in
O’Donovan’s concern to sustain moral responsibility within the natural order as a priority
unquenched by the epistemic thrust of revelation as an event of personal experience wrought
in ontic encounter with God.
From the outset Brunner focuses on the question of how to define the humanum as that
special “something” that separates homo sapiens from the higher primates and all other
animal life forms—
All these human beings are bound to one another … by that “something” which makes man man,
the ‘mind’ or the ‘reason’... in contrast to all that can be conceived from the biological point of
view; that is to say, the humanum.21
We see immediately that Brunner’s choice to define this “something” in terms of the
capacities of mind and reason hearkens back to the medieval Christian philosophy of
Boethius and the idea of a rational soul as a substance which can be defined in terms of its
mental capacities.22 This raises the question of whether Brunner has tacitly imported these
ideas as presumptions, or whether he intends to develop them via biblical theology. Be that as
20 John Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998)
12. The generic challenge to Barth’s ethical stance is seen in the responses of his contemporaries, e.g. W. Link’s
rejoinder: “How can the affirmation of the moral deed arise from the denial of everything human?” 18. Webster
points out rightly that Barth’s doctrine does not negate the human ethos, but rather, recognizes its transformation
through divine action, 30.
21 MiR, 22.
22 MiR, 41f. The torrid pace of neurobiology (see Chapter 1) has already made some of Brunner’s remarks on
this topic sound hopelessly dated: “down to the present time no traces of this “something” have ever been
discovered in an animal”. Cf. Brunner’s defense of his doctrine “in spite of all these attacks of modern
naturalism” (MiR, 41-2). Brunner finds support for this idea in the ancient humanism of Greek philosophy,
expressing affinity for the suggestion that the humanum corresponds in some sense to “the spark … of Divine
Reason”, 550f, although he also warns of going too far in that direction of interpretation, 551. Cf. Brunner’s
comments regarding “that inward and higher “something””; MiR, 19; cf. 82.
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it may, Brunner’s affinity for the idea of a rational soul finds further expression in terms of
the correspondence between humanum and divinum—between that which makes a human
being a human being, and that which makes God divine:
The distinctive element in man… is the humanum, which for Greek thought is also a divinum. The
humanum is based upon a divinum. This is the common element in the idea of man both in ancient
philosophy and in Christianity.23
Accordingly, Brunner’s expression of the humanum in terms of the capacities or
attributes pertaining to that special “something” aligns with the theological notion that God
can similarly be described in terms of attributes; hence, the dependence upon the notion of
divinum as an analog for discussion of the humanum. Brunner says this expression of human
nature holds true not only for Christian orthodoxy, but also for the whole “variety of views of
man”;24 and furthermore, the relationship between God and human corresponds analogically
with the idealized divinity of mediaeval metaphysics.25
The next distinctive attribute of the humanum is this:
There is one final depth in man … He has religion… [J]ust as man is homo faber, so also he is homo
religiosus. He is this even when he renounces all mythology, all ideas of a supernatural being, and
becomes an agnostic or an atheist.26
Brunner bases his concept of homo religiosus upon the existential experience of human
consciousness, a condition he ascribes to all human beings, not only to Christians and other
people of faith, but to all humankind regardless of belief in any supernatural reality or
23 MiR, 548. Similarly, in chapter one, Brunner defines the humanum as the “common element [of] all human
beings, … that humanum which distinguishes [them] from all other creatures”, MiR, 22, cf., 93.
24 MiR, 41f. Such an endorsement of metaphysics and the naturalistic views of humanism, both ancient and
modern, indicates a predilection for reconciliation between Christian and natural ethics, a dubious prospect to be
addressed in chapter 7.
25 Brunner discusses the humanum and divinum in light of philosophy in Appendix V, MiR, 547-559. We see
this point emphasized also in D-HE, 46, where Brunner identifies the divine-human relationship as the
fundamental ontological and epistemological reality. “[T]he state of the dependent-independent creature… is the
fundamental category of the Bible; and in relation to it is everything said in the Bible is said and must be
understood.”
26 MiR, 25.
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relationship with the living God. Thus, the inclination toward religion is a fundamental and
universal aspect of the humanum.27
Distillation of Brunner’s doctrine of the humanum thus yields these three characteristics:
1) The humanum is based upon the divinum, which is discerned as a higher
“something”;
2) The “mind” and “reason” represent “that “something” which makes man
man”; and
3) The inescapable inclination and predilection for religion marks the
humanum (as homo religiosus).
This statement of the humanum lays the foundation for Brunner’s “doctrine of the point
of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt)”28 which sparked his debate with Barth. Reason and mind are
hereby seen to be innate capacities, present even when in an undeveloped state, by which
humans can do those things that display their human-ness. Brunner explicitly defines mind
and reason as those capacities which constitute the “distinctively human element [of]
humanity.”29 These elements culminate in culture, mathematics, science, art, speech, and
religion.30
In Natur und Gnade also, Brunner mentions the capacity to hear the Word of God as a
distinctive element of the humanum.31 Furthermore, and to the ire of Barth, Brunner
maintains that this capacity can never be lost. Even in the case of the sinner, the capacity to
hear the Word of God remains a fundamental element of the humanum; it is always there as
an ‘actual’ reality, and not merely an artifact of faith:
Thus, the structure of the being of man is always pre-supposed, which indeed, as we now know,
is an actual, not a substantial responsible being, being in decision. In the Bible this structure is
27 By way of defining what he means by religious inclination in the case of non-believers, Brunner explains:
“The dimension of eternity remains, never unoccupied, even if only by the sense of insecurity and the anxiety
which accompanies it”, MiR, 26.
28 NG, 19; NT, 32.
29 MiR, 43. “…seiner Geist, seine Vernunft. In dieser Fähigkeit hat er seine Humanität. Diese Humanität aber is
erst das eigentlich Menschliche”; Mensch, 30.
30 MiR, 42.
31 Brunner uses the same word here, Fähigkeit, to express the idea of capacity in the sense of ability, skill, talent
or asset, as he explains the meaning of humanum in terms of the capacity to hear the Word of God,
Wortmächtigkeit; NG, 19.
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never regarded as lost—indeed how could this be so, since even the sinner is still a human
being?32
Brunner even goes so far as to describe this characteristic of the humanum as a “capacity for
recognising truth”:
Even fallen man still has—thanks to the “portion” of the imago that he has retained—an
immortal soul, a conscience, in which the law of God is indelibly and irremovably implanted. But
he also has an inclination toward truth and a capacity for recognising truth.33
This expansive statement of the human capacity and inclination for truth raises serious
questions. How does sin affect this capacity? What is truth in that case?34 Does this ascription
of an indestructible attribute to the ontological reality of the imago Dei indicate that
Brunner’s doctrine of Anknüpfungspunkt imports epistemological presumptions into his
statement of the truth-discerning capacity of the humanum? We can see here some
resemblance to O’Donovan’s doctrine of ontological priority for the moral order, which in
keeping with Brunner’s doctrine of Anknüpfungspunkt, supports the idea that truth (or the
moral order, as the case may be) is “out there” to be ascertained as an act of “thinking”.35
Of ontological priority and epistemological presumption
So far, our analysis suggests that Brunner’s doctrine of the humanum comports
remarkably well with the classical scholastic definition of the human being as a “rational
substance”, as per Boethius: persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia.36 This
provides an ontological foundation for his doctrine of Anknüpfungspunkt; however, he wishes
to forestall some unfortunate consequences of those medieval metaphysics to avoid the
32 MiR, 539. This is the same point Brunner made in NG with respect to Wortmächtigkeit: “The Word of God
does not have to create man’s capacity for words. He has never lost it, it is the presupposition of his ability to
hear the Word of God”; NT, 32.
33 NT, 42. “…Vermögen, Wahres zu erkennen”; NG, 28.
34 Jesus’ silence in the face of Pilate’s question [John 18:38] might suggest that the question has been asked on
false premises, and thus cannot be answered within the presumption of such a capacity as an independent,
human-focused Anknüpfungspunkt, or Archimedean point, as the case may be.
35 “Such is the subjective and pessimistic conception to which the notion of original sin is reduced when it loses
its ground in an objective creation-order containing a collective human nature”; 39 Articles, 71. Cf.
O’Donovan’s endorsement of “Augustine’s belief in a real human nature as such”, 68f.
36 De duobus naturis et una persona Christi, c.3.
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“disastrous influence” they have repeatedly inflicted upon Church theology.37 The risk here
is clear—to invite the notion that human nature can be conceived as possessing a “Divine
spark” within itself leads quickly to the suggestion of an idealized, pristine state for human
nature which remains impervious to sin. As Brunner notes, in such an idealized construction
of the humanum: “the idea of sin cannot develop”.38 It seems therefore that Brunner wishes
to place some constraints of some sort upon the consequences which his metaphysics of the
humanum can bring for dogmatics.
In order to guard against the risk of this sort of idealism, Brunner warns wisely:
Whatever the claims of philosophy may be, I maintain that faith must never renounce its own
ontology. … Every idea of being already betrays its background, whether it be that of
metaphysics or of faith.39
Having articulated his ontology of the humanum, we now see Brunner switching gears to
ask the epistemological questions concerning the ground rules for theological anthropology
and for dogmatics in general. It is a move reminiscent of O’Donovan’s pause for
epistemological reflection, which occurs only after the ontological statement of the moral
order has been made. It is as if Brunner pauses to ask what epistemological presumptions
have been at work in the forgoing statement of the humanum; and, his answer is this—every
ontological idea betrays its background. Where you begin is where you end; therefore, faith
must never renounce its own ontology. And what is the “ontology of faith”? Brunner defines
it concisely:
There is absolutely no definition which is more ‘original’ than this: Creator and creature. God is
the Creator not only of all that exists, but also of all the forms of existence…40
Thus, we see that the ontology of faith rests explicitly upon the relationship between the
Creator and the creature. This is the one premise upon which all theological statements are to
be based; i.e., the ontology of faith requires all knowledge to be rooted in the knower’s
relationship with the Creator, who is known through revelation. Thus, when Brunner defines
the distinctive character of the humanum in terms of the capacity of mind and reason to
37 MiR, 551.
38 MiR, 551.
39 MiR, 542, 543.
40 MiR, 543. I might note the irony that even in the course of setting forth the epistemic function of faith, the hint
of neo-Platonic metaphysics lingers in Brunner’s language: “forms of existence”.
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discern truth, and then asserts that this same capacity persists even apart from scriptural or
other special knowledge of God, this requires him (tacitly, at least) to presume a doctrine of
general revelation within his definition of the humanum. Indeed, Brunner cites his doctrine of
revelation through nature (general revelation) as one of his two fundamentally radical
differences from Barth (the other being his doctrine of the humanum):
I, in opposition to Barth, but in agreement with the Scriptures and the Reformers, maintain that
God is still revealing Himself in His work of Creation at the present time…41
O’Donovan’s charge against Brunner and Barth—that they never sorted out their
confusion of epistemological and ontological issues—now comes into clearer focus. In
Nature and Grace, Brunner expounds upon the doctrine of general revelation as a pillar of his
disagreement with Barth. It is here that he uses the term Offenbarungsmächtigkeit which
became such a contentious point in the debate:42
The term “nature” can be applied to such permanent capacity for revelation
(“Offenbarungsmächtigkeit”) as God has bestowed upon his works, to the traces of his own
nature which he has expressed and shown in them.43
Furthermore, Brunner’s definition of the humanum, as possessing the natural human
capacities of mind and reason, presumes implicitly that general revelation serves as a source
of knowledge not only for the physical reality of nature, but also for the spiritual realities of
God and morality. This suggests that the sense of moral responsibility is similarly contained
within the innate core of the humanum; it is part of the original, inescapable and
indestructible image of God placed into the very core of human existence (“den Kern seines
Menschseins”)—
This ‘thou shalt’ and ‘thou shalt not’ is not something added externally to human existence; it
constitutes the heart of man’s being. Man’s being is inseparable from his sense of obligation.44
41 MiR, 527. Brunner refers to the “Biblical doctrine of general or ‘natural’ revelation” as an essential tenet of
his theological anthropology, MiR, 11. Cf. NG, 24ff.
42 Brunner argues with energy: “Further, some twenty times or so Karl Barth quotes from my pamphlet the
words Offenbarungsmächtigkeit des Menschen which I not only have never employed at all, but which I, as
much as he, detest as heretical.” MiR, 527. While Brunner certainly has coined the word
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit in his pamphlet, he argues that Barth’s mistake is to interpret this capacity as an
attribute of man as subject, rather than nature as the object, of revelation.
43 NG, 15; NT, 27. Brunner makes this statement in the context of arguing that Barth “departs as much from the
Bible as [he] does from the Reformation. He acknowledges here only a general grace, but not a corresponding
general revelation (“allgemeine Offenbarung”).” NT, footnote, p. 60; NG, 14.
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Likewise, the apperception of God, even on the part of the unfaithful and sinners, is a
component of “the original nature… of the Imago Dei”; thus, Brunner maintains that “The
fact that he knows the law of God springs from his origin, the fact that he has a wrong
understanding of it is due to sin.”45 This “fact” proceeds logically from Brunner’s linked
doctrines of natural revelation and the ontological reality of the capacity for such knowledge
within the humanum.46 The result is that Brunner’s theological anthropology introduces
necessarily some knowledge of God as a possession of the imago, and thus, theologia
naturalis becomes a practical reality, not merely a formal concept:
[M]an is never without some knowledge of God; whether rightly or not, to some extent he is
always aware of Him. Rational ideas about the being of man are always, secretly, theological ideas,
however formal they may seem to be47
Now we can see that in order to define the humanum in terms of the ontological,
indestructible and inescapable capacity of mind and reason to know truth, Brunner has
imported, implicitly and necessarily, some epistemological content into his definition. This
content includes some knowledge of God, truth, morality, obligation and holiness. It follows
logically from Brunner’s construction of the humanum that this knowledge is fruit born of
general, “natural” revelation. For Brunner, the fruit of this understanding is evident
throughout all humanity, in every culture and religion, thus giving decisive evidence to the
practical efficacy of theologia naturalis.48 Furthermore, even when this knowledge is to
some extent imperfect or mistaken, it includes nonetheless some substance of natural and
spiritual reality, even knowledge of God and morality. Accordingly, we can see that
Brunner’s doctrine paves the way for a ‘natural’ ethic; yet he simultaneously insists upon the
‘ontology’ of faith. How are these statements to be reconciled with each other, as well as with
evangelical statements of revelation and atonement?
44 MiR, 19.
45 MiR, 526.
46 Brunner argues in NT that this capacity of the humanum, even in unconscious operation, may include
knowledge and respect of the holiness of the “ordinances of creation” (Ordnungen); NT, 31.
47 MiR, 545. This innate capacity to know God is important for Brunner, because it gives evidence to the
“intrinsic value” of man; MiR, 96-7. Brunner sees this ‘intrinsic value’ as a crucial point in his argument with
Barth, whom he accuses of turning the humanum into a profanum; MiR, 95, 171; cf. NT, 88.
48 There is an implication of immediacy here, which is echoed in R&MO, 35: “Secular man can observe the
same indications of order as anyone else.”
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The epistemological and ontological questions seem to become entangled at this point.
Brunner’s emphasis on the innate capacity of the humanum to discern and possess objective
knowledge of moral truth, obligation, and even traces of God’s own nature revealed in his
works, yet apart from any explicit faith, runs counter to the Reformers’ emphasis on sola
gratia, sola scriptura, sola fide.49 On the other hand, his insistence upon the ontology of
faith, which is based in a personal relationship with God as the basis for theological
knowledge, would seem to controvert his affirmation of objective moral knowledge as
pertaining to theologia naturalis and general revelation.50
How does Brunner intend to disentangle these knotty issues? His solution is
Solomonic—he “cuts the baby in half”, as it were; the baby in this case being the imago Dei,
the God-given, God-inspired imprint of personhood which shapes human nature.
Accordingly, the imago is conceived as a bifurcated reality—it consists conceptually in two
separate portions: one “material” and the other “formal”. The “formal” imago is that which
bears the divine imprint of “rational nature, the immortal soul, the capacity for culture, the
conscience, responsibility, the relation with God”,51 This is the ‘form’ or ‘shape’ of human
nature, which persists independently of the status and content of human knowledge or faith,
and which survives the stain of sin. The “material” definition of the imago, on the other hand,
represents the “anti-personal person” which is completely lost due to sin and the failure to of
the person to live in perfect submission and love in communion with God.52 This would seem
to be a neat solution, for it permits Brunner to uphold both the ontological attributes of the
humanum as well as the epistemological conditions of evangelical faith. This solves all the
apparent difficulties he anticipates regarding the doctrines of faith, sin, revelation and
theologia naturalis. Or does it?
49 As tacit, but nonetheless telling, evidence of this challenge, we notice that in Brunner’s articulation of the
doctrine of sin in The Divine-Human Encounter (pp. 97-99), he makes no mention of the ontological capacity of
the humanum or the imago; nor does he mention the bifurcation of the imago in this book at all, even though this
work contains segments copied verbatim from Mensch im Wiederspruch (e.g. D-HE, 46) and Mensch Im
Wiederspruch had been recently completed when he prepared and presented the contents of D-HE in lecture
form during 1937. We might excuse this omission on the grounds that Brunner was simply addressing different
topics in each work, but that is a dubious defence, because his purpose in D-HE is to directly address how the
human being comes to possess knowledge of God, and he does exposit here a doctrine of the imago, as well as
the idea of “formal” vs. “material” principles in knowledge, D-HE, 30f; yet, he does this without ever
mentioning his idea that the concept of the imago requires to be bifurcated.
50 Brunner would seem to be moving in this direction when he says, “Self-revelation and knowing, as we have
said from the start, is always the decisive element in the God-man relation”, D-HE, 44; cf. 31, 47-49, 61. He
seems to mean something different from Barth when he speaks of God’s “Self-revelation.”
51 In short, Brunner equates this with Calvin’s doctrine of the remnant of imago which persists in spite of sin,
and he interprets this as Calvin’s endorsement of the concept of the “formal” imago; NT, 41.
52 NT, 24; the ‘material aspect’ of the imago can be actualized only through participation in Christ, as per
Galatians 2:20 (32-33); cf. 42.
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The formal-material imago: Doppelgänger or Doppelsinnigkeit?
Brunner maintains that his concept of the bifurcation of the imago proceeds directly and
necessarily from the biblical theology of the Reformation. He states his case in no uncertain
terms, arguing that his dialectical theology is precisely that of the Reformers—
I have never taught that there was any other point of contact than this dialectical one; for the past
twelve years (see my article on the Law in Theologische Blätter, 1925!) the central point of my
theological thought—which has been unchanged—just as it is that of the theology of the
Reformers, has been, and is, the dialectic of the Law and the Gospel.53
And so, Brunner maintains that his device of separating the imago into two dialectically
opposed components proceeds in exact correspondence with the dialectic of Law and Gospel;
and furthermore, that this is the only way of understanding the biblical witness to the imago
and the humanum.54 By this device he claims to have answered the challenges to his
doctrines of revelation and sin by agreeing that the “material” imago is indeed completely
lost; the sinner is thus incapable of achieving faith and acquiring right understanding apart
from the initiative and agency of the Holy Spirit. At the opposite pole of this dialectical axis,
however, the “formal” imago is never lost; it is an indestructible ontological reality
possessing real capacities (e.g. Wörtmachtigkeit) and real knowledge. Thus, the “formal”
imago does double duty: it succumbs to the epistemological consequences of sin, and yet
survives those consequences and retains an indestructible capacity for knowledge pertaining,
at least to some extent, to both natural and supernatural reality, including the moral sense of
responsibility for ethical actions.
To sustain this double functionality of the imago requires that other doctrinal concepts,
in addition to the imago, also be interpreted in dialectical tensions. Brunner’s doctrine of
general (i.e., “natural”) revelation, for example, requires to be understood in this fashion:
This means that in the phrase “natural revelation” the word “natural” is to be understood in a
double sense, one objective-divine and one subjective-human-sinful.55
53 MiR, 514-5.
54 Cf. NT, 40: “This dualism, this inner contradiction in the human essence, is characteristic of man as he is
now.”
55 NT, 27. “Das heißt also hinsichtlich der „natürlichen Offenbarung“: das „Natürlich“ ist in einem doppelten, in
einem objektiv-göttlichen und in einem subjektiv-menschlich-sündigen Sinne zu verstehen.”, NG, 14-5.
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Whether this double sense of interpretation removes confusion or creates an ambiguity is
apparently a matter of opinion, judging by the attention it receives in his debate with Barth.
This statement also gives a clue as to the direction our analysis must go—we must ask how
Brunner aims to resolve the apparent contradiction implicit in the dualism that emerges in his
concept of the imago. To answer that question we look to Brunner’s statement of Objective-
Subjective antithesis as the “epistemological” principle which forms the heart of Reformation
theology.56
Brunner’s epistemological antithesis
Brunner takes up this issue in The Divine-Human Encounter, where he exposits the
“Objective-Subjective Antithesis” as the central issue in understanding faith. This antithesis
is necessary to work out “the Biblical understanding of truth” and “the formal nature of the
concept ‘understanding of truth’”57, because the Bible presents us with no ontological or
epistemological doctrines per se, but rather it sets forth the “two-sided relation between God
and man … as happening in a story.”58 Accordingly, Brunner finds the Objective-Subjective
Antithesis to be a doctrinal necessity, because “The relation between God and man and
between man and God is not of such a kind that doctrine can adequately express it in abstract
formulas”.59 By means of antithesis however, the story can be told simultaneously both from
the human point of view and from God’s.
In essence, Brunner maintains that the difficulties raised by Barth—pertaining to
Brunner’s ability to sustain his ontological doctrine of the imago and humanum in coherence
with the epistemological conditions of revelation and faith—disappear when viewed from the
bi-directional vantage point of the Objective-Subjective Antithesis. In doing so, Brunner aims
to deflect Barth’s critique by arguing that any doctrinal difficulties pertaining to the
bifurcation of the imago are merely illusions due to Barth’s failure to understand what is
going on in the Objective-Subjective Antithesis—this is no more and no less than the
requirement of dialectical theology. This antithesis explains how knowledge and truth can
56 Cf. D-HE, 20: “Its “epistemological” principle was a dialectic; that is, its form of expression was never the
use of one concept, but always two logically contradictory ones.”
57 D-HE, 31.
58 D-HE, 31.
59 D-HE, 31.
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remain human responsibilities (this is the subjective, experiential aspect of faith, ensuing
from the capacities of the “formal” imago), while at the same time affirming the sole
initiative of God in all matters of revelation (this is the objective aspect of faith, viewed from
God’s perspective).
Antithesis proves indispensible in Brunner’s doctrine. In The Divine-Human Encounter
he employs this bi-directional perspective to turn aside from the seemingly never-ending
levels of metaphysical abstractions that he found himself needing to pursue in order to sustain
his ontological claims regarding humanum. We see this antithesis at work, for example, in his
distinction between nous and meta-noein as a means of explaining the ontological reality of
Wortmächtigkeit:
Since the Bible clearly presupposes the nous of man as the place and organ of faith, and the meta-
noein is contained in the process of faith itself, it is not permissible to emphasize the creative
power of the preached Word of God to such an extent that the relation to the receiving nous and
to the understanding act of the thought of man is left out of account, in order not to be obliged
to admit that there is a point of contact. The point of contact is indeed precisely characterized as
a dialectical one by the meta-noein.60
Brunner makes this distinction in order to uphold the sense in which the nous is the
human receptacle (or “organ”) of revelation or understanding; thus, nous is to understanding,
as bucket is to water. This interpretation treats the nous as an ontological attribute or
component of what makes a person human. On this view, nous refers to the human capacity
to understand, to receive knowledge, and to be consciously aware. Brunner holds this
capacity to be a thing in itself—a “place” or “organ” within the human being—in distinction
from the act of faithful thinking, knowing, or understanding, in a transformative, repentant
act, which is represented by the verbal noun “meta-noein.” The meta-noein thus serves as the
pole standing in dialectical opposition to the nous. By means of this distinction, Brunner
upholds the reality of an Anknüpfungspunkt in spite of the Barthian argument that metanoia
(repentant belief) is a miraculous event orchestrated by the Holy Spirit, and is not contingent
upon any pre-existent ontological human capacity.61 Here again, we see that the concept of
60 MiR, 341. Interestingly, Brunner nowhere mentions “nous” or “meta-noein” in Appendix III.
61 This became a key point of contention with Barth, whom Brunner saw as emphasizing the “creative power of
the preached Word of God to such an extent” that it left no room for an ontological understanding of
Anknüpfungspunkt within the “formal” imago.
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Anknüpfungspunkt requires statement in terms of an epistemological antithesis and a
dialectical doctrine.62
There emerges from Brunner’s doctrine a cascade of nested abstractions, like Russian
dolls, with each bifurcation and each antithesis begetting another. This is the essence of his
dialectal theology.63 The bifurcation of the imago has repercussions, which require him to
apply his dialectical method as a corrective even to Luther’s theological anthropology—
Thus, like Luther, I teach that this present humanitas is a mere ‘relic’ of the original humanitas…
But it is not sufficient to describe this element that remains—as the Reformers do—merely
quantitatively as a ‘relic’; it ought to be understood dialectically … dialectically related to the
Gospel.64
Yet the Bible does not describe the divine-human relation in terms of such abstractions, as
Brunner notes duly—
Manifestly we have not spoken here of actual man, … Hence we have executed a thoroughly
necessary abstraction.65
So in order to speak of “actual man” Brunner finds it necessary to turn away (at least
momentarily) from these abstractions in order to consider the personal experience of faith in
the relationship between God and human. Such is the freedom of his epistemological
antithesis that it permits him to make this move, in order to affirm the experiential and
subjective aspect of faith. Here in his discussion of the “happening” of personal relationship
62 Brunner claims this vantage is required implicitly by the biblical witness; yet in response to his statement
above, “Since the Bible clearly presupposes…”, we might ask, whose presupposition is this? Is this the
presupposition of the Holy Spirit, or that of Brunner?
63 Brunner’s acclaim for Hamann proves ironic on this score. He puts some cryptic words of Hamann on the
frontispiece of Mensch im Wiederspruch, regarding the mystery of human nature and the need to “press forward
into the very heart of God Himself”, and then presses on with analytical abstractions, as though taking Hamann
as an endorsement for eristic theology. The irony is that Hamann anticipates the impossibly futile levels of
abstraction that will inevitably result from Brunner’s dialectical ontologies—“Yes, daily at home I have the
experience that one must always contradict oneself from two viewpoints, [which] never can agree, and that it is
impossible to change these viewpoints into the other without doing the greatest violence to them. Our
knowledge is piecemeal — no dogmatist is in a position to feel this great truth, if he is to play his role and play
it well; and through a vicious circle of pure reason skepsis itself becomes dogma.” Hamann, Briefwechsel, ed.
Arthur Henkel, Volume 5 (Wiesbaden/ Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1975) 432. Gwen Griffith-Dickson supports our
reading of Hamann as one who warns against intellectual confidence in the pursuit of rationalistic statements of
human nature: “Rather like the late Wittgenstein, his work was deconstructive”; The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, retrieved 10 April from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hamann/.
64 MiR, 514.
65 D-HE, 54. This conclusion sounds like a bit of retraction, coming as it does at the end of more than 20 pages
in the chapter which Brunner begins by analyzing the “matter” and “form” of Biblical understanding, 31f.
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in The Divine-Human Encounter we find no mention of the bifurcated imago, in contrast to
the explicit and lengthy discussion of the ontological attributes of the humanum found in his
theological anthropology in Man in Revolt. Perhaps this is why Brunner sees no inconsistency
in being able to affirm, on the one hand, the indestructible “formal” imago as possessing “a
conscience in which the law of God is indelibly and irremovably implanted”, even in the case
of “fallen man”,66 while at the same time concluding that, on the other hand:
Only the Christian, i.e. the man who stands within the revelation in Christ, has the true natural
knowledge of God.67
That Brunner finds it necessary to turn away from the abstractions induced by his
statement of the humanum, in order to discuss the actual “happening” of the divine-human
relationship, suggests that an evangelical understanding of this relationship is not readily
assimilated with his statements of the “formal” imago and Offenbarungsmächtigkeit. We
conclude that Brunner’s abstractions do not provide a “point of contact” for evangelical
ethics.68 We shall turn next to consider Barth’s side of the debate in order to explore further
the mutual implications of theological anthropology and evangelical ethics.
Part II: Barth’s Reply: Nein! ― Offenbarungsmächtigkeit and
theanthropic ethics
The concreteness of moral reality
From the opening pages of his 1928 Münster lectures, Barth sets a course for theological
ethics that will shape his life’s work:69 he refuses to allow theology and dogmatics to be
66 NT, 42.
67 NT, 27.
68 In this regard, Brunner’s 1929 essay sounds either prescient or cryptic—“For the question at stake, from the
moral side, is nothing more or less than this, whether that apparent roundabout way by faith may not prove to be
the only way to moral reality”; Brunner, ‘Faith in Justification and the Problem of Ethics’, in God and Man:
Four Essays on the Nature of Personality, trans. David Cairns (London: SCM, 1936) 72. If Brunner had pursued
the doctrinal implications of the “roundabout way of faith” for evangelical ethics, perhaps Barth would not have
felt the need to shout “Nein!”
69 Webster demonstrates the “definite continuity” and remarkable “degree to which Barth’s thinking is coherent
from beginning to end”, Barth’s Moral Theology, 2-3. Cf. O’Donovan’s judgment that the 1931 Ethics represent
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conceived in terms of mere abstractions. The crisis of encounter with God,70 realized in the
ontic event of the self-revealing Logos, Jesus, the “one man among all others”,71 rules out the
possibility of founding dogmatics upon abstractions.72 Similarly, theological ethics and
dogmatics are of a piece, inseparable into distinct disciplines, for such a separation would
require dogmatics to be formulated on some basis other than the concrete reality of the
Christ.73 This focus upon the concrete reality of Jesus provides Barth a starting point for his
development of ethics which differs radically from Brunner’s—
The ontological determination of humanity is grounded in the fact that one man among all others
is the man Jesus. So long as we select any other starting point for our study, we shall reach only
the phenomena of the human. We are condemned to abstractions so long as our attention is
riveted as it were on other men, or rather on man in general, as if we could learn about real man
from a study of man in general, and in abstraction from the fact that one man among all others is
the man Jesus. In this case we miss the one Archimedean point given us beyond humanity, and
therefore the one possibility of discovering the ontological determination of man.74
Whereas Brunner begins with the question “Was ist der Mensch?” and is driven
immediately into a cascade of abstractions in his effort to articulate an ontological doctrine of
the universal humanum, Barth will not deviate from the concrete reality of the one man Jesus,
as providing the only viable starting point for theological anthropology and ethics. Thus, he
dismisses abstractions summarily as being incapable of expressing the content of theological
ethics. Christ and his command are encountered as concrete realities, in the event of
revelation. This is “the dominant principle of theological ethics”—“God acts.”75
a “constant element in Barth’s thinking on the subject”, and thus, we should be advised to “reject the temptation
presented by his wartime writings to regard them as a later development”, O’Donovan, ‘Karl Barth and
Ramsey's "Uses of Power"’, Journal of Religious Ethics 19 no 2 (1991): 1-30, 3.
70 “The point of all ethical reflection is that at every moment of life…we have to respond by our action… At
every moment our action means crisis, not a crisis we bring on but a crisis in which we stand. … We are put on
the scales”; Ethics, 89.
71 CD III/2, 132.
72 “[T]he dominant principle of theological ethics, the sanctifying Word of God, is to be understood as an
event… God’s Word is not a general truth which can be generally perceived from the safe harbor of theoretical
contemplation”; Ethics, 50. Cf. “Grace… rules out any attempt to snatch at Gods’ being beyond his act”; Ethics,
31.
73 “Theological ethics is itself dogmatics, not an independent discipline alongside it”, Ethics, 18. “Theological
ethics confesses God’s revelation in Christ through the Holy Spirit”; Ethics, 35.
74 CD III/2, 132. Cf. “the ethical event as an encounter of the concrete God with concrete man”; CD III.4, 26.
75 Ethics, 50: “The Word of God is the Word of God only in act. The Word of God is decision.”
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The “great epistemological caveat”
As if to foreclose the option that theology and ethics might ever be pursued from some
starting point other than the concrete “reality of the divine Word”, or that dogmatics might
ever stray from its true Christo-centric foundation by conceiving of ethics and theology as
distinct disciplines, Barth sums up the opening chapter of his 1928 Ethics by framing the
“great epistemological caveat” (hereafter, “GEC”).76 This caveat is neither a principle per se,
nor a systematic method; it is rather a mere proverbial catch-phrase by which Barth can
reference his introductory remarks as providing the context in which theological ethics can be
developed in accord with the concrete reality of the command of God as being “the reality
which itself bears witness to itself where it is known.”77 Indeed, the phrase “great
epistemological caveat” receives mention only here in this first chapter of Ethics. If anything,
Barth’s reluctance to use the phrase elsewhere gives tacit witness that it does not provide a
prescriptive epistemological method for what follows. Nor does Barth herewith intend to set
down any epistemological principle as a starting point. The GEC can be understood only
within the spiritual context of which it speaks, and thus can be observed only in the form of a
Nachdenken. To treat it as though it could be expressed as foundational principle or method
would, ironically, strip it of its intended meaning, for it is not intended to provide a
constructive methodology, but rather to serve merely as a warning against the construction of
methodologies as though any epistemological principle could prepare us to hear and receive
the self-authenticating divine command. My intention is to use the term “GEC” here only in
the same sense that Barth uses it in the initial chapter of Ethics—as a handy phrase which
reminds us that the tenets and affirmations of Christian faith provide the context for
theological ethics. The caveat functions for Barth like an affirmation of the spiritual
foundation of ethics—“the way of thought that we are pursuing is not a secure one except in
the reality of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.”78 In other words, every step in the direction of
ethics requires theological reflection in the faithful practice of dogmatics. Thus we may
characterize Barth’s caveat as an injunction against approaching dogmatics or theological
76 Ethics, 98. Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology, 45f, notices the importance of this caveat as a foundational
aspect of Barth’s ethics, and rightly discerns that Barth consistently employs this caveat in “opposing the
tendency of modern theological ethics to adopt an ‘apologetic attitude’ to philosophical ethics”.
77 Ethics, 99.
78 Ethics, 98.
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ethics by any route other than fides quaerens intellectum.79 This is because faith comprises
acquaintance with the concrete person of Jesus Christ, in whom, to whom, and from whom,
dogmatics and theological ethics subsist.
In search of an Archimedean point
Witness to Jesus Christ is of course the core evangelical affirmation. This serves as the
overarching reality for dogmatics, theology and life. There exists no other point from which
to embark. Hence, Barth’s prolegomena in Ethics serves to remind that the moment we allow
either theological ethics or theological anthropology to drift into abstractions, and away from
the concrete reality of the divine-human encounter, we have strayed from theology and are
steering instead along some other path to knowledge, such as philosophy, psychology or
metaphysics80 —
From this knowledge of the man Jesus we have derived the criteria which indicate the limits
within which the attempt to attain knowledge of human existence must always move. We have
thus been warned against confusing the reality of man with mere phenomena of man.81
This insistence that the task of theology must always begin from the same starting
point—from the concrete reality of God revealed in the man Jesus—provides a crucial insight
into the shape of Barth’s epistemology.82 We find a telling excursus on this insight in the
first volume of Church Dogmatics, where Barth explains why he revised the opening chapters
in order to address precisely those same issues which are affirmed by his reference to the
79 Barth reflects on the seminal importance of Fides as “the real work that documents my conversion…from the
residue of a philosophical or anthropological… grounding of Christian doctrine”; Barth, ‘Parergon’,
Evangelische Theologie (1948) 272. Hans U. von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and
Interpretation (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 93 marks the significance of Barth’s 1931 commentary on
Fides as his “second conversion”, which enabled him to escape the shackles of philosophy and “arrive at a
genuine, self-authenticating theology”. Similarly, Moltmann describes Barth’s thought as theologia viatorum;
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Way and Forms of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000) 50.
80 Barth does not deny the usefulness of “naturalistic, idealistic, existential, historical, psychological and similar
thoughts and expressions”; “Yet we shall not derive the reality to which we refer from one of these working
hypotheses, but from the point where it is really present, where it is event and revelation.” CD III/4, 44.
81 CD III/2, 133.
82 T.F. Torrance credits Barth with confronting “the reduction of theology to anthropology that had been going
on since the end of the eighteenth century.” Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990) 136.
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GEC in Ethics. In the extended and revised Section 5.1 Barth answers Gogarten’s critique by
offering a definitive statement of the epistemological foundations for dogmatics.83
Barth frames Church Dogmatics I/1 §5.1 as a detailed response to Gogarten’s accusation
that he had failed to establish a “true anthropology” as the “central task [and] criterion of all
further theological propositions.”84 Two salient points of contention emerge from Barth’s
answer to this charge: first, the possibility of an Archimedean point for theological
anthropology; and second, the concept of a “point of contact” (Anknüpfungspunkt). For Barth
there is but “one Archimedean point given us beyond humanity, and therefore the one
possibility of discovering the ontological determination of man”; his name is Jesus.85 The
pressure to find an Anknüpfungspunkt is perennial, and Barth recognizes this pressure in
Gogarten’s desire to address the challenge of existentialism which arose in their day.86 Barth
neither shies away from nor dismisses this challenge. He addresses it directly; however, his
main concern is that this existential challenge must not be allowed to subvert the foundation
of faith which warrants knowledge of God.
The mechanism at work in Gogarten’s error is the implicit claim to conceive of
theological anthropology in terms that will enable an ontological point of contact for
knowledge of God. Thus, Barth’s response to Gogarten here resounds in accord with his reply
to Brunner, Nein!87 This repudiation fits the consistent pattern of his thought throughout
Church Dogmatics. The urgency of Barth’s polemical appeal is directly proportional to the
degree of risk he perceives in theological proposals spawned by a desire to be culturally
relevant by adopting philosophical and non-theological epistemological methods.88
83 The revised CD I/1 appeared in 1932, thus preceding Nein! by two years. T.F. Torrance marks Barth’s break
with Gogarten as the turning point from which Barth adopted a more focused polemical stance against the
incursion of natural theology, as he came to see Gogarten’s position as a betrayal of the Gospel, which
“involved a reversal of the action of God in the death of Jesus Christ”, Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith: The
Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988) 112. Gary Dorrien also
cites Barth’s argument with Gogarten as the point from which Barth made a clean break with the “increasingly
massive dogma of orders”; Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology without Weapons
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000) 115.
84 F. Gogarten, ‘Karl Barths Dogmatik’, Theol. Rundschau (1929), quoted in CD I/1, 125-132.
85 CD III/2, 132.
86 Barth validates the need to address the challenge, yet cautions: “Theology has all too often tried to seek out
and conquer the consciousness of an age on its own ground”; CD I/1, 127.
87 As does Gogarten, Brunner recognizes the cultural pressure toward apologetics as a motivation to construct a
theologia naturalis , an “intellectual work in the realm of concepts”; NT , 58.
88 While Barth’s main thrust here is directed against Gogarten, he also cites Schleiermacher as an example of the
same misguided effort to address the “consciousness of an age”; CD I/1, 127. Daniel Price identifies the
anthropological flaw in Schleiermacher’s description—“a natural capacity to develop God-consciousness”.
Daniel Price focuses more upon the psychological meaning of this capacity, but his insight provides a good
example of how natural capacities presume the ontological reality of a point of contact for theological
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The problem in Barth’s view stems from Gogarten’s argument in favor of “the primacy
of anthropology” as providing a foothold upon which to claim epistemic access to knowledge
of God.89 The presumption of an ontological foundation for theological anthropology,
implicit in Brunner and Gogarten, presumes to embark from an anthropological rather than a
Christological starting point. Gogarten runs counter to Barth in saying, “There is no
understanding of man without understanding of God, but … again I cannot understand this
God without already understanding man”.90 Is Gogarten suggesting that knowledge of “man”
precedes knowledge of God, and can thus provide an Archimedean point for knowledge of
God?91
We can trace these same general lines of thought throughout Nein! In each case, Barth
exposes the implicit link which connects the proposition of an abstract, ontological
Anknüpfungspunkt with the natural human capacity to discern knowledge of God.92 Doctrinal
statements of such a capacity as an ontological attribute of the humanum will result inevitably
from any foundation for theological anthropology which misses the intent of Barth’s caveat.
Uncovering the dilemma of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit
As we have seen in Barth’s response to Gogarten, the hinge issue in their debate is the
proposition that there exists an Archimedean point for theological anthropology apart from
the concrete reality of Jesus. Barth does not reject out of hand Brunner’s suggestion that the
shape of the “formal” imago might be a valid question for theological anthropology; after all,
there might be an appropriate Christological sense in which to define it. The problem with
Brunner’s concept stems rather from the epistemological capacities he attributes to this
“formal” imago. In his point-by-point analysis of “Brunner’s Natural Theology” Barth seizes
knowledge. Price, ‘Karl Barth's Anthropology in Light of Modern Thought: The Dynamic Concept of the Person
in Trinitarian Theology and Object Relations Psychology’ (PhD Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1990) 76.
89 CD I/1, 129. O’Donovan finds Barth’s emphasis on the eschatological significance of the resurrection to
overshadow the importance of advent and incarnation; R&MO (xvii). The Advent moment holds for O’Donovan
Donovan a vindication of an ontological basis for theological anthropology.
90 CD I/1, 129.
91 This is also the same question Barth addresses repeatedly to Brunner in his critical comments regarding MiR
in CD III/2. Barth concludes that Gogarten has deviated inconsistently from his own Christological claim; CD
I/1, 128.
92 Gunton explores the interrelation between human capacity and the event of revelation with helpful attention to
the inseparability of the ontic from the noetic: “First, it is the case that nature does not reveal its secrets apart
from structures of human rationality”; Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995)
34.
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upon the concept of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit (“capacity for revelation”) as the
“quintessence” and fatal flaw in Brunner’s doctrine.93
Barth begins his analysis of Brunner’s doctrine by expressing his willingness to accept
Brunner’s claim that “In this formal sense the original image of God in man is not
destroyed.”94 Thus far, and no further, Barth is willing to go along with the Brunner’s concept
of the “formal” imago. This concept per se does not in and of itself constitute the grave
danger against which Barth warns; it does however open the door through which theological
danger beckons like a siren. The problem emerges when Brunner attributes epistemic
capacities to the “formal” imago. On Barth’s view, the decisive question is “What is the
relevance of the ‘capacity for revelation?’”95 Using the analogy of a drowning man, Barth
asks, what difference does it makes whether this man could swim a few strokes? Are we to
understand that humans possess, as a general capacity of the humanum, the ability to help
save themselves by swimming a few strokes towards salvation? “Surely not”, Barth says,
quoting Brunner’s statement that “man of himself can do nothing for his salvation.”96 The
debate thus hinges on the epistemic function of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit—
Has not Brunner added to man’s “capacity for revelation” (Offenbarungsmächtigkeit), to what we
have been assured is purely “formal,” something very material: man’s practically proved ability to
know God, imperfectly it may be, but nevertheless really and therefore surely not without
relevance to salvation? Perhaps he can swim a little, after all? If he has really done this, we are
happy to know now more clearly what he means by “Offenbarungsmächtigkeit”.97
What does Brunner mean by Offenbarungsmächtigkeit? That is the question.98 If
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit is conceived to be an epistemological attribute of the humanum,
which provides a point of contact for knowledge of God, then Barth and Brunner would seem
to have an irreconcilable difference, summed up in a single word: Offenbarungsmächtigkeit.99
93 Nein! 78. Barth’s emphasis of this point annoys Brunner greatly: “Further, some twenty times or so Karl Barth
quotes from my pamphlet the words Offenbarungsmächtigkeit des Menschen which I not only have never
employed at all, but which I, as much as he, detest as heretical”, MiR, 527. Brunner’s point here is that he did
not append the words “des Menschen” to Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, which he does use in the pamphlet
mentioned. The appended words might render the noun Offenbarungsmächtigkeit as an active capacity of the
humanum, a nuance which Brunner wishes to avoid.
94 Nein! 79.
95 Nein! 79.
96 Nein! 79.
97 Nein! 82.
98 Indeed, Barth repeats the question again throughout his Antwort; Nein! 80, cf. 82.
99 Brunner’s invention of this word was destined to raise Barth’s suspicions given that he defines the Trinitarian
God in terms of revelation (Offenbarung): “… dann müssen wir vor allem verstehen, daß dieses ihr Subjekt,
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But is the difference truly irreconcilable? To some extent Barth and Brunner can be seen
to be talking past one another, indicating that some bit of confusion lingers in their debate.
Barth laments the loss of consanguinity with Brunner,100 while Brunner defends himself as
having been misunderstood by Barth.101 O’Donovan notices the persistence of this confusion
with regret, implying that Barth and Brunner might have been able to reconcile their
differences if only they had properly differentiated the ontological and epistemological
issues.102 While O’Donovan stops short of specifying clearly the locus of confusion, our
analysis points to the misunderstanding over Offenbarungsmächtigkeit as the central issue.
Identifying the locus of confusion
We begin our attempt to sort out the confusion by noticing some validity in Brunner’s
claim to have been misunderstood. As we have seen, he believes his dialectical approach of
splitting the imago succeeds in holding the ontological and epistemological priorities together
in tension. Furthermore, he believes that his conception of the “formal” imago can sustain the
full weight of the Reformers’ emphasis on sola gratia, and therefore that Barth is simply
mistaken when he interprets Brunner’s description of Anknüpfungspunkt as somehow denying
God the sole initiative in all matters of faith and salvation. Thus Brunner defends his
dialectical formulation of the epistemological capacities of the humanum against Barth’s
attack.103 This is not unlike O’Donovan’s defence of his own statements of objectivity for the
moral order by holding them in tension with evangelical statements of participation in Christ.
In Brunner’s case there is a bifurcation of the imago, and in O’Donovan’s case there is a
“polarity between revelation in the particular and created order in the universal”.104 By
articulating an epistemological antithesis at the heart of the humanum, Brunner believes he is
immune to Barth’s critique. On the one hand, the imago is totally lost (materially) and
therefore incapable of swimming any strokes at all in the act of faith, and yet on the other
hand, the imago remains intact (formally), and thus provides a natural point of contact suited
Gott, der Offenbarer, identisch ist mit seinem Tun in der Offenbarung, identisch auch mit dessen Wirkung”;
(K.D. I/I, 312; CD I/1, 296). Cf. Alan Torrance, Persons in Communion (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996) 89.
100 Nein! 71.
101 NT 15, 16.
102 R&MO, 86.
103 NT, 32.
104 R&MO, 85.
Chapter 4: Point of Contact: the Barth-Brunner debate 89
to the epistemic event of faith. Barth however, sees this as an untenable abstraction. Here is
the source of confusion over the epistemological and ontological “ground rules”, as it were.
For Brunner, the abstraction is essential to maintain biblical witness to the dignity of the
humanum as a bearer of the divine imago. For Barth however, the epistemic ground rules
specify that faith and knowledge of God occur only within the concrete reality of the divine-
human encounter, and therefore Brunner’s abstraction cannot be endorsed.
In this repartee, we see Barth applying, repeatedly and systematically, the test of fides
quaerens intellectum to Brunner’s doctrines of theologia naturalis and the humanum. For the
sake of our analysis, it will prove helpful to articulate the following three affirmations as
representing the main thrust of Barth’s epistemological direction. A doctrine of evangelical
ethics requires expression in terms which are:
(a) concrete, not merely abstract;
(b) positive, not merely dialetic; and
(c) derived through a union of noetic and ontic knowledge
Concrete, not merely abstract
We see this principle of concreteness at work in Barth’s disagreements with both
Gogarten and Brunner regarding the possibility that an Archimedean point, or any other
Anknüpfungspunkt, can be expressed in abstraction, rather than in the concrete reality of the
divine-human encounter as understood through the self-revelation of the God who meets us
and knows us in and through Jesus Christ.105
Positive, not merely dialectic
This distinction might not be as readily apparent, for Barth and Brunner each claim to be
offering positive theological statements. Brunner claims even to be making a more positive
105 As a handy summation of this point, we notice that Barth incorporates this epistemological caveat as a
foundational principle of his theological anthropology: “We were warned at the outset not to seek real man
elsewhere”; CD III/2, 121. Following Webster’s insight, we might likewise characterize the “formal” imago as a
case of nominalism, to the extent that it lacks identity in the concrete Christian narrative; John Webster,
‘Eschatology, Anthropology and Postmodernity’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 2 no 1 (2000):
13-28, 26-27.
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statement than Barth with respect to both theologia naturalis and theological anthropology.106
At first glance, it might seem he has a point here; after all, Barth is the one shouting, “Nein!”
Yet upon closer examination, we see that Barth’s approach places a premium on the positive
evangelical affirmations which are undone ultimately by Brunner’s dialectical bifurcation of
the imago. Barth addresses God’s revelatory presence in positive terms as a self-
authenticating speech-act.107 He insists upon this function of theology in spite of the
unavoidable mystery inherent in the confrontation.108 Accordingly, Barth finds great irony in
Brunner’s claim to have departed from his negative definition of Anknüpfungspunkt in 1932,
in order to argue in 1934 for a positive statement of theologia naturalis:
One can understand that he [Brunner] could not stop at a merely negative definition of the
“point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt).” … The “point of contact” had now to be defined
positively in the same way in which it was then defined negatively. Hence full scope is given to
the theologia naturalis vulgaris and we begin to move again round the circle in which theology
evidently has moved for two hundred years.109
What is going on here? Is Barth merely demonstrating his prowess as a master of
rhetoric?110 Rather than complain against Brunner’s movement, why does not Barth welcome
Brunner’s alleged turn to the via positiva? To sum up Barth’s accusation curtly, he charges
Brunner with having disguised a negative definition of the imago as a positive one.111
Brunner, for his part, claims to have defined the imago dialectically, rather than negatively, as
we have seen in his extensive treatment of the issue in Man in Revolt. Here is the reason
Barth’s positive emphasis is to be contrasted with Brunner’s dialectical epistemological
106 “It is the task of our theological generation to find the way back to a true theologia naturalis. And I am
convinced that it is to be found far away from Barth’s negation and quite near Calvin’s doctrine”; NT, 59f.
107 Bonhoeffer, for one, found this early on to be Barth’s distinctive theological signature: “Barth was the first
theologian to begin the criticism of religion… but he put in its place a positivist doctrine of revelation which
says, in effect, like it or lump it.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1971) 286. Robin Lovin notes that Barth’s single-mindedness on this point is a
motivating factor in Brunner’s desire to confront Barth; Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices: The Social
Ethics of Barth, Brunner, and Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984) 45ff.
108 This positive approach serves as a foundational issue for Barth, in CD I/1, 162ff, as well as in the 1928
precursor, Prolegomena zur Christlichen Dogmatik , 91.
109 Nein! 121.
110 Some have so charged Barth, unjustly in my view; e.g., John C. McDowell, ‘Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and
the Subjectivity of the Object of Christian Hope’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 8 (2006): 25-41,
29.
111 Barth diagnoses this negative aspect of Brunner’s dialectic approach in CD III/2, 130, where he argues that
the “formal” imago cannot signify a positive content of being in the humanum, but merely a “form, …
possibility, potentiality, disposition and capacity” in a passive sense, because the real attributes of the humanum
can be “actualised [only] in that act of God’s gracious dealings”.
Chapter 4: Point of Contact: the Barth-Brunner debate 91
movement, rather than with his negative statement of Anknüpfungspunkt. 112 Brunner’s
dialectical bifurcation of the imago defines the humanum in both positive and negative
statements—the imago is destroyed, and yet it survives intact. That is the heart of Brunner’s
dialectical approach; however, Barth exposes its superficial and mutually exclusive aspects.
On the one hand, Brunner argues that the “formal” humanum must be considered incapable of
knowledge of God:
“The Gospel cannot be preached unless this continuity is completely disrupted. The content of
the Gospel is of such a kind that by it this previous understanding (i.e. of God through reason) is
not merely correct but decidedly negatived. The natural knowledge of God is neither a true
knowledge of God nor a true knowledge of God.”113
“Continuity” refers here to “a directly observable continuity between nature and grace, reason
and revelation”;114 this is “completely disrupted”, and thus defined in negative terms. Yet on
the other hand, Barth finds Brunner to be arguing for the exact opposite:
Moreover, “the necessary, indispensable point of contact,” which before was defined as the
“formal imago Dei,” has now, as it were, openly become “what the natural man knows of God, of
the law, and of his own dependence upon God.” … Evidently the “formal imago Dei” meant that
man can “somehow” and “to some extent” know and do the will of God without revelation.115
The problem lies not in the “decidedly negatived” aspect of Brunner’s doctrine, but
rather in its dialectical movement which produces contradictory statements. The insidious
flaw here is exposed by Barth’s comparison of “Brunner then and now”, where he asks with
rhetorical flourish:
Is there any form of pride worse than that of a certain type of Kierkegaardianism? Has there ever
been a more explicit Prometheanism than that of the philosophy of an existence despairing of
112 Linda Woodhead illustrates the reason Brunner’s dialectic fails to sustain a positive statement of the
humanum: “human nature… shares in the mystery of God—and can never be pinned down”, and “the
impossibility of understanding or speaking of the divine nature also applies to human nature”; Woodhead,
‘Apophatic Anthropology’, in God and Human Dignity, R. Kendall Soulen and Linda Woodhead, eds. (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006) 233-46, 233f. Woodhead recognizes the via negativa as a route to understanding the
“capacity” of the human being, but in contradistinction to Brunner, her definition of this capacity renders
incoherent any ontology of material content for the Anknüpfungspunkt, which Brunner affirms. Unlike Brunner,
Woodhead avoids carefully any suggestion that the divine “something” is a possession or attribute of the
“formal” imago.
113 Barth quotes Brunner from “Die Frage nach dem ‘Anknüpfungspunkt’ als Problem der Theologie”, Zwischen
den Zeiten (1932); Nein!, 113.
114 Nein! 113.
115 Nein! 89, 90.
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itself? How can that “negative point” be the “point of contact” for divine revelation, since its
demonstration leads necessarily to a triumph of reason at its most natural and unregenerate?116
What Barth argues here is that Brunner’s dialectical bifurcation of the imago posits an
unregenerate, un-knowing, natural capacity of the humanum as an entrée to knowledge of
God. Thus Barth suggests that Brunner’s dialectical attempt at resolving the continuity and
discontinuity within the epistemological dilemma of human existence reduces the “point of
contact” to a point of despair. This proves an inescapably incoherent foundation for
Brunner’s doctrine, because a point of despair does not offer a positive basis upon which to
pursue dogmatics.117 This problem arises precisely as a result of Brunner’s move to elide an
affirmation of fides quaerens intellectum in his statement of formal capacities of the
humanum. Brunner’s “formal” imago doctrine seems to skirt that affirmation, and to follow
instead a route which leads inevitably into an Anknüpfungspunkt conceived negatively, rather
than to affirm positively the confessions of evangelical faith.118
Noetic and ontic knowledge: parity in union, not priority in distinction
The noetic reality of cognition (and re-cognition) and the ontic reality of faith require to
be considered in unity and parity, such that neither may presume priority over the other. This
becomes particularly important for Barth in the service of theological anthropology:
We pass beyond the limits of autonomous human self-understanding, therefore, to a genuinely
different level of thought, only when we realise that the conjunction “God and man” or “God
with man” or “man with God” means noetically and ontically that God acts towards man…119
116 Nein! 120.
117 Barth expounds upon this conclusion in CD III/2, 122: “in face of the existentialist interpretation of man…
everything that can be said and thought about man points beyond or behind himself”. The fruit of such
knowledge can point only away from the self’s own reality, toward something inaccessible and hidden, toward
something beyond or behind oneself. Barth has praise also for Brunner, nonetheless, regarding his statements of
man as existing within the Word of God (428-9), but he faults Brunner for not following through to discover the
weakness implicit in the dialectical split of the imago; CD III/2, 129.
118 Linda Woodhead recognizes the negative aspect of the “point of contact” so conceived, and concludes that if
there is any capacity to be attributed to the humanum on the basis of the apophatic approach, it will necessarily
be defined in passive, rather than active terms. Although she does not address the Barth-Brunner debate
specifically, her analysis supports Barth’s contention that Brunner’s “formal” imago makes sense only
passively, as in the capacity to be saved by God. Woodhead, ‘Apophatic Anthropology’, in God and Human
Dignity, R. Kendall Soulen and Linda Woodhead, eds. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006) 233-46, 236f.
119 CD III/2, 124. Cf. “Here, too, it is the case that the grace of God in Jesus Christ is the noetic basis as and
because it is also the ontic basis of man’s creaturely being. But here it is both in almost indissoluble unity, and
therefore to avoid repetition we may consider it at once in this double quality”; CD III/4, 41.
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In contrast, Brunner has broken the bond between the noetic and ontic aspects of the
divine-human relationship in a single stroke, by his bifurcation of the imago. Barth protests
that in “the question of the ‘point of contact’… Brunner has been unable to adhere to sola
fide—sola gratia.”120 Furthermore, in his extended treatment of Brunner’s doctrine of the
humanum, Barth concludes that the failure to define the humanum in terms of the “concrete
and realised relation to divine revelation” can result only in a “purely formal” statement of
human capacity in which:
[W]hat he [Brunner] says about the identity of this Word of God with historical revelation and
with Jesus Christ as attested by Holy Scripture obviously refers only to the noetic and not the
ontic basis of the being of man.121
In essence, Brunner’s bifurcation of the imago suggests that the noetic and ontic aspects of
knowledge can be considered independently. Barth objects to this on the grounds that the
noetic “formal” aspect cannot be divorced from the ontic reality of faith which serves as the
basis for knowledge of God, at least not in the case of revealed truth.
Fides contra ontologiam
To ignore any of the three affirmations named above, by defining the humanum in terms
that are either abstract, dialectical and/or grounded in priority of the noetic over the ontic,
will result inevitably in a formulation of the humanum which imports material theological
content of ethical and dogmatic significance into the concepts of human capacity and
Anknüpfungspunkt. Barth detects precisely this problem with Brunner’s statement of
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, because it adds “to man’s ‘capacity for revelation’… something
120 Nein! 90.
121 CD III/2, 131. Brunner defends himself against this complaint in NT, 32, where he argues that “the Word of
God itself creates man’s ability to believe the Word of God, i.e. the ability to hear it in such a way as is only
possible in faith. It is evident that the doctrine of sola gratia is not in the least endangered by such a doctrine of
the point of contact.” But we detect here confusion on Brunner’s part over the issue of the noetic-ontic divide,
for he has not addressed Barth’s point that to conceive of the Word of God as providing natural access to
knowledge of God, in the absence of any ontic reality through God’s self-revelation as the Trinitarian God of
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is to relegate the Word of God to the status of the universal Logos, which “has no
intrinsic connexion with the history summed up in and denoted by this name”, that is, Jesus Christ NT, 131.
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very material: man’s practically proved ability to know God, imperfectly it may be, but
nevertheless really and therefore surely not without relevance to salvation”.122
For this reason, Barth argues that the only way to make sense of Brunner’s bifurcated
imago is to agree that, “a man is a man, and not a cat”. Otherwise it seems to be an
inescapable conclusion that Brunner has imported material content into his concept of the
“formal” imago.123 Speaking metaphorically, the shape of the bucket is determined by its
contents. Barth expounds upon this problem in Church Dogmatics where he fleshes out his
theanthropic approach to theological anthropology. Here he explains why theological
attempts to bypass confessional affirmations with respect to the humanum will inevitably
result in “naturalistic and idealistic interpretations” which are essentially restatements of “the
naively classical definition of man as an animal ratione praeditum”.124 On Barth’s view
therefore, the problem with such formulations of the humanum is that they claim to arrive at
theologically significant knowledge through autonomous self-understanding, in denial of the
epistemic conditions present in the event of faith.125 Accordingly, Barth grasps the nettle
when he says, “It is at this point that offence is usually taken.”126
The ethical import of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit
Given their fundamental disagreement over the proper epistemological approach to
theological anthropology, Barth’s and Brunner’s differences might seem to be irreconcilable.
Still, our analysis has clarified at least one point upon which we can imagine Barth and
122 Nein! 82.
123 “What he [Brunner] calls the purely formal side of humanity is evidently full of material”; Nein! 121. Joan
O’Donovan affirms Barth’s critique of Brunner’s dialectical imago: “Brunner, as Barth is quick to notice, is
unable to sustain his formal definition of person, being compelled by his dialectic of nature and grace to
elaborate the formal imago in terms of material capacities of knowing God’s nature and will”, Joan O’Donovan,
‘Man in the Image of God: The Disagreement between Barth and Brunner Reconsidered’, Scottish Journal of
Theology 39 (1986): 433-459, 451, and goes on to demonstrate the problematic ethical implications of Brunner’s
dialectic, specifically with respect to the humanity of “new-born children and idiots”, again following Barth
(Nein! 89). She argues insightfully that Brunner’s theological anthropology leads into a morality defined in
terms of the self, “a legal morality” motivated by self-respect, rather than by love of God: “Brunner is, of
course, describing the moral hubris of sinful mankind and not the moral telos of created mankind” (458).
124 I.e., an “animal endowed with reason”, CD III/2, 122. Bruce McCormack notes that Barth’s theanthropic
approach rules out any “independent anthropology (independent, that is, of reflection upon the true, restored
humanity disclosed in Christ)”; McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1997) 454; cf. Paul Nimmo Being in Action: The Theological Shape of Barth's Ethical Vision
(London: T&T Clark, 2007) 33.
125 CD III/2, 124. Cf. “This point of contact is, therefore, not real outside faith but only in faith.” CD I/1, 273.
126 CD III/2, 124.
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Brunner would agree—their disagreement can be seen to revolve around the epistemological
significance of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit as an attribute or component of an ontological
statement of the humanum. Addressing Brunner rhetorically, Barth asks, “And where is all
this going to lead us?”127 The point is not to perpetuate an intractable disagreement over
epistemology, but rather to consider the implications of each proposal for ethics. Barth
follows his rhetorical question by pointing immediately to the implication Brunner’s doctrine
holds for the discovery of moral principles based in culture and reason, on the basis of trust in
the natural endowment of the humanum. And on the last page of Nein!, Barth returns to the
subject of ethics, to explain the ultimate importance this debate holds, not merely for
dogmatics and academics, but for the world in general:
Ethics will be quite a good and useful thing if it always remembers the commandments of God.
In contrast to Brunner’s ethics it should not be based on a dogmatic presupposition of those
mythical “ordinances.” Therefore it should refrain from trying to turn the commandments of
God into the commandments of men.128
Ethics is indeed the proving ground for the doctrine of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit.
Theological anthropology and ethics are not lightly to be split asunder without doing
impinging upon the affirmations of evangelical faith.
Part III: A lens onto O’Donovan’s effort to sort out the confusion
We began this chapter with the goal of probing the tension inherent in O’Donovan’s
statement of moral knowledge; this tension arises due to the suggestion that moral knowledge
can be construed as embodying objectifiable moral principles within a conceptual structure,
and simultaneously, “also, and perhaps more importantly, a function of its object”.129 Delving
into his treatment of the Barth-Brunner debate, we have seen how this casts a lens onto
O’Donovan’s epistemological realism, and why he insists that a chapter on epistemology
must follow a chapter on ontology. While arguing for the objective reality of the moral order
as an ontological fact independent of, and prior to, the conditions which grant epistemic
127 Nein! 85.
128 Nein! 128.
129 R&MO, 76.
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access to moral reality, O’Donovan’s assertions bring implications that run parallel to
Brunner’s dialectical statements of the imago. The crux of the matter revolves around the
issue of immanent, natural access to moral knowledge, as we have seen in O’Donovan’s
support for the concept of a “natural ethic” which affirms the objective reality of an objective
“order of things” within which Christian ethics has “an objective reference”.130 O’Donovan
cites the Barth-Brunner debate concerning theologia naturalis as an example of the confusion
over this concept which he intends to dispel.131 Our analysis shows that O’Donovan’s
concern to maintain a polarity in the dogmatics of revelation parallels Brunner’s concern to
establish a point of contact for the divine-human encounter. This becomes clearer in light of
the doctrinal implications of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, which brings into play the concept of
an Anknüpfungspunkt (“point of contact”) for moral knowledge. As the concluding exercise
of this chapter, we shall apply this analysis to a case study which will demonstrate how these
issues play out in O’Donovan’s thought.
Case Study: O’Donovan, Barth and Ramsey on the concept of a
“purchasing point for grace in nature”
O’Donovan’s analysis of political ethics in the case of ‘Karl Barth and Ramsey’s “Uses
of Power”’ serves as a tailor-made case study of the epistemological issues addressed by
Barth’s Ethics.132 He begins by noting that Barth rejects any “natural substratum” for politics,
as well as “any purchasing point for grace in nature” (10-11). He then notices how Barth
enforces this injunction by insisting that “the ordo essendi must follow the ordo cognoscendi
exactly” (11). In other words, the ontological issues must follow, and not have priority over,
the epistemic conditions of moral knowledge. This departs clearly from O’Donovan’s
emphasis upon the ontological priority of the moral order. Barth’s affirmation of the concrete
reality of faith precludes the possibility of relying upon any Archimedean point for
130 R&MO, 17.
131 R&MO, 86-91.
132 O’Donovan, “Karl Barth and Ramsey’s “Uses of Power””, The Journal of Religious Ethics 19, no. 2 (1991):
1-30. Page numbers above in parentheses above refer to this article.
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knowledge other than the event of the self-revealing Christ. Barth’s epistemological direction
in this regard runs opposite to O’Donovan’s emphasis upon ontological priority.133
While O’Donovan is able to affirm the Christo-centric epistemologies of both Ramsey
and Barth, he goes on to distinguish them on the basis of their ontological statements of
moral order. He suggests that Ramsey and Barth did not part company over the issue of ordo
cognoscendi; but rather, they differed in their ontological statements regarding the “esse of
politics”.134 The esse—the statement of ontological reality which emerges from dogmatics—
does of course become the nub of the problem, if it is taken as a validation for any false
Archimedean point, such as the doctrine of Anknüpfungspunkt which emanates from
Brunner’s theologia naturalis. This risk in political ethics stems from the potency of the
concept of lex naturae, and its kinship with theologia naturalis. O’Donovan holds Ramsey
harmless from that danger, arguing that in Ramsey’s case:
The esse is not brought in as an independent datum; rather, it is the hypothesis demanded by the
shadow that the cross throws, together with its light, across the bene esse. (11)
By ruling out the possibility that the esse of the moral order can be construed as an
“independent datum”, O’Donovan would seem to agreeing with Barth that Christ alone
provides an Archimedean point. O’Donovan makes this assertion with reference to Barth’s
“rejection of any purchasing-point for grace in nature”, clearly linking this injunction against
“an independent datum”, with Barth’s rejection of theologia naturalis (10f). Ramsey, Barth
and O’Donovan would all seem to agree that the esse of politics does not arise as an
independent datum, nor does this esse imply the existence of an Anknüpfungspunkt in nature.
But what of the bene esse? Does the bene esse also conform to these same caveats?
O’Donovan follows Ramsey in defining the bene esse as the right and good essence of
political ethics: the goal, purpose and telos, which is to be understood in terms of “in-
principled love”, and therefore “the bene esse of politics… is a work of Christian love” (9).
133 O’Donovan’s formulation of the principle: “the ordo essendi must follow the ordo cognoscendi exactly”
seems at first glance to be consistent with Barth’s exposition regarding the epistemic importance of the God-
man Jesus: “But only this divine act of majesty can be the ratio cognoscendi, the ground of knowledge, of this
man”, CD IV/2, 38. Here we see Barth yet again insisting upon rigor in adherence to fides quaerens intellectum.
O’Donovan’s phrasing conveys Barth’s intent to uphold the primacy of faith in the matter of locating epistemic
access to ethical and theological knowledge. Whether the GEC can be as tidily summed up in a principle, as
O’Donovan would have it, remains to be seen.
134 O’Donovan identifies this esse as the crucial issue, yet he notes that “Ramsey has almost nothing to tell us
about the esse of politics” (10). In spite of this absence in Ramsey’s language, O’Donovan proceeds to interpret
the Barth-Ramsey comparison in precisely these terms. This indicates the value of our case study as a window
onto O’Donovan’s epistemology, and not merely as a window onto Ramsey’s.
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Thus, O’Donovan endorses Ramsey’s Christological explanation of bene esse. But beyond
this point, Ramsey and Barth diverge (at least in O’Donovan’s view).
The problem pertains to the concept of “the humanum of Christ, of the one Christ who
represents both passing and coming humanity in himself”. Arguing that Barth has been
inconsistent in his application of the reality of the humanum as embodied in Christ (22),
O’Donovan points to Barth’s refusal to grant ontological reality to the concept of homo
politicus (16). Ramsey, on the other hand, finds warrant to conceive of humankind in terms of
homo politicus, because the doctrine of Incarnation “requires … a political analogue to the
homo assumptus” (16). O’Donovan asks: why does Barth deny this concept? He expounds
upon this question in a footnote, arguing that Barth makes inconsistent statements with
respect to the concept of the humanum—
Barth intended to… concede a place in Christology to the humanum, not “a man,” but “human
being,” which is the object of assumption in the Incarnation (1955:45-50); and for that reason we
must look for a reason outside the realm of Christology to explain why there was no analogue to
the humanum assumptum in his political theory. (27)135
In drawing attention to this sentence in which Barth acknowledges that Jesus Christ embodies
the humanum which pertains to all humanity, O’Donovan has chosen not to elaborate upon
the context in which Barth makes this statement. In the same paragraph quoted by
O’Donovan, Barth confesses yet again that faith subsists in concrete encounter with Christ:
It is not the idea of the humanum, in which per definitionem this could exist in real men either never
and nowhere or only always and everywhere. It is the concrete possibility of the existence of one
man in a specific form…136
Thus Barth guards explicitly against any abstract definition of the humanum as a
universal concept (as O’Donovan seems wont to do) and he likewise affirms Jesus as the
“one man” in whom the concrete possibility of the humanum must be discovered.137
Furthermore, Barth also begins this same paragraph by affirming the noetic and ontic unity of
135 O’Donovan is here citing CD IV/2. O’Donovan similarly critiques Barth’s “formal treatment of the state” by
referring to “vacillation… within Barth’s thought” which may be seen in “the dialectic between the normal,
central functions of the state and its marginal, occasional function”; ‘Karl Barth and Ramsey's "Uses of Power”’,
3.
136 CD IV/2, 48.
137 Again, in this same passage, Barth upholds the concreteness of theological anthropology: “Incarnation is the
actuality of this work of God. A recognition of the ultimate character of this actuality depends upon our
avoidance of all abstractions”, CD IV/2, 46.
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knowledge of Jesus Christ, in order to guard against any merely noetic or dialectical concepts
of the humanum:
We might also use the term human nature, like the older dogmatics, so long as we are careful—
when we apply the term to the humanity of Jesus Christ—to keep the expression free from any
idea of a generally known humanum…138
In the same manner, Barth reminds us yet again that the specific and concrete being and
essence of Christ resists definition in terms of a universal, objectifiable and abstract
concept—
But its object, that which God assumed into unity with Himself and His being and essence and
kind and nature, is not “a man,” i.e., one of many who existed and was actual with all his fellow-
men in a human being and essence and nature and kind as opposed to other creatures, but who
was and is also this one man as opposed to all other men.139
Thus we see Barth holding to a rigorously Christo-centric anthropology which embeds
the dogmatic and ethical content of the humanum as within a framework of positive
confessional affirmations grounded in the concrete reality of Jesus Christ. Barth also goes on
to explain in this same paragraph why the concept of “a man” in general, pertaining to the
universal humanum as the basis of an autonomous human being, must recede into the
background, in order to focus on the concrete reality of the one man, Jesus of Nazareth.140
Thus, Barth has carefully sandwiched his comments on the concept of the humanum within
confessional affirmations. O’Donovan mentions none of this context, and would thus seem to
garner scant evidence for his claim that Barth’s political theory is inconsistent with respect to
his doctrine of the humanum. Thus, we might question O’Donovan’s suggestion that Barth
denies the possibility of homo politicus on account of an insufficiently fleshed out idea of
humanum assumptum in his doctrine of Incarnation.141 We might conclude rather, in
138 CD IV/2, 47. O’Donovan relates Barth’s refusal of the “dialectic of esse and bene esse… in politics” to the
source of his divergence from Ramsey, who apparently does rely on such a dialectic notion of politics. ‘Karl
Barth and Ramsey's "Uses of Power”’, 10.
139CD IV/2, 48.
140 CD IV/2, 47.
141 O’Donovan objects to Barth’s doctrine of Incarnation, because it does not sustain the ontological definition
of homo politicus for which O’Donovan would advocate. Barth’s emphasis upon the epistemic role of faith, and
the corresponding union of noetic and ontic orientations in dogmatic knowledge, thus impedes O’Donovan’s
search for epistemological realism. He locates the root of the problem in “Barth’s account of the Christ-event
[which] has left no room for Advent”, ‘Karl Barth and Ramsey's "Uses of Power”’, 12, and suggests Ramsey’s
doctrine as a more realistic one, because it offers “a political analogue to the homo assumptus… [which] Barth
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opposition to O’Donovan, that Barth’s emphasis upon a Christo-centric anthropology moves
him to “keep in the background” any general, abstract statements of humanum, or humanum
assumptum, or homo politicus, in order to emphasize the concrete reality of Jesus Christ
which necessarily accompanies and governs the dogmatic treatment of such concepts. This is
not to say that Barth rules out the concept of the humanum and its correlates as noetic
impossibilities, but rather he precludes such abstractions as these from directing the course of
the hermeneutics of doctrine. Here then, is the answer to O’Donovan’s question as to “why
there was no analogue to the humanum assumptum in [Barth’s] political theory.” The answer
is clear: because the concept of humanum assumptum, as O’Donovan defines it—
dialectically, abstractly, and independent of ontic immediacy—simply does not exist within
Barth’s doctrine of the Incarnation.142
On O’Donovan’s view, Barth’s conclusion regarding the homo politicus is too severe; it
reaches a dead end in pursuit of a realistic political ethics. While he would seem to agree with
Barth that fides quaerens intellectum is a crucial epistemological criterion, it is not the only
criterion. Thus, O’Donovan concludes from his comparison of Ramsey and Barth that a limit
needs to be placed upon Barth’s theanthropic approach, at least in matters related to the
ontological priority of the bene esse of the humanum. That limit is reached where O’Donovan
finds Barth’s conclusions with respect to the humanum to be unrealistic and/or irrelevant.
O’Donovan expresses his concern for relevance in his interpretation of Ramsey’s
political ethics, which he affirms as:
… a doctrine more properly called “realist,” i.e., an essentialist understanding of what political
agents are and what politics is good for. Only such moral counsel as derives from the being of
political agency can be relevant to the decisions which statesman and citizens must make. (15)
was not ready to grant”, 16; cf. 26. Cf. R&MO, xviii: “Barth’s scheme betrays him into silence”; also R&MO,
143-6.
142 Ivor Davidson’s analysis of the doctrine of dyotheletism (i.e., ‘two wills’ of Christ) offers good insight into
the risks of applying the concept of assumptio carnis (‘assumption of human flesh’) in a dialectical, abstract
manner; Davidson, ‘ ‘Not My Will but Yours be Done’: The Ontological Dynamics of Incarnational Intention’,
International Journal of Systematic Theology 7 no 2 (2005): 178-204. Davidson warns against applying the
doctrine “in some static or abstract sense”, 183. Such hermeneutical inclinations lead toward a bifurcation of the
imago. Davidson identifies this inclination in the habit of such abstractions to articulate a ‘God-consciousness’
within human nature—“a potentiality already inherent in humanity, arousing a natural spiritual capacity to new
heights of experience”, 203. As far as Barth is concerned, the development of such abstractions is not doing
“real theology—not even for the sake of being rejected” Nein! 75; indeed, it is not doing theology at all, as
McDowell recognizes: “The problem is that, as far as Barth, in a moment of intensive acuity, is concerned,
Brunner is doing theology in a way that is, in fact, doing no theology at all.”, John C. McDowell, ‘Karl Barth,
Emil Brunner and the Subjectivity of the Object of Christian Hope’, International Journal of Systematic
Theology 8 (2006): 25-41, 34.
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O’Donovan endorses Ramsey’s emphasis on developing a “realist” doctrine that will
prove useful and relevant in “real life”. To drive this point home, O’Donovan closes his
comparison of Ramsey and Barth by explaining what makes a political theory relevant:
For Ramsey… the form of the act was decisive for everything else in political theory. It bound
together international and domestic, public and private, in one moral field; it laid the foundation
for civil society and the authority of government; it drew justification from the theologico-moral
principle… (23)
This premium on principled action presses theological ethics to provide rules and
principles which can be applied with confidence in pursuing appropriate teleological goals.143
O’Donovan emphasizes this point again in the last sentence of his article, saying that political
action belongs “at the core of political theory” (23). Here again, we see that Barth’s Christo-
centric anthropology presents an impediment to O’Donovan’s aim to be realistic, because it
blocks the path by which ethics might be construed as a set of objective principles. No matter
how carefully nuanced those ethical principles might be, even in light of the limitations due
to human moral knowledge being existential, flawed, provisional and incomplete, the very
premise that ethics might be discussed in terms of principles at all runs counter to the
evangelical affirmations of faith.144 O’Donovan’s concluding endorsement of Ramsey’s
appeal to justify political ethics on the basis of “the theologico-moral principle” shows up the
problem. The gospel is not based in a moral principle.
We find here in O’Donovan’s treatment of Ramsey and Barth several of the same themes
which undergird R&MO—to wit, his appeal to ontological priority for the moral order, his
claim to find warrant for this reality in the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the dialectical
conception of moral knowledge. In R&MO as well as in this case study, O’Donovan
143 Aquinas provides the classic statements of this premium on action, and its implications for practical reason,
conscience and natural theology. Clifford G. Kossel identifies “the question of action” as “the first precept of the
natural law” for Aquinas, calling it: “the natural necessity that binds practical reason and will”; Kossel, “Natural
Law and Human Law (Ia IIae, qq. 90-97)”, The Ethics of Aquinas, edited by Stephen J. Pope (Wash. D.C.:
Georgetown, 2002), 169-193, 175.
144 While not addressing the “great epistemological caveat” per se, Paul T. Nimmo demonstrates convincingly
that for Barth “the discipline of theological ethics” does not yield to “specification in the form of ‘moral
principles’ or ‘ethical system’”, Nimmo, Being in Action: The Theological Shape of Barth’s Ethical Vision
(London: T&T Clark, 2007) 60-61. Nimmo follows Trevor Hart here in recognizing that “the command renews
and is part of an ongoing relationship between two subjects, a ‘history’ as Barth calls it”, Hart, Regarding Karl
Barth: Essays toward a Reading of His Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999) 86. Thus principles attempt to
resolve the ethical crisis on false premises. It is for this reason that Barth categorizes moral principles as
“instruments of the misinterpretation and misapplication of the command, provoking the very desires which are
excluded by the command, the very attempt at human self-justification and sanctification which is forbidden by
God and absolutely fatal”, CD II/2, 727.
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advocates for an epistemological realism which is found to be inconsistent with Barth’s
confessional priorities.
Conclusion
We have identified two important issues which bear further examination:
First, our case study identifies the source of the conflict between O’Donovan’s pursuit of
epistemological realism and the confessional priorities of evangelical faith—the ensuing
epistemological conflict emanates from differences in the underlying interpretations of
humanum; and inversely, differing interpretations of the humanum are seen to lead directly to
epistemological conflicts in dogmatics and ethics. O’Donovan points to the doctrine of the
Incarnation—specifically the concept of homo assumptus –as a pivotal issue in precisely this
context.145
Second, the presumption of discrete moral principles places theological ethics upon a
non-evangelical path. The moral content of the gospel cannot be reduced to a set of discrete
principles. O’Donovan’s comparison of Ramsey and Barth demonstrates clearly the friction
which Barth’s approach creates for any movement in the direction of ethical principles. Even
Ramsey’s explicitly Christological formulation of political theology and the ordo essendi146
fails ultimately to avoid the conflict between the epistemic aspect of evangelical faith and the
presumption of objective principles within the moral order. O’Donovan has characterized this
conflict as an artifact of Barth’s inconsistency in special ethics (of political power, for
example); however, O’Donovan’s appeal for consistency may be more dependent upon his
own program to justify a ‘realist’ political theology, than upon any logical errors in Barth’s
epistemological orientation. As we have seen, O’Donovan ultimately judges the success of
political theology on the basis of its usefulness in determining political action in real life, an
145 E.L. Mascall comes to the same conclusion with respect to the crucial role of the doctrine of ‘the assumption
of manhood into God’ as he explains the implications this doctrine holds for natural theology. Like O’Donovan,
Mascall takes exception to Barth’s epistemological rigor with respect to Christo-centric anthropology. Mascall’s
perceptive analysis of the epistemological difficulties leads him to focus ultimately on the doctrine of the
Incarnation as the crux of the matter; Mascall, The Openness of Being: Natural Theology Today (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971) 155.
146 As O’Donovan notes, Ramsey construes the essence of political theology in terms of “in-principled love…
subject to the contradiction of the cross”, and asserts that “The task of politics is to be a sign of the reign of
Christ…”, ‘Karl Barth and Ramsey's "Uses of Power”’, 11.
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admirably pragmatic and undoubtedly pastoral concern. Barth, on the other hand, eschews
this sort of pragmatism as a goal of dogmatics and ethics, and holds rather to rigorous
application of the confessional sensibilities of fides quaerens intellectum as the decisive
factor.
This conflict over the concept of a “purchasing point for grace in nature” reveals the
issue of the direction of the pressure of interpretation.147 O’Donovan would describe Barth’s
direction of interpretation as moving from ordo cognoscendi (i.e., faith) to ordo essendi; and
he argues, by way of Ramsey, that this lexical ordering becomes untenable as a course to
accomplish a realist political theology. In rejecting this ordering O’Donovan presses, tacitly
at least, in the opposite direction of interpretation, which is to begin with the recognition of
the importance of a ‘realist’ concern for political relevance, and move from there toward
dogmatics of the ordo essendi.148 In framing his argument however, he has presented both
Barth’s and Ramsey’s ethics in a somewhat reductionist manner, evaluating their ethics as
though they could be articulated in terms of principles. As we have seen, evangelical
affirmations of moral knowledge cannot be presumed to find support in objective principles
without doing those affirmations irreparable harm. Nor can the ordo cognoscendi and ordo
essendi be established in lexical order, as though any epistemological method could prescribe
their relative priorities; rather, they operate in tandem, just as do the noetic and ontic aspects
of knowledge. Thus, we may conclude that neither the epistemological difficulties nor the
source of confusion named by O’Donovan may be laid at Barth’s doorstep. The difficulty lies
rather in the ontological doctrine of the humanum which emerges from the presumption of
any point of contact (whether called Anknüpfungspunkt or “purchasing point for grace in
nature”) which fails to adhere to the confessional affirmations of evangelical faith.
147 Alan Torrance identifies this issue as a useful rubric in studying Barth’s theological language. Torrance
credits Daniel Hardy with identifying in Barth’s language a ‘pressure of interpretation [which] demands the
differentiation of God from the sum of the domains of the world”; Torrance, Persons in Communion
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996) 201f; D. W. Hardy, ‘Christ and Creation’ in The Incarnation: Ecumenical
Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed A.D. 381, ed. T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1981): 88-
110, 105. Support for this idea is found also in Colin Gunton’s rubric of ‘concentric circles’ of interpretation,
which are centered upon the singularity of the “personal act of divine self-revelation which is Jesus Christ”; Cf.
Alan Torrance, ‘"Auditus Fidei: Where and How Does God Speak?” ’ In Reasons and the Reasons of Faith, eds.
Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter (New York: T&T Clark, 2005) 27-52, 39.
148 O’Donovan states his realist goal: “Our goal is to make right appear in our midst (iustitia); and to make it
appear conformably to the safety of that organism of human relations which we inherit (lex); and to refound that
organism securely upon that appearance of right by means of an appropriate disposition of power (ordo)”; ‘Karl
Barth and Ramsey's "Uses of Power”’, 11; i.e., he seeks to disclose the right (iustitia) within the moral order (lex
and ordo). R&MO expresses essentially the same goal: to defend the “moral principle which requires deference
to political authority” consisting in “the threefold cord” of “the natural authorities of might and tradition with
that other ‘relatively natural’ authority, the authority of injured right”, 128f.
104
5 THE KIERKEGAARDIAN KNOT: BINDING THE
CONCEPT OF MORAL ORDER WITH THE
EPISTEMIC EVENT OF FAITH
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen,
not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else.
C.S. Lewis, “Is Theology Poetry?”
Whence the conflict between O’Donovan’s realism and the “great
epistemological caveat”?
Here is the conundrum to be solved: Given that O’Donovan pursues an explicitly
evangelical ethics, how can it be that the affirmations of the GEC present an obstacle to his
path? After all, O’Donovan places “the gospel at the heart of evangelical ethics”, and he
emphasizes the concrete reality of Jesus Christ at the center of evangelical faith.1 Do these
affirmations not align perfectly with the GEC? Whence then does the conflict arise? The
preceding case study offers a clue as to its source—O’Donovan, Brunner and Barth each
begin from different starting points; their goals diverge based upon their differing perceptions
of the problems to be addressed. O’Donovan identifies voluntarism as the fundamental
problem for Christian ethics, and he names Kierkegaard as its progenitor:
Kierkegaard, perhaps, provides the pattern for modern Christian voluntarism, in which
neither faith nor morality can rest upon the foundation of reason but must simply be
chosen… In this modern ‘faith-ethic’ Christian moral obligation becomes a function of
the believer’s decision, something that he has opted into. It is esoteric, meaningful only
1 R&MO, 25, 264, 242. Reflecting back on R&MO, O’Donovan cites these affirmations as the core of his
evangelical ethics in ‘John Finnis on Moral Absolutes’, Studies in Christian Ethics 6 (1993): 50-66, 64.
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to those who, by a process in which moral awareness has apparently played no part…,
have placed themselves within the closed circle.2
Kierkegaard’s expression of faith in the language of existentialism has precipitated a
distressing slide into voluntarism, which renders Christian ethics irrelevant in mainstream
discussions of moral philosophy. O’Donovan laments the loss of credibility that this slide into
voluntarism creates for teachers of moral philosophy and Christian ethics,3 yet the even more
distressing problem is the debilitating effect this slide has upon Christian dogmatics. The
most virulent and hazardous strains of voluntarism have cut morality loose from the bounds
of reason, and placed moral authority upon the unreliable and shifting ground of emotions
and feelings which remain ultimately inarticulate.4 What other direction could ethics go,
once Kierkegaard demonstrated that “truth is subjectivity”?5 On O’Donovan’s view this
Kierkegaardian shift in theology and ethics has created a new burden for morality in the
modern era—arbitrariness;6 that is to say, the view that morality is determined by the
arbitrary choice of individual moral agents operating under “the voluntarist supposition that
my good is something which I create or evoke for myself.”7 Thus we see that the desire to
mitigate, even to reverse, this slide into voluntarism motivates O’Donovan’s “outline for
evangelical ethics”.
2 R&MO, 16. Cf.: “Western moral thought since the Enlightenment has been predominantly ‘voluntarist’ in its
assumptions”, 16. O’Donovan is ready to praise Kierkegaard for transforming “all ethical concepts”, 263;
nonetheless, O’Donovan laments the distressing slide into voluntarism. Richard Swinburne, for one, would seem
to agree with O’Donovan’s assessment of Kierkegaard: “I find most modern writing on this subject almost
unbelievably unclear… clearly much of the responsibility for the traces of this view in modern theological
writing derives from Kierkegaard.” Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981) 115-116.
3 R&MO, vii.
4 R&MO, 119. O’Donovan likewise laments that “The voluntarist tradition of thought, by exalting the command
of God above all reason, deprived it of speech and thereby relegated it to the sphere of private and interior
compulsions…”, 141. And the result of this slide in modern moral philosophy was that “the voluntarist journey
ended with a vacuum of authority”, 134.
5 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton
University Press, 1992). Hereafter, CUP.
6 R&MO, 151. This arbitrariness necessarily entails relativism, because there is “no rational resolution available
to our deliberations… nothing more than a bare choice, a raw exercise of the will”, and thus we are “caught in
the relativist impasse”, 220.
7 R&MO, 250. Superficially at least, this sounds very much in line with Kierkegaard’s proposal: “But freedom,
that is the wonderful lamp. When a person rubs it with ethical passion, God comes into existence for him”,
CUP, 138.
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Voluntarism & the ascent of the modern “self”
Of course this descent of ethics into the inarticulate abyss of voluntarism is not entirely
Kierkegaard’s fault. The same story can be told via the broad narrative of modern Western
thought, as the rise of the concept of the individual self to preeminence throughout culture
and philosophy. The modern affirmation of the self has become a foundational concept in the
practice of both theology and philosophy, as moral philosophy and theological ethics have
moved in the direction of voluntarism. Charles Taylor describes this movement with
admirable precision as he traces the demise of the “ontic logos” as a defining concept for
theology, philosophy and morality.8 Taylor offers a sweeping explanation of the shift in
intellectual currency which brokered the ascent of the subjective self, and the corresponding
decline in importance of the objective cosmic order as a foundational ontological concept. No
longer could the cosmic order be conceived so readily as the veritable embodiment of Ideas,
once the modern self rose to exert its newfound power of epistemological priority over
everything, and to posit the individual as the creator of meaning and value through
imagination, intellect and will. Hence, the existential self of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or serves,
emblematically at least, to usher in the virulent strain of voluntarism which derails
theological ethics and moral philosophy.9
Echoing O’Donovan’s theme, Taylor documents the shift in moral philosophy which
occurs when the glory of God’s goodness, as embodied in the created cosmos, loses priority
as an objective, ontological reality. Taylor also diagnoses perceptively that this loss of
ontological emphasis proceeds not merely out of shifting metaphysics, but also from the
simultaneous loss of an ontic relationship with supernatural truth, whether that truth be
witnessed in the ontic reality of the platonic Ideas per se, or in the supernatural reality of
religious faith. Hence, Taylor’s apt phrase “ontic logos” designates the focal point of
meaning which is lost as the modern self rises to epistemological preeminence: “All this
changes when we disengage from the world, and when therefore theories of ontic logos cease
8 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
9 Taylor sums up the transfiguration of reality wrought by the voluntarist notion of self: “In Either/Or
Kierkegaard lays out the idea of an aesthetic transfiguration of life, only to trump it with a higher form, the
ethical. …[T]he ethical man truly chooses himself. He chooses himself infinitely… [A]ll finite things get their
value and significance from this choice”, Sources of the Self, 449-50.
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to be meaningful for us”. 10 The significance of this movement by which the self disengages
from the world, is that it shifts the location of value, in the sense of moral goodness, from the
external and objective reality of the moral space we inhabit, to the internal and subjective
reality of “minds, ours or God’s”.11 Meaning and value then become determined by “a
transfiguration of our own vision, rather than simply through a recognition of some objective
order of goodness”. 12 The obvious cost to moral philosophy here is that the objective order
of goodness may no longer be presumed to exist. Or even if it does exist, we cannot presume
to be able to recognize it or communicate it, for the locus of value has been shifted to the
interior noetic and emotional life of the independent self.13 This is precisely the problem
which O’Donovan aims to confront in R&MO—“Clearly there is something suspicious in the
paradoxical dissociation of morality from reality”, a movement which he considers
“voluntarist in inspiration”.14
O’Donovan and Taylor each trace the decline of objective moral reality in an arc that
sweeps from Descartes to its nadir in the present-day “vacuum of authority”15—a trajectory
which gathers momentum as it receives a gravitational tug toward voluntarism from
Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the willful self in Either/Or. They each point to the debilitating
effect which the modern turn to subjectivism has had upon the “public cosmic order of
meanings”,16 in Taylor’s phrase, which results in the “relativist impasse”,17 in O’Donovan’s
phrase. Though they offer similar appraisals of Kierkegaard’s existentialism as an impetus for
voluntarist tendencies in modern thought, the differences in Taylor’s and O’Donovan’s
nuances are most interesting. For O’Donovan, Kierkegaard is conceivably the dominant
progenitor of modern Christian voluntarism. Taylor, on the other hand, sees Kierkegaard as
merely one illustrative example of the significance of the rise of the volitional self in the
10 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 187, cf. 287. Taylor dates the demise of the “ontic logos” from Descartes’
rejection of teleological order, 144, which echoes another of O’Donovan’s themes. Though Taylor steers clear
of the theological significance of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, his analysis nonetheless points perceptively to the
mutual implications of ethics and anthropology (which he expresses here in terms of “identity”), as he concludes
that “being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues, to do with identity and how one ought
to be”, 112; cf. 521.
11 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 187.
12 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 448. Taylor goes on to relate this transfiguration of vision to Kierkegaard’s
expression of the ethical realm (in Either/Or) as that which we attain “by choosing ourselves in the light of
infinity”, 449, and “In choosing myself, I become what I really am, a self with an infinite dimension”, 450.
13 See, e.g., A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1985); A. Thiselton,
Thiselton on Hermeneutics: The Collected Writings of Anthony Thiselton (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006).
14 R&MO, 249.
15 R&MO, 134.
16 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 511. “We now live in an age in which a publicly accessible cosmic order of
meanings is an impossibility”, 512.
17 R&MO, 220.
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grand sweep of modern thought.18 This difference in perspective may be explained in part by
Taylor’s intention to refrain from theology; however, his intentionally secular presentation
makes his emphasis upon the loss of “ontic logos” all the more interesting.19 Why does
Taylor choose to emphasize the ontic and supernatural aspect of moral reality, while
O’Donovan chooses to focus on the ontological? This subtle difference indicates different
directions in their approaches to confront the challenges of modern subjectivism. O’Donovan
diagnoses the toxicity of Christian voluntarism within theological ethics, and prescribes a
remedy in the form of dogmatic attention to the a priori ontological reality of the moral order
as a seawall against which the tide of voluntarism must be dashed. In this regard, we are not
surprised that he finds “a point of agreement with the classical ethics of Plato, Aristotle and
the Stoics… ethics as a close correlate of metaphysics”,20 as well as his acknowledgement of
“points of strong sympathy between our account and the more realist versions of Natural Law
theory.”21 O’Donovan founds this affinity with the classical statements of ethics upon his
affirmation that:
The order of things that God has made is there. It is objective, and mankind has a place
within it. Christian ethics, therefore, has an objective reference …in accordance with this
order.22
So, the moral order is there, but where? Is it in the divine will? Is it in some metaphorical
understanding of the “good” or telos? Is it immanent, and locatable by virtue of some point of
contact? Or does it lie rather in the event of God’s self-revelation of his redemptive purposes
for humanity? These questions drive O’Donovan’s concern to establish an objective referent
for the moral order, over and against the challenges of subjectivism, voluntarism and the like.
18 Taylor groups Kierkegaard together with Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche as “nineteenth-century writers who
illustrate this issue of self-affirmation”, Sources of the Self, 449.
19 By no means do we wish to suggest that Taylor intends to connote a biblical or Christological significance to
the meaning of “ontic logos”. He is careful to apply the concept in the secular realm, applicable to Plato’s realm
of Ideas, for example, and makes no special distinction between secular and religious concepts of supernatural
reality. He uses the phrase not to impute religious significance to moral reality, but rather to recognize the
inseparability of “Forms [and] intelligence (nous)” in the acquisition of knowledge; thus, “correct human
knowledge and valuation comes from our connecting ourselves rightly to the significance things already have
ontically… true knowledge and valuation only arise when this connection comes about”; Sources of the Self,
186.
20 R&MO, 17.
21 R&MO, 85.
22 R&MO, 17.
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Ontic encounter vs. ontological priority
Taylor approaches the bane of subjectivism from another direction. Rather than begin
with a foundational statement of the objective reality of the moral order, he begins by
addressing the dilemma of the modern concept of the self. The various modern attempts to
resolve this dilemma suffer generally from a common failure to achieve a “personal
resonance” of an “epiphanic quality”.23 Taylor concludes that the significance of moral
knowledge lies in the ontic encounter with moral reality, rather than within the ontological
reality per se, as though morality could be communicated merely in abstract terms spoken in
isolation of the context of personal, ontic encounter with moral reality. While he stops well
short of pursuing the theological implications of this criterion of “personal resonance”, his
insight suggests a promising line of inquiry for our study of O’Donovan’s attempt to ground
evangelical ethics upon the ontological priority of the moral order.24 Taylor’s insight
prompts us to ask: How well does O’Donovan’s statement of ethics capture the significance
of personal resonance and ontic encounter?
We might be initially tempted to argue that the difference in nuance between Taylor’s
emphasis on the ontic logos, and O’Donovan’s on the ontological reality of the moral order,
is a distinction without difference, given that ontic descriptions are readily to be found within
O’Donovan’s discourse, and conversely, ontological concepts frequent Taylor’s evaluation of
modern approaches to moral reality. Furthermore, O’Donovan devotes an entire chapter of
R&MO to a highly articulate and focused explication of the essential and inescapable
existential characteristic of knowledge of the moral order—its interiority, incompleteness and
mystery.25 We might suppose therefore that he shares Taylor’s emphasis upon ontic
encounter. Furthermore, O’Donovan notes that reason is fallen, and we rely therefore upon
God’s gracious intervention via revelation and reconciliation in Christ.26 The shadow of the
23 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 512. Taylor sums up modern moral philosophy as a set of “strange cramped
theories … which have the paradoxical effect of making us inarticulate on some of the most important issues of
morality”, 89, cf. 107.
24 Taylor is careful to avoid delving into theological discourse here, and we should be equally careful not to
interpret his analysis as a theological statement; however, he explicitly acknowledges his personal favor for
Christian spirituality and a “theistic perspective” as superior to secular moral views, and he closes this book
with an affirmation of Judeo-Christian theism as the most hopeful and workable solution to “the moral
predicament of our time”, Sources of the Self, 517, 518, 521.
25 R&MO, 76-97.
26 “Man has refused the role assigned him by his Creator. Knowledge will therefore be inescapably
compromised by the problem of fallenness, the defacement of the image of God, and by the fallen creature’s
incapacity to set himself right with good will and determination”, R&MO, 81-2.
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cross is thus the only real vantage from which to apprehend knowledge of the order of reality,
and this requires the revelatory power of God—
Such knowledge … must be apprehensive knowledge of the whole of things …
vindicated by God’s revelatory word … given to us as we participate in the life of Jesus
Christ. … True knowledge of the moral order is knowledge ‘in Christ’.27
O’Donovan emphasizes participation in Christ as the only path leading to true moral
knowledge. Based upon this Christological statement of moral knowledge, O’Donovan would
seem to be endorsing here also the central affirmations of the GEC—the concrete reality of
Christ, the positive identification of Christ as the only real Archimedean point, as well as the
union of noetic and ontic orientations.28 The union of the noetic and ontic aspects of
knowledge resound here in O’Donovan’s affirmation of participation in Christ. How else are
we to interpret the significance of the concrete reality of Christ’s love as that which has the
sole capacity to make the “true moral life” intelligible?—
The true moral life of the Christian community is its love, and its love is unintelligible
except as a participation in the life of the one who reveals himself to us as Love, except,
that is, as the entry of mankind and of the restored creation upon its supernatural end.29
O’Donovan seems to endorse both the ontological and the ontic at the same time; it’s as if he
holds trump cards in two suits at once. This is reminiscent of Brunner’s dialectical approach,
which explains why O’Donovan seizes upon the Barth-Brunner debate as the archetypal
example of where the problem lies—
In the great theological attack upon Natural Law which was spearheaded earlier this
century by Karl Barth, we can only regret that the ontological and epistemological issues
were never properly differentiated.30
Although O’Donovan expresses antipathy here for Barth’s doctrine, we have seen already
that he also ratifies the existential essence of moral knowledge. Thus, it seems to be not
27 R&MO, 85.
28 O’Donovan clearly conveys a concrete, positive Christology in his affirmation that “Christianity must take …
the path of an integrally evangelical ethics which rejoices the heart and gives light to the eyes because it springs
from God’s gift to mankind in Jesus Christ” R&MO, 12. And he is adamant that this Jesus is “the historically
concrete figure of Jesus of Nazareth”, 242.
29 R&MO, 246. Cf: “Love is the overall shape of Christian ethics”, 25; and, “Morality is man’s participation in
the created order”, 76.
30 R&MO, 86-7.
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existentialism per se to which O’Donovan objects, but rather Barth’s insistence upon “the
divine command—interpreted in the existentialist way as particular and unpredictable”.31
This critique of Barth’s “uncompromised theological epistemology” resonates well with
O’Donovan’s objection to the voluntarist sentiments of Kierkegaard’s ethics.
Who can understand Abraham?
The inscrutable figure of Abraham provides the litmus test for divine command ethics.
The moral dilemma contained in God’s unconscionable command to sacrifice Isaac cannot be
simply explained away by postulating a historical shift in cultural norms.32 Nor can the
problem be dismissed as a case of discerning one’s vocation, for such a claim would presume
to reduce morality to the arbitrary conditions of private voluntaristic perceptions. No, there is
a horrible conflict here in God’s command to sacrifice Isaac which will not be disposed so
handily. The story of Abraham thus provides the entry point through which O’Donovan
might expose and expunge the dark side of voluntarism which he ascribes to Kierkegaard’s
moral sensibilities:
In speaking of a ‘tension’ between the vocational and the generic demand, we need not
assent to the view apparently held by Kierkegaard (in Fear and Trembling) that there is no
resolution possible within the sphere of moral thought—that what is demanded at the
vocational level is ‘a religious suspension of the ethical’.33
31 R&MO, 86-7.
32 R&MO, 43. O’Donovan joins with John Finnis in affirming the classical statement of Thomas Aquinas that
“the primary principles are authenticated by their universal self-evidence alone”. This is one pole of the
irreducible polarity which O’Donovan aims to uphold, R&MO, 86.
33 R&MO, 44. A few comments are necessary to frame the context for O’Donovan’s handling of Kierkegaard.
First, we note that the actual phrase employed by Kierkegaard is not “religious” but rather “teleological
suspension of the ethical” (emphasis added). Elsewhere (e.g., 142) O’Donovan cites the phrase accurately.
Second, we are well advised to pay attention to Kierkegaard’s advice to keep in mind his intention to present the
“life-views” of his pseudonymous authors, and we should therefore not be fooled into placing these words in the
mouth of Kierkegaard himself: “Therefore, if it should occur to anyone to want to quote a particular passage
from the books, it is my wish, my prayer, that he will do me the kindness of citing the respective pseudonymous
author’s name, not mine”, CUP, 627. Finally, having acknowledged the necessarily fictional quality of
Kierkegaard’s essay in Fear & Trembling, we may proceed to analyze O’Donovan’s response to the “life-view”
presented therein, without undue concern as to the degree to which the views of de silentio might or might not
reveal the views of Kierkegaard himself, because our immediate concern is to examine how O’Donovan
engages with the concept of “teleological suspension of the ethical”, rather than to assess Kierkegaard’s reasons
for employing pseudonyms. Our practice shall be (pace Kierkegaard) to cite de silentio when it suits our context.
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To impute that “there is no resolution possible within the sphere of moral thought” is of
course anathema to O’Donovan’s concept of ontological priority. The problem is not so much
the limitation this places upon thinking—after all, human reason has been “compromised by
the problem of fallenness”34—but rather, the problem lies in the suggestion that the realm of
the moral order contains irresolvable conflicts. This prospect is untenable, for God cannot be
divided against himself. O’Donovan reminds us, following Aquinas, that this is the one
limitation upon God’s categorical freedom which cannot be countenanced.35 Thus, the
suggestion of a “religious [sic] suspension of the ethical” is tantamount to a claim that ethics
exists only within the private, subjective realm of the individual’s ability to hear accurately a
divine summons, as Abraham presumably did. Kierkegaard’s suggestion thus presumes to
abnegate the prospect of locating moral authority within the orders of God’s creation (ordo
creationis). Against such a dire and incoherent consequence of divine command theory,
O’Donovan protests—
God’s authority … is not opposed to the created order as such. It does not override our
obligation to the truth in a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ such as Kierkegaard
described.36
O’Donovan thus interprets the concept of “teleological suspension” as an outright denial
of the moral order. Such a suspension would deny the very possibility of a real, objective, and
teleological order within the universe, and relegate ethics entirely to the private and
subjective realm of personal discernment of divine commands. This is the “frightful
conception” which emerges from Kierkegaard’s handling of the story of Abraham. While
O’Donovan gives Kierkegaard due credit for recognizing the horror of such a conflict,37 he is
not dissuaded from the view that there are irresolvable problems with the voluntarist style of
ethics cultivated by Kierkegaard, and that the root of these problems stems from the
antinomian conflict which would ensue if God had created the universe either without
recognizable ethical order, or with an ethical order in conflict with God’s authority. Such
34 R&MO, 82.
35 With reference to St. Thomas: “God is limited by the logic of non-contradiction, but by nothing else”, R&MO,
41. Gilles Emery supports this interpretation of St. Thomas specifically with respect to the order of creation
(ordo creationis), and explains how Thomas conceptualizes creation as proceeding as a communication of
God’s being, as “a reality from its principle (eductio principaiati a suo principio)”. Emery, ‘Trinity and
Creation’, in Theology of Thomas Aquinas, Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, eds. (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005) 58-76, 60.
36 R&MO, 142.
37 O’Donovan quotes Kierkegaard’s Either-Or II, R&MO, 226. Cf., 263.
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would be a “frightful conception… that the universe might be at war with itself”, and a
“terrifying collision between love for God and love for the persons.” 38 O’Donovan asserts
adamantly that “this collision does not and cannot occur.”39
The Thomistic doctrine of God as the summum bonum, in whom there can be no self-
contradictory denial of his own goodness, renders the possibility of collisions within the
ontological reality of the moral order incoherent.40 They cannot happen. On O’Donovan’s
view then, Kierkegaard (or Johannes de silentio, as the case may be) is clearly mistaken in
presuming that a proper religious and ethical response to the reality of the divine address
might require a “teleological suspension of the ethical”. In a nutshell, this leads directly into
the abyss of voluntarism which O’Donovan seeks to expose as incoherent and incompatible
with an evangelical ethic:
The demand that morality must change with God’s acts in history therefore puts the axe
to the root of the doctrine that morality is generic.41
How then does O’Donovan propose to resolve the moral tension in God’s call to
Abraham? He suggests that Kierkegaard has failed to perceive it as a conflict between kinds
of ethical obligations (vocational vs. teleological order), in which the vocational kind trumps
the teleological. Although the tension of vocation is indeed a real felt experience of the
particular individual, it is not due to any inherent conflict within the moral order per se; but
rather, there is a generic principle which subsumes the vocational demand:
Because the vocational demand, which is not generic, is sanctioned by the generic
principle that one should heed one’s vocation, the conflict is resolved like any other
conflict between prima facie moral claims.42
38 R&MO, 226.
39 R&MO, 227.
40 “‘Teleological’ ethics… derives from the ontological conception of God as the summum bonum, in which it
was the task of moral reasoning to recognize and responds to the ordered structures of being and good”; R&MO,
138.
41 R&MO, 41.
42 R&MO, 44. “Subsumption, then, is a matter of truthful recognition”, 197, cf. 189. This principle of
subsumption would seem to be consistent with moral absolutes, in the sense that conflicts are presumed to be
resolvable in light of ‘higher’ universally applicable principle which can subsume the lower ones. O’Donovan
disavows this possibility however, in his critique of John Finnis, which leaves some quandary as to when
“subsumption” is a workable hypothesis and when it is not; O’Donovan, ‘John Finnis on Moral Absolutes’
Studies in Christian Ethics 6 (1993): 50-66. In a more recent essay, O’Donovan expresses an opposing view that
would seem to corroborate Finnis’s view of ‘universal reference’ in ethics: “no claim acquires a moral binding
force unless it is seen to be accounted for in categories that are universal, transcending particular differences of
time and circumstance…” Given these varying views of ‘universality’ we might wonder whether a paradox lies
beneath the very concept, and all the more so, as O’Donovan concludes: “through the concrete moral demands
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Thus Abraham’s moral dilemma, and other moral tensions following the pattern of
Abraham’s, do not provide evidence of conflicts within the moral order; rather, they give the
appearance of conflict to the individuals involved simply because those individuals lack a
fuller awareness of the totality of the moral principles in play.43
Though O’Donovan exercises due diligence to guard against the tendency of voluntarism
to stray into the irrational abnegation of teleology, he does not mean to disparage completely
the significance of the voluntarist emphasis for God’s freedom.44 The freedom of God to act
without prior constraint remains essential.45 Thus, the classical lines of debate between
deontic and teleological ethical theories, the two “moral languages”, need to be held together
in tension.46 In doing so, he emphasizes the rationalism of the teleological school, as opposed
to the voluntarism of the deontic. On this view, there exists a “necessary dialectic” between
the teleological language which derives from the “task of moral reasoning”, and the deontic
which derives from the affective, voluntary inclinations due to perceptions of “command and
obedience”.47
By means of this dialectical statement, O’Donovan claims to dispose of any counter-
arguments from the direction of divine-command thinking which might object to his “linking
of moral obligation to the natural generic-teleological order.”48 He defends his position on
the basis that, “the relation of the creation to the Creator is teleological, but not in any way
generic”.49 In essence, this contention amounts to a dialectical affirmation of the irreducible
duality of the deontic and teleological moral languages. This way O’Donovan can affirm both
that we encounter we hear the distant call of an intelligible world-order”, O’Donovan, ‘What Can Ethics Know
about God?’, in Torrance, Alan J., and Michael Banner, eds., The Doctrine of God and Theological Ethics
(London: T&T Clark, 2006) 33-46, 37-38.
43 O’Donovan uses the story of Jesus’ boyhood sojourn in the temple [Luke 2:41-52] to illustrate—although
Jesus “first appears in paradoxical tension with his duty to his family”, this is merely a perception of paradox,
because once we admit that there is a “generic duty” to “follow our vocations”, the conflict is resolved; R&MO,
43f.
44 R&MO, 136.
45 O’Donovan describes the exercise of arbitrium as fundamental to our understanding of providence and the
doctrine of God, R&MO, 42.
46 R&MO, 137.
47 R&MO, 137-9. Cf. 132: “God’s command cuts across our rational perceptions and relativizes them.”
48 R&MO, 38. O’Donovan refrains from making a broader survey of divine command theories, which would
have distracted from the main thrust of this book; however, it is instructive to note that divine command theories
are not constrained categorically by the dialectic as O’Donovan states it. More nuanced approaches have been
taken by Swinburne, Robert Adams and Philip Quinn for example. See William J. Wainwright, Religion and
Morality (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005), for a survey.
49 R&MO, 40.
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the absolute and incontrovertible reality of teleology underlying the “natural generic-
teleological order”, and also the absolute and unassailable freedom of the Creator:
The tension between the two moral languages reflects a necessary dialectic in the
perceptions of moral agents for whom moral insight is still a task and not yet an achieved
fact.50
There lies within this dialectical approach to ethics, an echo of Brunner’s dialectical
statement of the humanum, in which the human person retains some capacity (by virtue of the
indestructible “formal” imago) to perceive moral reality, even though the practical
understanding of that reality is necessarily flawed (on account of the loss of the “material”
imago). This would explain O’Donovan’s “strong sympathy” for “the more realist versions of
Natural Law theory”, as well as his affirmation of Brunner’s statement of the doctrine of
creation with respect to the “ordinances”.51 This dialectical tendency appears also in
O’Donovan’s doctrine of revelation. It follows that a dialectical approach to the human
capacity to discern moral order would likewise suggest a dialectic between the function of
natural reason with respect to the general revelation of the natural order, and the particular
event of special revelation:
The value of the voluntarist emphasis lay in its perception that the dialectic between
reason and revelation rests not on an accidental deficiency of human reason but on the
aboriginal metaphysical fact that human reason is not transcendent.52
We may now summarize O’Donovan’s answer to the question of Abraham’s moral
dilemma: First, the existential tension is real. Second, the apparent conflict within the moral
order, as witnessed in the tension between the divine command and the teleological moral
reality, is an artifact of imperfect human reason. It only appears to be a moral conflict, within
the necessarily existential limitations of human knowledge. In actuality, the conflict is
removed due to the particularity of vocation being subsumed within a greater generic moral
principal.53 Third, even though it gives no evidence to any underlying conflict in the
“generic-teleological order”, existential tension is a necessary condition of the imperfect
50 R&MO, 139; cf. 132; also his defense of “the natural ethic” 16-21, and his discussion of Natural Law, 85-91.
51 R&MO, 85, 87.
52 R&MO, 136.
53 Wainwright judges perceptively, with reference to the similar explanations of Gellman, Outka and C.S. Evans,
the unfortunate result that: “each of these accounts unduly sanitizes Johannes’s messaged”; Wainwright,
Religion and Morality (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005) 195.
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capacities of perception and reason which comprise the “aboriginal metaphysical fact that
human reason is not transcendent.”54 Fourth, there is an irreducible polarity between the
“rationalist” and “voluntarist” moral languages, which requires to be conceived within a
dialectical doctrine of human perception—a dialectic which bears resemblance to Brunner’s
bifurcation of the imago, though without embracing it explicitly. Fifth, this dialectical
approach safeguards both the absolute freedom of God, and the absolute reality of the moral
order within creation. O’Donovan thus proposes to have resolved the paradox inherent in the
Kierkegaardian notion of “teleological suspension of the ethical”.
Faith as paradox
O’Donovan’s engagement with Kierkegaard sheds light on the question with which we
opened this chapter: How is it that O’Donovan’s evangelical ethics can simultaneously
endorse a concrete Christocentric view of ethics, and yet encounter conflict with the
affirmations of the GEC? By this close reading of O’Donovan’s response to Kierkegaard, we
have seen that O’Donovan aims his polemics at eliminating the threat of antinomianism
which derives its energy from the voluntaristic tendencies he ascribes to Kierkegaard. The
antinomian tendencies of Christian voluntarism are so perennially pernicious that O’Donovan
sees them (anachronistically) even in Luther’s dictum, Pecca fortiter!55 By means of his
dialectical approach, O’Donovan claims to hold this antinomian tendency in tension with
moralism, its polar opposite, in order to achieve an “integrally evangelical ethics”.56 The
ultimate problem here is the voluntaristic tendency for theological ethics to degenerate into a
“Christian morality without rules”, a “‘normless’ ethics” which refuses to admit the
teleological reality of the moral order.57
O’Donovan grasps for the nettle when he objects to Kierkegaard’s call for “teleological
suspension”, which seems on the surface to be a hardened voluntaristic denial of teleological
reality. The problem hinges on the proposition that moral knowledge and deliberation may be
conceived as emanating from the interiority of human experience, unconstrained by the
54 R&MO, 136; cf. 38.
55 R&MO, 262f.
56 R&MO, 11, 12, Cf. 262-263.
57 R&MO, 25.
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objective teleological reality of the moral order.58 Abraham’s moral dilemma provides the
archetypal illustration:
What makes it distinctive, however, is that the conflict cannot be fully understood by
anyone except the agent, since the character of one of the claims is susceptible only of
private discernment.59
Indeed, Abraham’s trial remains a hidden, private affair of which neither he, nor de silentio,
no Kierkegaard, nor the reader, can speak:
Abraham cannot speak. What would explain everything, that it is a trial—though note,
one in which the ethical is the temptation—is something he cannot say (i.e. in a way that
can be understood.60
Does this raise the spectre of an incommunicable, inarticulate darkness as the final
arbitrator of all ethical questions? Such is the impossibly hopeless verdict O’Donovan wishes
to refute:
[T]he authority of God is not incommunicable, interior and removed from public view…
The voluntarist tradition of thought, by exalting the command of God above all reason,
deprived it of speech and thereby relegated it to the sphere of private and interior
compulsions, making it a matter of personal vocation rather than shared moral
obligation.61
The very idea that God might be unable to communicate his authoritative word, or that
humans might not be able to receive, interpret, or communicate revealed truths, is absurd.
Such inarticulateness renders absurd not just ethics, but faith as well. Thus, de silentio
concludes: “Faith is… the paradox of existence”, and “Faith is exactly this paradox, that the
single individual is higher than the universal.”62 And here is the nettle which eludes our
grasp—the paradox of faith which cannot be explained away, at least, not in the universal
language of ethics. Here is the nettle which stings and spurns the attempt to explain the faith
58 O’Donovan states the problem: “Abstraction from teleology makes it impossible, in the first place, to know
the universe whole” R&MO, 49. He detects this abstraction within “the voluntarist tradition”, and asks: “once
the divine command is abstracted from the ordered universe what content is left to the idea of authority itself?”
134.
59 R&MO, 44.
60 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. by Sylvia Walsh; C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh, eds.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 101. Hereafter, F&T.
61 R&MO, 141.
62 F&T, 40, 47 and passim.
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of Abraham in terms of universal principles.63 Fear and Trembling is not a book about ethics,
after all. It is a book about faith, for which Abraham proves to be, literally, the seminal
example.64 Thus, to interpret the phrase “teleological suspension” as an ethical theory is to
take it out of context. It will not make sense as a statement of Christian ethics (as O’Donovan
has demonstrated thoroughly) for the simple reason that it was never intended to provide
one.65 It is rather the self-styled “dialectical lyric” of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author to
marvel at the absurdity of faith, the paradox that faith can even exist. Thus, de silentio puts it
forthrightly:
Abraham represents faith and that it is properly expressed in him, whose life is not only
the most paradoxical that can be thought but so paradoxical that it cannot be thought at
all. Abraham acts by virtue of the absurd… This paradox cannot be mediated…66
If we are correct in this assessment of F&T, and in concluding that the “teleological
suspension of the ethical” is a commentary upon faith, rather than a prescription for Christian
ethics, then we may conclude similarly that O’Donovan’s objection to this Kierkegaardian
concept would be better aimed not against any allegedly Kierkegaardian doctrine of Christian
ethics, but rather against the paradoxical epistemological issues of faith which Kierkegaard
explores through the example of Abraham.67 O’Donovan’s response, therefore, is properly
taken as a critique of the idea (which is “Kierkegaardian” in O’Donovan’s interpretation) that
63 Craig Barnes shows that this text cannot be preached by explaining away the paradox, or by helping Abraham
to “help God be rational”; Barnes, The Pastor as Minor Poet (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009) 118.
64 Evans concludes correctly: “Fear and Trembling is not a book about ethics; it is a book about faith”, F&T, xi;
cf. xxii. The ethical is treated because it is something that can easily be confused with faith”; Evans,
Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004) 62. Thiselton, likewise, recognizes Kierkegaard’s intent in F&T as showing via Abraham that “the sharp
edge of choice-in-the-face-of-paradox” cannot be blunted by attempts to understand it; Thiselton on
Hermeneutics: The Collected Writings of Anthony Thiselton (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 2006) 356, 357. Others
come to the same conclusion, e.g., Philip L. Quinn, ‘Kierkegaard’s Christian Ethics’ in The Cambridge
Companion to Kierkegaard, Gordon Daniel Marino and Alastair Hannay, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998); Jonathan Malesic, ‘A Secret both Sinister and Salvific: Secrecy and Normativity in
Light of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74 no 2 (2001):
446-68.
65 “The ethics whose teleological suspension is at issue in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is the secular
ethics of his own time”, and thus is not intended as a comment upon Christian ethics; Quinn, ‘Kierkegaard’s
Christian Ethics’, 349. Works of Love is Kierkegaard’s most thorough treatment of Christian ethics. This
assessment is confirmed by C.S. Evans in Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral
Obligations.
66 F&T, 49.
67 Murray Rae demonstrates persuasively that for Kierkegaard the “ethical concerns are inseparably bound up
with epistemological ones. The fundamental reason for this is that in knowing the Truth we are not concerned
with knowing propositions but with participating in the new life Christ offers”; Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision of the
Incarnation: By Faith Transformed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) 146; thus: “in respect of Christian faith ethics
(the business of acting decisively) and epistemology cannot be separated”, 159.
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faith presents an epistemic obstacle to moral deliberation and the articulation of evangelical
ethics. How can we really trust God and believe in the teleological goodness of God’s
creation if ethical conflicts may exist as realities beyond the power of rational thought? And
so O’Donovan concludes:
The risk of Abraham cannot be avoided. But once its dangerous tendencies have been
thus corrected, rationalism too can instruct us. If obedience is to be ‘trusting’, it must be
hopeful. The disciple who obeys the divine word in defiance of his own limited
perceptions of right is genuinely trustful only if he believes that the paradox is not an
ultimate contradiction in reality. He must hope to see the moment of critical
confrontation finally resolved by the elevation of his reason to grasp God’s action as a
coherent whole.68
The fly in the ointment here is the possibility of “an ultimate contradiction in reality”.
But what does “in reality” mean here? The forgoing analysis indicates clearly that for
O’Donovan it refers to the assured, objective reality of a teleological moral order within the
creation. This reality is simply there. It requires no revelation and no evangelical faith to see
it. Given the incorruptible wholeness of God, conflict cannot exist within this reality. Such a
conflict would present an unassailable paradox capable of resisting the force of reason. Such
would be a stumbling block to faith. This is untenable within O’Donovan’s outline for
evangelical ethics.69
There would seem to be ample justification to raise skeptical questions about
O’Donovan’s interpretation of Kierkegaard.70 While it seems patently evident that
Kierkegaard intends to present faith as a paradox which eludes the explanatory powers of
reason,71 it seems equally clear, in light of his attention to the efficacy of reason in his corpus,
that he also affirms reason as a valuable component of faith and discipleship.72 But while
68 R&MO, 136.
69 The “stumbling block” here derives, to some extent, from O’Donovan’s interpretation of what de silento
means by “teleological suspension”. Based on his fine reading of CUP, C. Stephen Evans argues persuasively
that Kierkegaard “never doubts that [the] ideal of objective knowledge is valid … or that there is a reality
independent of us that we are attempting to know.” Evans, ‘Realism and Antirealism in Kierkegaard’s
Concluding Unscientific Postscript’, in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998): 154-176, 170. “The crucial question for Kierkegaard then is not whether a person’s
beliefs are objectively right but whether the person has the right kind of relationships to what is believed”,173.
70 “Kierkegaard proposes that the moral law can be known by general revelation as well as special revelation”,
Evans, Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love, 163.
71 E.g., CUP, 208ff, 213, 218; F&T 31.
72 For Kierkegaard, faith is “neither the abandonment of reason (contra rationem), nor an addition to reason
(supra rationem), but rather reason’s redemption”; Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision of the Incarnation, 116.
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O’Donovan’s interpretation of Kierkegaard may not provide a nuanced assessment of
Kierkegaard’s ethics, it does lend a clear view of the intersection at which these
epistemological paths collide. We are now at the scene of the accident, as it were.73
Suspicion of teleological ethics
In his closing chapter of R&MO, O’Donovan sums up his reason to be suspicious of
paradoxical notions—
Clearly there is something suspicious in the paradoxical dissociation of morality from
reality which this argument urges upon us…. In this dissociation we may discover the
clue to its real character, and recognize in it a reflection of that suspicion of teleological
ethics which we have already discerned to be voluntarist in inspiration.74
We can capture the gist of the problem in these snippets:
de silentio (Kierkegaard): “teleological suspension of the ethical”
O’Donovan: “suspicion of teleological ethics”
Does this juxtaposition invite a dialectical resolution? Kierkegaard denies that route, via
the sharp irony of de silentio’s voice. There is no higher principle, no set of principles, no
greater telos, and no “higher universal” of any kind, which could remove the paradox of faith.
This is the difference between faith (the existential paradox) and ethics (teleological
principles, in this case). Thus, to accept the mission to resolve the paradox in ethical terms
would be to follow the path of the “tragic hero”:
73 This collision becomes particularly acute in O’Donovan’s assessment of the paradox of self-love; cf. R&MO,
249. Analysis of precisely this paradox generates the main thrust of O’Donovan’s monograph, The Problem of
Self-Love in St. Augustine (Yale University Press, 1980). From the first page, he focuses upon “the sheaves of
paradox” born by the notion of self-love, and he proceeds to explain how the tension between Augustine’s belief
in “immanent teleology [at] the root of his eudaemonist ethics” coheres with his “epistemological program,
credo ut intelligam”, in spite of the fact that “There is no ‘theory of self-love’ articulated in his pages”, op. cit.,
1, 157. O’Donovan also cites Kierkegaard in this context as an illustrative example of the sort of enigmatic and
impressionistic interpretations which contribute to the paradox, rather than resolve it, 1, 112.
74 R&MO, 249.
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He lets an expression of the ethical have its telos in a higher expression of the ethical; he
reduces the ethical relation between father and son or daughter and father to a sentiment
that has its dialectic in its relation to the idea of the ethical life. Here, then, there can be
no question of a teleological suspension of the ethical itself.75
In other words, the tragic hero denies the paradoxical question (of “teleological suspension”)
and reduces ethics to dialectical principles. For Kierkegaard however, the concept of moral
order and the existential aspects of faith must remain bound together in a paradoxical union.
These must not be set asunder if Kierkegaard’s portrayal of Abraham’s ethical dilemma is to
cohere with its goal, namely faith itself.
On O’Donovan’s view however, Kierkegaard has sidestepped the crucial issues within a
practical doctrine of Christian ethics, and the result has been to encourage “confusion of the
ontological and the epistemological in much modern theology”.76 O’Donovan can affirm on
one hand, “love as the overall shape of Christian ethics”,77 and participation in Christ as the
fundamental condition of moral knowledge;78 yet on the other hand, he will not permit the
paradox of faith to supervene or preclude the immanent teleology of the moral order, and so
he disposes of this obstacle by cutting the Kierkegaardian Knot.
Where and how does O’Donovan cut the “Kierkegaardian Knot”
(K2)?
Simply put, the K2 is an affirmation of the epistemic function of faith as an event bound
inextricably with the concept of the moral order.79 This bond is cut by O’Donovan’s
ascription of ontological priority to the moral order. He does so to overcome the idea (which
75 F&T, 51f. Here we see Kierkegaard invoking the label “dialectical” as a category for attempts to reduce a
paradox to systematic principles. By the subtitle to Fear & Trembling, A Dialectical Lyric, we infer that the
tome may be read as a critique of dialectical theological ethics which would purport to explain away the
paradox of faith. De silentio boasts ironically of “the power of the dialectic” and then proceeds to show how
nonsensical dialectical reasoning becomes if employed to dispose of paradox. In the process he pays sarcastic
homage to Lessing as “one of Germany’s most erudite minds”, F&T, 77.
76 R&MO, 19. O’Donovan acknowledges that “Kierkegaard also distinguished very sharply between faith and
morality”, but judges this distinction to have been ultimately ineffectual in correcting the misguided direction of
“contemporary Christians who have followed him in assigning to both a voluntarist foundation”, 16.
77 R&MO, 25.
78 R&MO, 11, 85, 150 and passim.
79 The reality of faith does not fit into neatly contrived definitions, and I do not mean to suggest that I am
attempting that errand, for I fear that would place me in the camp of less-than-successful tragic heroes.
Nonetheless, my hope is that this phrase provides a useful short-hand rubric for the discussion to follow.
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he attributes to Kierkegaard) of faith-as-paradox as an epistemological strategy which grants
priority to subjective (and ultimately, voluntaristic) personal experience. Thus, O’Donovan
would prefer to safeguard the reality of “immanent teleology”80 within the moral order, and
he endeavors to hold together the irreducible duality in which moral knowledge is both
existential and immanent.81 This strategy bears resemblance to Brunner’s Objective-
Subjective antithesis and dialectical statement of the humanum. Although O’Donovan
expresses sympathy for Brunner’s theology in this regard, he stops short of identifying with
Brunner’s stringent dialectical theology.82 And so, O’Donovan takes a different approach to
uphold the polarity: rather than begin from a dialectical statement of the humanum and its
challenging implications for moral knowledge, O’Donovan approaches from the direction of
ontological priority, and relegates the epistemological questions to secondary status in order
to stave off the troubling modern objection to fideism.83 In this way, he aims to overcome
the detritus of the Barth-Brunner debate in which he concludes “the confusion of the
ontological and the epistemological issues were never properly differentiated”.84
There is irony in the direction of interpretation indicated here, for it could be seen to
emanate from the implicit imposition of an a priori either-or choice regarding the premise of
objectivity in the moral order:
The order of things that God has made is there. It is objective, and mankind has a place
within it. Christian ethics, therefore, has an objective reference because it is concerned
with man’s life in accordance with this order.85
80 O’Donovan finds support for this epistemological stance in his extended treatment of Augustine’s ethics,
wherein he finds “that Augustine does believe in immanent teleology and that that is the metaphysical root of
his eudaemonist ethics”, The Problem of Self-Love, 157.
81 Thus would O’Donovan avoid the “constant tendency in Christian theology for this polarity to collapse”;
R&MO, 87, 85.
82 O’Donovan recognizes, along with Barth, that Brunner displays a degree of “unclarity over the
epistemological issue”; R&MO, 87. Elsewhere, he mentions his desire to avoid “antithetical development” of
ethical norms, preferring the term, “complementary”; O’Donovan, ‘John Finnis on Moral Absolutes’, Studies in
Christian Ethics 6 (1993):50-66, 63.
83 O’Donovan argues persuasively that there is “no neutral account of what moral thought is, from which such
sceptical questions can successfully be raised and answered in a spirit of pure enquiry, without either faith or
unbelief”, R&MO, 77. As Bruce Marshall puts it succinctly, “Surely no one wants to be a fideist”; this sentiment
pressures theologians into “giving reasons for beliefs without creating epistemic subordination and
dependence”, which leads theology into apologetics; Marshall, Trinity and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999) 141-7.
84 R&MO, 86. Cf. O’Donovan’s concern that this confusion not “be allowed to shelter a destructive and semi-
Christian ontology”; ‘The Natural Ethic’, 26.
85 R&MO, 17.
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Elsewhere, O’Donovan phrases the a priori either-or choice in these terms: “Is cosmic order
really present in the world, or is it imposed upon reality by the human mind?”86 If this
objectivity is to be taken as a priori, then it follows naturally that:
Any attempt to think about morality must make a decision early in its course, overt or
covert, about these forms of order which we seem to discern in the world. Either they
are there, or they are not. This decision, which will shape the character of the whole
moral philosophical enterprise, forces itself as much upon secular as upon Christian
thought.87
In order to ensure conformity with the “objective reference” provided by the content of
the moral order, the decision must be made first, with respect to discernment of the certain
and objective existence of the moral order; only afterwards may the epistemological
questions be raised.88 Might this epistemological sequence suggest that in his advocacy of
ontological priority O’Donovan has endorsed the same sort of voluntarist movement which
he finds problematic in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or?89
What is the significance of this epistemological either-or decision? In effect, it serves to
constrain the implications of the GEC, placing a caveat upon the caveat, as it were, and
taking some of the “great”-ness out of the GEC. Similarly, this either-or decision effectively
makes ethical doctrine contingent upon the decision to believe in an absolute ontological
reality, without regard for the epistemic conditions of faith pertaining to such belief. By
isolating the epistemic conditions pertaining to the choice of such a belief, this a priori choice
renders asunder that which the K2 would find to be bound together (paradoxically) in faithful
union. Has O’Donovan postulated herein a voluntaristic either-or as a precursor to the
86 R&MO, 67.
87 R&MO, 35.
88 R&MO, 76. Cf. O’Donovan’s statement in the preface to the second edition of R&MO where he defends his
conclusion that epistemology of the moral community needs to be placed within “a subjective chapter of ethics
which must follow (and must follow) from the objective chapter”, xix (italics in the original).
89 We do well to keep in mind the proviso that the fictional Either/Or may not be fairly characterized as
Kierkegaard’s statement of Christian ethics, though it does illustrate a voluntarist approach to faith and
knowledge. Either/Or is better seen as Kierkegaard’s illustration of the aesthetic and ethical “stages” which are
surpassed in Kierkegaard’s conjecture by the “religious sphere of faith”, as he demonstrates in Stages on Life’s
Way, Malesic, ‘A Secret both Sinister and Salvific’, 454. Charles Taylor reminds us rightly, with respect to the
ethical position of B in Either/Or: “Kierkegaard in his later writings evolved beyond this definition of the
ethical, which came to be seen as a stage which was in turn trumped by the religious”, Sources of the Self, 450.
Taylor does not pursue the implications of this observation further, nor does he discuss the meaning of faith
within Kierkegaard’s ethics, but his observation highlights the importance of rendering Kierkegaardian ideas of
“choice” and “self” in a full context of Kierkegaard’s concept of ethics. C. Stephen Evans elaborates this point
in Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004).
Chapter 5: The Kierkegaardian Knot 124
formulation of a Christian ethics, in order to eliminate the threat of Kierkegaardian
voluntarism from the outset? If so, it might seem that the only tool capable of cutting the K2
would be, in and of itself, another paradox. This would be an ironic conclusion—a paradox to
cut the paradox. Clearly, that irony will not satisfy the direction of O’Donovan’s ethics.
It is patently obvious that O’Donovan does not mean to propose another paradox as the
solution to Kierkegaardian voluntarism. But given the premise of an initial either-or choice in
O’Donovan epistemological approach, how is such a paradox to be avoided? Here
O’Donovan takes a cautious step in Barth’s direction, in his desire to sustain a balance along
the axis of tension that runs between the opposing realist and voluntarist poles of evangelical
faith.90 He gives Barth credit for recognizing difficulties with Brunner’s argument and
concludes that, in spite of Barth’s failure to properly differentiate the ontological and
epistemological issues, “the epistemological positions of this greatest of twentieth-century
theologians remain fundamentally important for Christian ethics.”91 Barth would thus be
judged to be going in the right direction in his Christo-centric approach;92 but only to the
extent that it does not undermine the realist view of ontological priority. Thus, O’Donovan’s
critique of Barth is not so much a disagreement with Barth’s direction, but rather, a judgment
that Barth has perhaps gone too far in this direction; that is to say, O’Donovan judges Barth
to have made unfortunately unbalanced doctrinal statements in his quest for absolute
epistemological rigor.93
In conclusion, we hear O’Donovan affirming aspects of both Brunner’s and Barth’s
opposite positions with respect to moral reality: he can affirm the epistemological aspect of
faith, as advocated by Barth, as well as the ontological priority of the moral order, for which
he deems Brunner to be a better advocate.94 Ultimately, O’Donovan concludes that the
bidirectional perspective of the resurrection is the key to a statement of evangelical ethics
which can uphold the tension in these positions, while resisting a collapse into either a
rigorous dialectical doctrine of ontological reality, or a paradox of faith such as the K2
90 R&MO, 85. Indeed, O’Donovan can even affirm “the dynamic of the Gospel” as demonstrating “that
paradoxically twofold need which refuses, existentially or ontologically, to be reduced to simplicity one way or
the other”; DN, 38.
91 R&MO, 87.
92 R&MO, 90. Cf. WJ, 86, where he expresses appreciation for Barth’s essay, “Gospel and Law”, and as we have
seen above, O’Donovan affirms the christo-centric direction of both Barth and Ramsey.
93 R&MO, 86-87.
94 O’Donovan agrees that there is a “sense, then, in which it is true to say that the image of God in man was not
merely ‘defaced’ but ‘lost’”; R&MO, 89.
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espouses. This makes moral knowledge contingent upon participation in Christ95 and the
agency of the Holy Spirit—
Again, when we speak of the Christian moral life as lived in the Spirit, we declare that this
life is itself part of the divine self-disclosure, and as such points us forward to the goal of
that self-disclosure. …The Holy Spirit, outside of whose field of operation the Christian
moral life is unthinkable, is a signpost to the future…96
But this begs the question yet again: has O’Donovan resolved the paradox of faith, or merely
restated it? How can the “divine self-disclosure”—which Barth would seem to affirm as the
realm in which moral life is lived and discerned—be the context of moral life, if it is also true
that teleological content of the moral order is immanent and requires no revelation?97
O’Donovan’s answer rests upon the crucial role of the bi-directional perspective of the
resurrection.98 Does this work?
And where is all this going to lead?99
At this point, it might seem we have reached an epistemological impasse, for we are now
talking about whether and how to resolve the paradox of evangelical faith, and that would
seem to be, in and of itself, a paradoxical task.100 So let us aver the paradoxical nature of
faith, and rephrase the question: How does O’Donovan’s epistemological realism, with
respect to the bi-directional view of the resurrection, cope with the seemingly dialectical
aspects of moral knowledge? We shall proceed to answer this question in terms of another
95 R&MO, 79, 81, 85 87.
96 R&MO, 247.
97 “God is who He is in the act of His revelation”; CD II/1, 257. Cf. Schwöbel, ‘Theology’, in The Cambridge
Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 17-36, 32.
98 R&MO, 249.
99 This is the question which Barth poses in Nein! (85) as the test of Brunner’s doctrine. Similarly, we propose to
test O’Donovan’s epistemological realism by examination of its implications.
100 We are reminded here of Barth’s reply to Bultmann when asked what he held against Bultmann’s theological
philosophy, to which Barth said he could only reply “not with an argument, but with a recitation of the creed”;
Gary Dorrien cites this from Barth’s letter to Bultmann, 20 June 1931, in Karl Barth/Rudolf Bultmann Letters,
64-65; Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology without Weapons (Louisville: Westminster
John Knox Press, 2000) 98.
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case study which “puts the ball in play” or the “bird in flight”, to borrow Barth’s allusion, for
the dynamic epistemic criterion of faith seems to require observation while in motion.101
Case Study: Ordnungen102
Our test case concerns the doctrine of Ordnungen (“orders of creation”), which
implicates the noetic and ontic aspects of knowledge. The most focused treatment of the
differences between Barth and Brunner over the doctrine of Ordnungen occurs in Brunner’s
Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, and Barth’s rejoinder in Church Dogmatics III/4;
accordingly, we shall direct our attention to those two documents.103
Brunner begins with an affirmation which, superficially at least, would seem to be
consistent with Barth’s view of ethics and dogmatics—
As the indicative and the imperative suddenly alternate, as speech about the redeeming
love of God flows directly into the claim for human love, so the whole New Testament
is an indissoluble blend of “ethics” and “dogmatics”.104
It becomes immediately apparent that Brunner’s “indissoluble blend” bears merely superficial
agreement with Barth’s concept of the sameness of dogmatics and ethics, because Brunner
proceeds quickly to split them into two separate movements, claiming the necessity of “an
external technical separation”.105 Barth disagrees: “The attempt methodically to separate
dogmatics and ethics is dubious even from the point of view of ethics”. 106
101 “For our position is really an instant in a movement, and any view of it is comparable to the momentary view
of a bird in flight”; Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1928) 282f,
quoted in Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, 24.
102 This is the word Brunner uses in his title, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf einer protestantisch-
theologischen Ethik (1932), E.T., The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian Ethics, trans. by Olive Wyon
London: The Lutterworth Press, 1937). Hereafter, DI.
103 It is interesting to notice Brunner’s decision not to translate the title of Das Gebot und die Ordnungen
literally, but rather to mention only the divine command, and omit reverence to die Ordnungen. My conjecture
is that Barth’s Nein! which appeared in the intervening years between the German original and the English
translation might have influenced him. Also of interest is the striking resemblance between Brunner’s subtitle,
an Outline of a Protestant Theological Ethic, and O’Donovan’s, An Outline for Evangelical Ethics. The two
books certainly cover very similar territory, and begin from similar concerns for relativism and Kierkegaardian
consciousness; e.g., DI, 17, 21.
104 DI, 84.
105 DI, 86.
106 CD I/2, 790. Webster notes correctly that for Barth “Christian dogmatics is inherently ethical dogmatics”,
Barth's Moral Theology, 8.
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Why does Brunner insist upon this “technical separation”?—because he has proposed
that the other task of theology is to engage in discussion with the secular culture which
demands proficiency in apologetics.107 Barth rejects this other task of theology as being
impossible, for it would require theology to be something other than that which it can only
be—namely, a witness in actuality of the self-revealing God.108
O’Donovan for his part, echoes Brunner’s statements, emphasizing God’s redeeming
love as the foundation of Christian ethics, in which the indicative of teleology and the
imperative of divine command originate and remain forever linked to God’s divine self-
disclosure. And, like Brunner, O’Donovan recognizes that this foundation creates a bond
between theology and ethics, so that “Christian thought about ethics must prove itself as
‘moral theology’”.109 Yet, also like Brunner, he deems it necessary to separate ethics from
dogmatics—
Ethical questions are not the same as doctrinal questions; the old slogan that ‘ethics is
dogmatics’ was intolerably high-handed.110
With this pithy conclusion, O’Donovan does not mean to suggest that the bond between
ethics and dogmatics may be severed; his position is carefully nuanced in defense of that
“indissoluble bond” between them. Christian ethics would be incoherent apart from the
faithful witness of dogma. Yet, dogma and ethics do different things. “Dogma is doxa, an act
of praise”, while the task of ethics “is to inform, out of praise and for the sake of praise, the
deliberative reasoning which determines practical human undertakings.”111 Thus, “the
communication between the two is reciprocal.”112 And they are the responsibilities of
different disciplines—the “moralist” and the “dogmatician”.113 This division of “intellectual
roles”, however, must also be carefully nuanced in order to preclude the false interpretation
107 In this sense of the word “apologetics”, Barth finds nothing to do with theology CD II/2 (518, 520). Barth
said as much also in his earlier Ethics, p. 21, where he rejected apologetics as being “the attempt to establish and
justify theological thinking in the context of philosophical, or, more generally and precisely, nontheological
thinking.”
108 Brunner: “It is the task of our theological generation to find the way back to a true theologia naturalis”, NT,
59. Barth refers to Brunner’s “other” task for theology and explicitly rejects it, Nein!, 70, 76. Cf. Barth’s
rejection of natural theology as “another” task of theology in CD II/1, 128f.
109 O’Donovan, ‘What Can Ethics Know about God?’, 33.
110 Ibid., 33.
111 Ibid., 34.
112 Ibid., 34.
113 Ibid., 34.
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that they could ever exist as concrete realities.114 These roles are abstractions, O’Donovan
maintains, yet they are obviously important abstractions, apparently made so by the need to
conceive of the intellectual task of ethics without continually confining it within the
existential act of doxa. On O’Donovan’s view then, neither of these tasks may be confined
within the jurisdiction of the other; rather, they must mutually inform one another.115 This
proviso of mutuality protects against the risk of voluntarism, and gives the moral theologian a
platform for dialogue with the “thought-world of ethics and politics”.116 Here we can see how
the nuanced distinction between ethics and dogma, for both Brunner and O’Donovan, posits a
point-of-contact between thought-worlds in furtherance of the goal of apologetics.117
In contrast to this sanguine view of dialogue between ethics and dogmatics, Barth argues
against the possibility of accord between theology and such a disjointed conception of ethics,
as though morality could be pursued in generalizations outside the covenantal grace of God.
Indeed, such a presumption would replay the first sin of speculation in denial of God’s good
creation, as conceived by the serpent in the garden (Gen. 3)118.
Barth denies the premise of a “general conception of ethics”, yet he affirms the existence
of order within the creation, and the possibility of existential discernment of order even when
the observer lacks knowledge of God. The question for Barth is not whether a realist view of
the moral order is defensible, but rather: on what grounds is it defensible? This is the context
in which Barth articulates his doctrine of the “little lights”, which stands in contradistinction
to Brunner’s Ordnungen, not because Barth denies the Ordnungen per se, but rather, because
114 Ibid., 34. O’Donovan nuances this abstraction further, noting that the “conversation between specialists could
have little interest unless we each had a theological stake in the other’s special interest”, and he acknowledges
“the evil that has befallen the world” when such “heuristic distinctions” are taken “in a humourlessly literal way
as ultimate frontiers”, Ibid., 35.
115 And even so, O’Donovan suggests that mutual dialogue between the dogmatician and the moralist remains
insufficient “to pursue the goal of theology to the end”, for which they might need to recruit metaphysics as a
third participant, Ibid., 45.
116 Ibid., 44. O’Donovan values this dialog by which political theology breaks out of the “cordon sanitaire”
established by religious fideism. Thus, he concludes: “Theology must be political if it is to be evangelical”, DN,
2-3. O’Donovan continues in the direction set in R&MO regarding the objective and immanent reality of the
moral order, with respect to politics, as he supports a realist assertion that political authority within a society is
acknowledged as being simply there, to be apprehended as in the Thomist tradition of ‘Natural Law’, DN, 47.
O’Donovan nuances this “theorem” by following it immediately with the context of the Psalmist who recognizes
in this reality the provision of “Yhwh’s rule” which engenders praise.
117 Rufus Black finds similarly that O’Donovan’s concept of practical reason argues in favor of “the
epistemological superstructure for a bridge between Christian and other forms of ethics”. Black finds
O’Donovan to be in concert with Grisez and Finnis on this score, even though “O’Donovan is much more
skeptical than Grisez about the extent to which fallen humanity can accurately perceive this natural order”; The
Revival of Natural Law, Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black, eds. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000) 159.
118 “Strange as it may seem, that general conception of ethics coincides exactly with the conception of sin”; CD
II/2, 518.
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of the impossibility of knowing either the meaning of the Ordnungen or the source of the one
true light who kindles and orders the lesser lights, if the self-creating circle of theological
knowledge is broken—“To be aware of this order we do not leave the closed circle of
theological knowledge.”119 The lesser lights of creation do shine by, through and with the
light of Christ, in witness to their creation, but they do not lay open to understanding by the
prospect of any autonomous human capacity—that unfortunate prospect can lead only into
further mystery and existential angst apart from the self-revelation of their Creator.
The “closed circle of theological knowledge” is of course that same epistemological
condition which O’Donovan resists as being “voluntarist in its assumptions” and “mainly
irrationalist” in content, and so must be avoided in favor of a more realist account of
knowledge of the moral order.120 There is irony here, for Barth and O’Donovan share a
common intention—to avoid arbitrariness—though they proceed in divergent directions.121
O’Donovan aims to expose the specious epistemological presumptions of voluntarism, by
affirming the objective reality of the moral order. Barth aims to expose the erroneous
presumption that ethics and dogmatics may be conceived in distinction from one another. On
Barth’s view, the error lies in the premise of an autonomous self-understanding as a means of
escaping the “circle of theological knowledge”. This circle must remain intact as the sole
means of epistemic access to moral knowledge, because it subsists in the epistemic event of
revelation. Any attempt to arrive at moral knowledge apart from the unified ontic and noetic
criteria of this circle will be cast upon the whims of “arbitrary human assertion”,122 which
claims its authority by default if the epistemic event does not proceed “according to the Word
of God!”123
Accordingly, to proceed in ethics via any route other than the self-revealing Word is
necessarily arbitrariness based in human self-understanding:
119 CD III/4, 44. Cf. CD IV/3.1, 153.
120 R&MO, 16.
121 This irony rises to the surface in O’Donovan’s sermon, “Knowing the Truth”, where he exegetes John 7:16.
Here he acknowledges that “truth is a relation between ourselves and what is not ourselves, and that relation
cannot arise within the circle of our own critical exertions… If one does not receive one’s knowledge as a gift,
one constructs it as a private invention”; O’Donovan, The Word in Small Boats: Sermons from Oxford, ed. Andy
Draycott (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010) 110-11. By this statement we might infer that the only viable
alternative to arbitrariness is to receive knowledge as a gift—a conclusion that would seem to correspond,
ironically, with Barth’s insistence upon the “closed circle of theological knowledge” wherein knowledge is
received as a gift in the event of revelation.
122 CD III/4, 31.
123 CD III/4, 27.
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This being the case, it would be an act of arbitrariness which could only result in
misconceptions to understand the truth of the idea of creation as the only key to this
reality and indirectly as the key to the understanding of the ethical event, even if it were
as easy to grasp this key as representatives of the theology of orders assume.124
We have seen that O’Donovan objects to this conclusion on the grounds that the
objective reality of the moral order is simply there—it is assured, for the resurrection bears
witness to its vindication, and the incarnation to its presence. We participate in this moral
reality in Christ. O’Donovan has argued persuasively that this perception of reality is not an
arbitrary creation of the volitional self. And Barth also affirms the existence of order in the
creation. Is this another impasse in the paradox of faith, as seen by two evangelical
theologians who differ merely in emphases? Perhaps not. Our thesis is that something else is
going on here: O’Donovan is stepping conveniently in and out of the “circle of theological
knowledge”, as Barth has defined it.
Conclusion
We have seen that O’Donovan aims to avoid the unfortunate implications of Brunner’s
dialectical theology, yet without sacrificing the moral content he ascribes to the Ordnungen.
Now we can see how this is accomplished. Rather than postulate an explicitly dialectical
ontology of the humanum, which carries unfortunate implications for the epistemic function
of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, O’Donovan relies, implicitly, upon a dialectical epistemology
from which to view the moral order from either of two directions—looking “backwards”
from the resurrection in order to affirm the “givenness” and objectivity of the moral order
established concretely in the cosmos, and simultaneously “forwards” from the resurrection,
cognizant of the reality that revelation, via the agency of the Holy Spirit, is the necessary
condition for full and true moral knowledge. This is a robust epistemological strategy, from
which an apologetic direction may be chosen depending upon the intellectual challenge to
hand (which is why its articulation is as difficult as capturing a bird in flight). When faced
with the questions of moral philosophy, this epistemological realism can articulate the ethical
significance of the Ordnungen as well as the ontological reality of the human being as esse
etiam in intellectu. When faced with the questions of theological dogmatics, this
124 CD III/4, 28.
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epistemological realism can function in full cognizance of revelation and metanoia as the
events in which moral knowledge obtains, and even go so far as to affirm, with evangelical
robustness, the paradoxical and existential aspects of faith and life in Christ.
When O’Donovan’s epistemological realism moves in the “forwards” direction, carried
by the epistemic force of faith, revelation and metanoia, it moves in concert with both Barth’s
concept of the “closed circle of theological knowledge”, and the K2. When it moves in the
“backwards” direction, it meets resistance in the form of the GEC. Finally, to the extent that
this bi-directional epistemological realism articulates a dialectical epistemology, it cuts the
K2. To adopt an epistemological “standpoint” based in any way upon a parsing, distinction or
division of the movement contained within the event of divine self-revelation, is to presume
the existence of some other realm in which the epistemic conditions of moral knowledge may
be sought. It is for this reason that the GEC functions within a single circle of knowledge.
Thus Barth warns against the attempt to divide the movement of faith into distinguishable
epistemological directions—
Thus the nature of Christian moral knowledge is to be sought and found neither in
isolated preference for one or the other standpoint [creation, reconciliation, redemption,
to nature, grace or glory], … but in the treading of this way in accordance with the divine
act of revelation, in the traversing the three standpoints in the basically single circle of the
movement of knowledge described.125
In different aspects, and to varying degrees, O’Donovan’s epistemological realism
encounters conflict with the evangelical affirmations of the GEC (Barth), and the existential
paradox of faith (Kierkegaard). Nonetheless, O’Donovan’s approach brings valuable insight
into the limitations of Brunner’s dialectical ontology of the humanum, Barth’s
“uncompromised theological epistemology”, and the voluntaristic tendencies of
Kierkegaardian existentialism. Might there be a way to incorporate these important
contributions of O’Donovan into an evangelical ethics which avoided the complications we
have described by the phrase “dialectical epistemology”? We shall turn our attention next to
that prospect.
125 Barth, Ethics, 54.
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6 THE TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONS AND
THE CONCEPT OF MORAL ORDER
καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν
κατʼ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν
Colossians 3:9
We have seen how the paradoxical implications of faith and metanoia for moral
knowledge can present a challenge to O’Donovan’s outline for evangelical ethics; yet, only
by incorporating the personal, experiential reality of faith into moral reality can we hope to
express an evangelical statement of ethics which coheres with the Gospel.1 In this chapter I
shall advance the thesis that the way forward, to mitigate and even resolve some of the
difficulties encountered in the implications of O’Donovan’s epistemological realism, is to
recognize the transformational role of faith in providing epistemic access to moral
knowledge. We aim to articulate an evangelical ethics which can provide a coherent
ontological concept of the moral order, while at the same time affirming the actualization of
faith as the essential event of epistemic access to moral knowledge.
This is not to suggest that the solution to meeting this challenge is a matter of “getting
the mixture right” between subjective faith and objective reality. The question is not a matter
of placing more emphasis upon the existential aspect of faith, as compared to the objective
1 Of course, I do not mean to suggest that O’Donovan ignores the role of faith in the actualization of moral
knowledge; to the contrary, he insists upon the existential reality of “participation in Christ” as the essential
criterion for true moral knowledge (see Chapter 3).
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reality of the moral order. These are not offsetting arms of a scale which balance each other,
as though they were fungible commodities which could be mixed together in the proper
proportions so as to even the scales. No, that way of thinking simply perpetuates the conflicts
inherent in a dialectical epistemology, and relativizes the role of faith in moral discernment,
which leads to misconstrued and unanswerable questions, such as: How much moral truth can
be perceived without evangelical faith? And, how much faith is enough to enable true moral
knowledge?2
These are the types of questions that emerge from Brunner’s bifurcation of the imago.
Even though he delimits carefully the scope of natural reason by specifying that full
knowledge of God is accessible only to those “whose eyes have been opened by Christ”,3 his
doctrine of the “formal” imago still endorses the capacity of natural reason to ascertain divine
truth “to some extent”. Barth of course rejects the suggestion that the formal imago is capable
of recognizing “the will of God imprinted upon all existence from creation” and finding
moral truths embedded in the lex naturae and the “ordinances of creation and nature.4 We
have seen that the dialectical epistemology which emerges from O’Donovan’s outline faces
similar challenges, when it severs the bond between the epistemic role of faith and the
actualization of moral knowledge.
The hermeneutical task
The doctrine of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit emerges as critical factor in theological ethics
precisely for this reason—it addresses the very core of what it means to speak of moral
knowledge. Our thesis regarding the transformational role of faith in providing epistemic
access to moral knowledge must therefore be examined in light of its doctrinal implications
for Offenbarungsmächtigkeit. We shall be especially concerned with the development of the
hermeneutic of this doctrine, because as we have seen, attention to epistemological
presumptions is crucial.5 O’Donovan draws attention to this hermeneutical issue when he
2 Cf. Matt. 17:20: “For truly I tell you, if you have faith the size of a mustard seed…” The size or relative
proportion of faith is not the issue, but rather, the merest existence of faith is enough for God to use for
miraculous effect.
3 Nein!, 111.
4 Nein!, 111.
5 Thiselton provides an instructive example here, in his concern for the development of “a hermeneutic of
specific doctrines”, as opposed to articulation of a systematic theology; Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of
Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007) 177. I share this same goal: to pursue a hermeneutic of the doctrine
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describes the paradox implicit in moral knowledge due to “the self-involvement of the subject
from within” which can prevent moral discernment from ever breaking free of “the circle of
self-reference into a clear conception of the objective reality of good”.6 The paradox of faith
is thus embedded within moral knowledge—such knowledge involves the relational and
transformational aspects of faith as the relationship in which divine revelation occurs. The
relational aspect of knowledge and faith runs throughout scripture, yet it has received
renewed theological attention in the modern era.7 Much of the polemical energy of the Barth-
Brunner debate, for example, can be seen to derive from Barth’s doctrine of “Man’s readiness
to know God” as being completely dependent upon the relationship of the creature to the
Creator.8
Relationality: from ontological priority to the ontology of faith
O’Donovan’s attention to the relational aspect of moral knowledge has grown more
prominent in recent works, perhaps indicating new concern for the relational aspect of
knowledge, faith and revelation. Reflecting back upon R&MO, he defends himself against
critics who read the book as “merely a cover for a return to a ‘natural ethic’”. In his own
defense, he says that these critics were mistaken—they missed “the central problematic of the
book, how an ethics could be evangelical, which is to say proclamatory of the divine action.
By rooting ethics in the resurrection I argued that it could only be grasped within the history
of divine action.”9 Thus, he reiterates that his ethical theory is grounded in the revealed truth
of the Gospel as received through faith.
of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, as opposed to a systematic theology of faith and all that would be entailed therein.
As we have seen, O’Donovan’s dialectical epistemology is well capable of making theological statements of
faith, Christology and pneumatology. The issue at hand is not to whether and how well his evangelical ethics
functions as a systematic theology; but rather to identify the hermeneutical significance of the doctrine of
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit for evangelical ethics.
6 R&MO, 250. Cf. WJ, 19-22.
7 Thiselton rightly notes that relationality “stems from the very heart of biblical traditions”, and has been
expressed axiomatically by Calvin, Schleiermacher, Barth, Pannenberg, Moltmann, Balthasar, Rahner, and
many others; The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 179f. For a helpful survey of the treatment of relationality in
theological anthropology, see Stanley Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of
the Imago Dei (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001). His relational understanding of the imago Dei
supports the view that theological ethics requires to be discussed in terms of participation in Christ, in order to
understand ethical praxis as a matter of new creation in the act of “putting on Christ”, 262-3. Cf. Rom. 13:14;
Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24; 2 Cor. 5:17.
8 CD II/1, 128. Cf., “In its own way all natural theology circles about the problem of the readiness of man to
know God”; Ibid.
9 DN, 19.
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O’Donovan develops the foundational importance of divine action further in The
Desire of the Nations, where he emphasizes divine rule and the divine initiative in which faith
is actualized. He goes on to emphasize, with respect to revelation: “the history of divine rule
is presented to us as a revealed history”.10 The relational aspect of faith appears even more
directly in O’Donovan’s exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount, where he finds prayer to
occupy the center of the sermon, and to serve as a lynch-pin to “enshrine the moral attitudes
of the community.”11 The relational importance of the worshiping community emerges as an
important exegetical theme throughout Desire.12 Commenting on “the connexion between
Easter gladness and the moral life” as seen in 1 Peter, he concludes:
Church morality is an evangelical morality. It springs from the vindication of God’s rule
… in Christ’s resurrection… This is a morality of new creation in Christ, the life of a
new community constituted by God’s acceptance of Christ, promising a world made new
in Christ and fit for human beings to live and act in.13
O’Donovan continues to develop the importance of faith for ethical deliberation in The
Ways of Judgment, which he closes with an extended reflection upon the evangelical
understanding of conscience as being shaped by “hopeful attention to the inner dialogue with
God”, and faith as a personal event “governed by the inner control of the Holy Spirit”.14
While O’Donovan has continued to hold fast to his doctrine of objectivity for knowledge
of the moral order,15 he has begun to explore in more depth how the objectivity of moral
knowledge is to be understood with respect to the ontological reality of faith as a relationship
in which one is ‘claimed’—
To understand the moral order as objective is to treat as objective also the experience of
being claimed, of being obliged or beholden to structures of relations which are given
with one’s being in the world. It is to know that such a claim is not the projection of
one’s own or anyone else’s purely subjective will. It is to discover the character of the
10 DN, 21.
11 DN, 107.
12 Commenting on R&MO, O’Donovan acknowledges a new emphasis upon worship and faith as essential for
political theology and ethics: “In The Desire of the Nations I added a fourth strand to the analysis of YHWH’s
kingship, worship, to which the equivalent in the Gospel account of Jesus’ ministry proved to be faith”; WJ,
142.
13 DN, 182-3.
14 WJ, 309, 315. O’Donovan acknowledges here his desire to augment his earlier discussion of conscience given
in R&MO, with greater sympathy to “the task of reflective self-examination” (footnote, p. 308), which supports
our discernment of his movement to give greater consideration to personal experience.
15 O’Donovan, ‘What Can Ethics Know about God?’ 39.
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moral order as authority, and so to establish that authority is the objective correlate of
freedom.16
Thus we perceive a consistent movement in O’Donovan’s work toward appreciation for the
relational aspect of faith. This direction is evident from the beginning in R&MO; still, he
seems to develop it further in response to various critiques of his “realist” approach to
evangelical ethics.
It is also evident that the confusion surrounding the epistemological and ontological
issues at the heart of the debate over natural theology continues to draw his attention. The
conflict between the immanence of lex naturae and the transcendence of participation in
Christ has not been resolved, as we have discovered through our analysis of the doctrine of
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit. It will prove fruitful therefore to explore further the doctrine of
moral knowledge as “participation in Christ” and the concept of moral knowledge which
derives from natural theology.
Toward a “more natural” theology
Eberhard Jüngel has taken helpful steps in this direction, with his pursuit of “a new
approach to solving the old problem of natural theology.”17 Jüngel frames the problem in
Christological terms, asking how the doctrine extra Christum nulla salus (outside Christ there
is no salvation)18 can be reconciled with natural theology. In other words, how can it be that
“this exclusive truth claim becomes an inclusive granting of a truth that concerns every
human being as such”?19 The easy answer is to insist that there are two distinct types of
knowledge—salvific vs. non-salvific—and that the Gospel belongs to the former, whereas
ethics and natural knowledge of the moral order belong to the latter. This is, of course, a non-
solution, and we need not rehearse here the ground previously surveyed regarding the
inseparability of ethics and dogmatics, which we have seen to be necessarily bound together
16 Ibid., 40.
17 E. Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum Nulla Salus—a Principle of Natural Theology? Protestant Reflections on the
'Anonymity' of the Christian’ in Theological Essays (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989) 173-188, 174. Jüngel takes
his cue from “the problem which [Karl] Rahner indicates by speaking of anonymous Christians”, 173-4. We
need not analyze Jüngel’s interpretation of Rahner’s statements here; the essential point for our study is that
Jüngel’s response to Rahner addresses precisely the same issue of the epistemic role of faith which concerns our
thesis.
18 Cf. Acts 4:12; John 14:6.
19 Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum…’, 175-6.
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by the evangelical affirmation of ethics as subsisting within the self-authenticating divine
command. Suffice it to say, every scheme to bifurcate knowledge into categories of “natural”
vs. “revealed” has been tried—it can be bifurcated either by a dialectical doctrine of the
imago (Brunner), or by a dialectical epistemology (O’Donovan). In either case there are
serious implications for Offenbarungsmächtigkeit.
Jüngel’s proposal is tantalizing, because if he is right in suggesting that there can be a
Christological basis for an “entirely new construction of natural theology”, then this new
construction will also demonstrate the transformational role of faith in providing epistemic
access to moral knowledge. How so? Because a truly Christological natural theology will
necessarily sustain the integrity of the bond between ethics and dogmatics, in which God-talk
is an act of fides quaerens intellectum which proceeds through the epistemic event of faith.
Such a new construction of natural theology would also seem to be precisely what is required
to sustain O’Donovan’s suggestion that the moral order requires to be understood in terms of
the relational “experience of being claimed.”20
Jüngel sets the cornerstone for construction of his christocentric natural theology upon
Luther’s statement that “justification by faith is the theological definition of the human
person”.21 This thesis places faith at the core of the ontological statement of the humanum.
Furthermore, because it describes “the whole of the person and therefore all persons”, this
definition serves also as a suitable platform upon which to construct a natural theology.22
The neat trick to be pulled off here by Jüngel (if he can do it) is to express natural theology in
terms of faith. He has merged the epistemological aspect of faith into the ontological
description of the person (and the humanum). Is this merely a sleight-of-hand, a playing with
words? Or has Jüngel indeed offered a coherent dogmatic approach to convey the meaning
of natural knowledge in terms of the Christological event of faith? He acknowledges this
20 Similarly, Hauerwas argues “that the great natural theologian of the Gifford Lectures is Karl Barth, for Barth,
in contrast to James and Niebuhr, provides a robust theological description of existence”; Stanley Hauerwas,
With the Grain of the Universe (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2002) 39. Barth says, “a ‘Christian’ natural
theology, [must] really represent and affirm the standpoint of faith. Its true objective to which it really wants to
lead unbelief is the knowability of the real God through Himself in His revelation”; CD II/1, 94. Ray Anderson
(1986: 263) proposes a similar concept: “It would indeed be a new direction in natural theology of the
transforming grace of the death and resurrection of Christ to be displayed in the public arena through serious
moral commitment to the humanizing of human persons. It would indeed be an appropriate testimony to the
theological legacy of Karl Barth for evangelical theology to move in this new direction.”; Anderson, ‘Barth and
a New Direction for Natural Theology’, in Theology Beyond Christendom: Essays on the Centenary of the Birth
of Karl Barth, May 10, 1886, ed. John Thompson (Allison Park, Penn.: Pickwick, 1986): 241-66, 263.
21 M. Luther, The Disputation Concerning Man, thesis 32, LW 34, p. 139, quoted by Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum…’,
180.
22 Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum…’, 180.
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potential objection by going immediately to the heart of the matter as he asks: what is the
meaning of the word “God”? The question needs to be answered within the context of
natural theology if Jüngel’s proposal is to succeed, yet the God known through Christ is
known only through the event of faith, actualized through God’s self-revelation. How then
can this word be used meaningfully at all outside the context of faith, and with universal
validity? This is a hermeneutical problem. The word ‘God’ takes on performative
significance in terms of the relationship of faith in which God becomes known. This is the
direct result of the intention to define ‘God’ in concrete, trinitarian, and hence Christological,
terms as:
…the deus iustificans (God who justifies), and thereby as the one who communicates
himself, whose self-communication takes place sola gratia (by grace alone) and therefore
in freedom… [T]he word ‘God’ is a ‘word of offer’.23
If Jüngel’s definition is to bear weight in natural terms (extra Christum), the word ‘God’
must be seen to function as a relational event in which an offer is made sola gratia (by grace
alone). This clearly refutes the traditional meaning of natural theology, as Jüngel admits. The
biblical and Christological meaning of God fails utterly to be derived from traditional natural
theology. Thus, it is far from clear that Jüngel has successfully arrived at a Christological
natural theology.24
Regardless of the degree to which Jüngel’s approach might be deemed successful by
proponents of traditional natural theology, we can draw at least one significant conclusion
from his proposal—the attempt to construct natural theology upon Christological terms may
be construed as a hermeneutical exercise. The reason for this is that the epistemic role of
faith, as an event, resists reduction into merely ontological language. The orders of creation
(Ordnungen) might be reducible to ontological categories and concepts, but the faith event in
which the self-revealing God makes himself known is not reducible into these same
ontological categories. Thus, natural theology collapses under the weight of the burden of
explaining the epistemic events of faith and revelation. Its language contains no categories
from which the meanings of faith and ‘God’ can be derived:
23 Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum…’, 181.
24 Jüngel recognizes that this claim fails to win “universal validity” apart from the claim that “God is a
hypothesis which must verify itself.” ‘Extra Christum…’, 180. This criterion may also be expressed as, “the
desire to prove that all persons always exist in relation to God independent of the saving revelation, 181.
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The being of God is the hermeneutical problem of theology. Or, more precisely: the fact
that the being of God proceeds is precisely the hermeneutical problem.25
The hermeneutical problem consists in the paradoxical impossibility of deriving the
meaning of ‘God’ apart from God’s self-communication. The verb “proceeds” conveys this
self-referential activity of God, in which God is known through the event (the proceeding) in
which he continually becomes who He is.26 This is the context in which Jüngel titles his
interpretation of Barth’s Trinitarian theology as Gottes Sein ist im Werden. Of course Jüngel
follows Barth here, even to the extent that he describes this book as “an interpretive
paraphrase of some trains of thought of Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics.”27 Nonetheless, he
goes significantly beyond the boundaries of paraphrase and offers fruitful insights for
dogmatics, two of which I shall highlight as being most significant:
a) A Christological starting point leads to a more natural theology; and
b) Knowing and being cohere in that which is self-evident.
First, Jüngel’s Christological foray into natural theology yields a more significant
statement of humanity than is possible within traditional natural theology. This is why Jüngel
refers to it as a more natural theology. He derives this claim directly from the confession of
Jesus as being in the beginning with God.28 Thus the unity of the human Jesus, as “the Son of
God … in concreto and not in abstracto”,29 immediately places the meaning of humanum
within the context of the Trinitarian God. In his concrete human-ness, Jesus bears all the
ontological possibilities of the humanum, incarnate in unity with the imago Dei. Jüngel takes
this theanthropic conception of human being as “the christological counterpart to the
theologia naturalis which [Barth] rejected.”30 This unique valuation of humanity in the form
of God’s self-revelation lends a significance to human dignity far surpassing any conceivable
dignity obtainable through traditional natural theology:
25 Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming: the Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. John
B. Webster (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001) 10; hereafter, God’s Being.
26 The divine name, YHWH, can thus be interpreted as an outright rejection of categories pertaining to theologia
naturalis, lex naturae, and religion in general. I might therefore reiterate Jüngel’s synopsis in the aphorism:
YHWH is the hermeneutical problem of theology.
27 Jüngel, God’s Being, xxvi.
28 John 1.
29 CD II/2, 98.
30 God’s Being, 97.
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In this, Barth has in some measure christologically surpassed the conception of all natural
theology. One can hardly any longer make the charge Barth’s rejection of any natural
theology withheld from humanity the significance which is its due.31
This insight invalidates those critiques of Barth based upon the charge that he diminishes
somehow the theological significance of human dignity by accentuating divine action and
Christo-centric anthropology. This was of course Brunner’s concern—to defend the
theological significance of human dignity. He accused Barth of treating human nature as
mere raw material, truncus et lapis, 32 and of making humans “wholly passive” in the event
of faith.33
O’Donovan and Brunner make similar moves here: each affirms the capability of
humans to see (at least to some extent) moral truth within the orders of creation. Brunner is
concerned to affirm human dignity and to shore up the case for duty and responsibility as
being the heart of morality. This leads him to emphasize the capacity of the “formal” imago
to acquire moral knowledge. O’Donovan, on the other hand, is concerned to refute
voluntarism as a norm for ethics, and so he argues for the ontological priority of the moral
order. Both approaches lead to a similar conclusion in claiming that the moral content of the
Ordnungen remains accessible to human capacities, without the need to invoke any
contingency upon ‘special’ revelation.34 Both Brunner’s and O’Donovan’s arguments thus
lead to doctrines wherein Offenbarungsmächtigkeit may be expressed as a reality which can
be actualized apart from faith.35
The conclusion to be drawn from Jüngel’s exposition is that such a critique of Barth
misses utterly the significance of defining human dignity solely in terms of the transcendent
dignity of the God-man Jesus as a self-revealing event of God. Thus, Jüngel can claim rightly
that Barth’s Christological anthropology has “surpassed the conception of all natural
theology.” This is why Jüngel, with intentional irony, makes the claim that the only solution
to the limitations of natural theology is to posit a more natural theology which can transcend
31 God’s Being, 97.
32 MiR, 538.
33 MiR, 537. Brunner accuses Barth of espousing a “false anthropology”; MiR, 539. We may hear a sympathetic
echo of this concern for human dignity in O’Donovan’s claim that the moral order “remains accessible to
knowledge in part. It requires no revelation to observe the various forms of generic and teleological order which
belong to it.” R&MO, 88. Cf. Brunner’s desire to set forth a “Genuine Christian Humanism”; MiR, 344. Cf. DI,
68; and MiR, 558f regarding the reduction of the humanum to a profanum.
34 R&MO, 86-7.
35 We need not here digress to consider the deeper question of whether this capacity of the humanum is an active
or passive attribute (see Chapter 4). The similarity noted here between Brunner’s and O’Donovan’s doctrines of
moral knowledge holds in either case.
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them by virtue of the truth of human nature, as witnessed in the Trinitarian God and the
humanness and election of the Son.36
Natural theology cannot pull itself up by its bootstraps to such heights as this in the
affirmation of the divine affirmation of human dignity. Being incapable of recognizing the
significance of “participation in Christ”, natural theology fails ultimately to bring the events
of being and knowing into a coherent identity, and thus fails to answer with epistemic clarity
the questions it asks. If there is a solution to be found in the direction of natural theology, it
must subsist in a more natural theology which comes at the problem from the one Word of
God. Only from this direction can we
…outline a more natural theology than so-called natural theology: a natural theology which
knows Jesus Christ as the one who has reconciled both human beings and the world (2
Cor 5:19).37
The second insight I wish to explore here is that Jüngel frames the fundamental problem
of natural theology differently than does Barth. Barth defines natural theology as a treatment
of “the readiness of man to know God”; 38 i.e., the capacity of the humanum to apprehend the
revelatory content of God’s work. Jüngel’s and Barth’s views complement one another.
Jüngel’s approach, however, offers a valuable clue as to how we might sort out the
ontological and epistemological issues in natural theology, and hence, in moral knowledge
also. Jüngel views the fundamental problem of natural theology as a theological claim
regarding the “self-evidentness of God”—
The desire to prove that all persons always exist in relation to God independent of the
saving revelation which occurs in Jesus Christ shows that natural theology has been
36 It seems difficult to reconcile Brunner’s charge against Barth in light of the sweeping affirmations of human
dignity which Barth applied to all humankind in The Humanity of God, 50.
37 Jüngel, Christ, Justice and Peace: Toward a Theology of the State in Dialogue with the Barmen Declaration,
trans. A. J. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992) 26 [E.T. of Barmen; Kirche Zwishen Versuchung und
Gnade]. We have focused here on the import of Jüngel’s “more natural” theology for the unity of ontological
reality and epistemic access. He highlights another significant outcome worth mentioning, and that is the ability
of his more natural theology to go “Deeper, therefore, into compassionate solidarity with those who cry de
profundis for God…”; Jüngel, Christ, Justice and Peace, 28. A.J. Torrance interprets this solidarity as an
inherent capacity to recognise “Jesus Christ as the one who has reconciled both human beings and also the
world”, and thus to give meaning to human suffering in a healing way which traditional natural theology cannot;
Christ, Justice and Peace, xv-xvi.
38 CD II/1, 128. Similarly, in Nein!, Barth defines natural theology in terms of a system of interpretation, which
depends upon the human capacity to discern divine revelation: “By ‘natural theology’ I mean every (positive or
negative) formulation of a system which claims to be theological, i.e. to interpret divine revelation, whose
subject, however, differs fundamentally from the revelation in Jesus Christ and whose method therefore differs
equally from the exposition of Holy Scripture”, Nein!, 74-5.
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guided by the concern to make clear that God is self-evident. The self-evidentness of God
is the real claim of natural theology.39
Jüngel recognizes correctly the motive underlying natural theology: to yield theological
knowledge without admitting, or submitting, to the epistemic contingencies of special
revelation. Thus, natural theology claims “to demonstrate that which ought to be self-
evident.”40 The “self-evidentness” of the truth claims in natural theology can be described in
terms of either human capacity or God’s self-evident being, but in either case, the logic
underlying the claim is problematic. How can that which is self-evident be demonstrated or
proven? Demonstration proceeds from that which is self-evident, toward that which is not.
The claim that knowledge of God is naturally self-evident therefore reduces to the claim that
God creates, and subsists within, the epistemic event which makes such knowledge evident
and knowable. Once again, we see that the act of being and the event of knowing must
cohere—the ontological reality and the epistemological actualization of knowledge are
inseparable; they are bound in the Kierkegaardian Knot41, and are mutually ‘indwelling’, to
borrow Polanyi’s phrase.42
This diagnosis leads to the conclusion that attempts to construct a natural theology in
merely ontological terms will fail. Such attempts fail the test of coherence, because the
epistemic conditions of knowledge and the relational events which actualize “self-
evidentness” are not subsumed by ontological categories.43 For a ‘something’ (or a self) to
make itself self-evident, the epistemic conditions of its evidence will be inseparable from its
essence. In other words, being and knowing are joined within its identity—ratio essendi and
ratio cognoscendi cohere.44 This is precisely the coherence expressed in our thesis: the
ontological reality of the moral order requires to be understood in terms of the epistemic
reality of participation in Christ. Jüngel’s approach to a Christological natural theology
39 Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum…’, 181.
40 Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum…’, 182.
41 See chapter 5.
42 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1958).
43 John Milbank sees this as the crux of the matter—“the domain of metaphysics is not simply subordinated to,
but completely evacuated by theology”; Milbank, ‘Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics’, New Blackfriars
76, issue 895 (2007): 325-343, 328. Milbank offers good insight upon the implications for ethics, for example,
the impossibility of rendering the relational component of ethics in metaphysical terms; The Word Made
Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 39.
44 Jüngel, ‘Extra Christum…’, 182.
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arrives at this conclusion—ontological being and epistemic process are inseparable.45
Traditional natural theology fails this Christological test by presuming that meaning may be
discerned through the ratio essendi without regard for the epistemic process at work through
the ratio cognoscendi. This Christological conclusion is not meant as an a priori rejection of
traditional natural theology, as though no meaning could be derived from the Ordnungen.
Indeed, natural theology can and does arrive at meaningful interpretations of the Ordnungen,
yet within the self-imposed constraints of its own epistemological presumptions. Even the
arch adversary of natural theology Karl Barth acknowledged the appeal of natural theology,
and refused to reject the problem which it presents for human existence—the questions it asks
and the answers it seeks are realities not to be disparaged.46 Intellectual integrity demands an
answer to the observation that right and wrong seem evident to people of all faiths, including
those with faith in no faith, and those with faith in faith in no faith, and so on. Natural
theology obviously gives answers to the question of how moral reality may be known.47 Yet
does it arrive at the right answers? What makes moral knowledge moral? What makes it
knowledge?
Participation in Christ
The co-inherence of ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi means that the capacity of the
Ordnungen to reveal moral knowledge, as well as the capacity of persons to receive the
revealed content of moral knowledge, both require to be defined in terms of the self-
revelatory act and being of God.48 A “more natural” theology then, on Jüngel’s view, will
understand Offenbarungsmächtigkeit in terms of “participation in Christ”, which of course is
the same epistemic condition which O’Donovan affirms as the uniquely valid route to moral
truth, the path of obedience:
45 Murray Rae makes this case elegantly through his commentary on Kierkegaard’s application of the Meno
Paradox; Rae, Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation: By Faith Transformed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).
46 “But the problem [of natural theology] itself we cannot reject. If God is knowable, then it is necessary also to
ask how far He is knowable to man”, CD II/1, 129. Cf. Barth’s remarks on the Barmen Declaration; CD II/1,
178.
47 Barth similarly acknowledges the capacity of natural theology to give answers, yet in the light of biblical
theology, these are seen to be wrong answers. CD II/1, 129.
48 Colin Gunton provides extended comments on this theme in Act & Being (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
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Knowledge of the natural order is moral knowledge, and as such it is co-ordinated with
obedience. There can be no true knowledge of that order without loving acceptance of it
and conformity to it, for it is known by participation and not by transcendence.49
Here is the test of coherence for natural knowledge—to what or to whom does the moral
person respond in obedience? If not to the triune living God, then to what moral authority
does it bear witness? Furthermore, what ontological reality can be ascribed to any other
authority? Barth, of course, famously expresses this dilemma by referring to natural theology
as being no theology at all, for it can proceed only by means of denying the witness of “real”
theology—
For, “natural theology” does not exist as an entity capable of becoming a separate
subject within what I consider to be real theology—not even for the sake of being
rejected. If one occupies oneself with real theology one can pass by so-called natural
theology only as one would pass by an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one
does not want to fall.50
Barth concludes that “nothing could be simpler or more obvious” than to see that ““natural”
theology [is] quite impossible within the Church, and indeed, in such a way that it cannot
even be discussed in principle.”51 Why impossible? Because “it is possible only on the basis
of a mortal attack on the Christian doctrine of God”.52 In the direction of natural theology
therefore, is to be found no knowledge of God, but only a disobedient step in the opposite
direction.53 Thus, the test of coherence in moral knowledge turns out to be a Christological
test. O’Donovan acknowledges the falsehood which pertains to knowledge obtained apart
from participation in Christ:
49 R&MO, 87. O’Donovan would seem to be sympathetic to Kierkegaard here in this coordination of knowledge
and obedience. Kierkegaard explored this line of thought “relentlessly”, as Rae observes: “Without obedience,
Kierkegaard further contends, faith does not exist, and without faith there is no knowledge of God”; Rae,
‘“Incline Your Ear so that You May Live”: Principles of Biblical Epistemology’, in The Bible and
Epistemology: Biblical Soundings on the Knowledge of God, eds. Mary Healy and Robin Parry (Milton Keynes,
U.K.; Paternoster, 2007) 161-180, 173. We can read Paul’s language about “putting on Christ” in this sense, as
expressions of the epistemic event of revelation in which knowledge occurs in faith. Galatians 2:20 sums up this
understanding of living by faith.
50 Nein!, 75.
51 CD II/1, 85.
52 CD II/1, 85.
53 CD II/1, 86.
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This is the sense, then, in which it is true to say that the image of God in man was not
merely ‘defaced’ but ‘lost’.54
Nonetheless, O’Donovan proceeds, by the means of a dialectical epistemology, to entertain
the possibility that moral knowledge remains somehow accessible, even in the disobedience
of unfaith, at least partially and to some extent, because “It requires no revelation to observe
the various forms of generic and teleological order which belong to it.”55 This is the point at
which his epistemological realism departs from an evangelical understanding of God’s self-
revelation and the inescapable paradox of faith seen in the K2. Is there a way to reconcile his
concern for realism with the evangelical epistemic reality of faith? Is there a way to affirm
both (1) faith and obedience as the epistemic reality in which moral knowledge obtains, and
(2) the ontological priority which O’Donovan places upon the moral order?
In this regard we can discern a connection between O’Donovan and Jüngel in at least this
one salient matter—O’Donovan’s pursuit of “evangelical realism” might also be viewed as an
attempt to articulate a “more natural” theology. After all, he is concerned to affirm both a
“more realist” approach to lex naturae—which represents the moral content of knowledge
obtainable through natural theology—as well as to affirm the Christological significance of
participation in Christ as the uniquely effective epistemic condition of true moral knowledge.
Is this not another way of framing precisely the same challenge which Jüngel addresses in his
effort to present, on a Christological basis, “an entirely new construction of natural
theology”?56 Let us then apply Jüngel’s insights to O’Donovan’s epistemological and
evangelical realism by asking: How might O’Donovan’s realism be qualified by an
understanding of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit in terms of “participation in Christ”?
54 R&MO, 89. O’Donovan prefaces this acknowledgement by referring to the idea of defacement of the image of
God as “a theme which previous generations” applied to the “epistemological implication of the fallenness of
man”. By this context, we can see the connection between disobedience and misknowledge, as well as infer
O’Donovan’s desire to advance dogmatics beyond the dilemma this poses for theological ethics. R&MO, 87; cf.
82.
55 R&MO, 88. Thus, the change brought about by the revelation of Christ, in a moment of conversion, “does not
deny our fragmentary knowledge of the way things are, as though that knowledge were not there, or were of no
significance … Rather, revelation catches man out in the guilty possession of a knowledge which he has always
had, but from which he has never won a true understanding”, R&MO, 89.
56 Jüngel defines this task in terms of holding together both the evangelical affirmation of extra Christum nulla
salus, as well as the possibility of natural knowledge of God, as asserted by Vatican I. These two conditions
parallel O’Donovan’s concerns, with respect to moral knowledge, to affirm participation in Christ, as well as the
objective reality of the moral order, and natural knowledge thereof; ‘Extra Christum…’, 176.
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Offenbarungsmächtigkeit in Christ
So the presumption of an objective reference for Christian ethics based in the concept of
moral order (see Chapter 1 of R&MO, for example)57 apparently embarks upon a
metaphysical course which will eventually stumble over the epistemic event of faith. But
what if the epistemic event of faith is included within this objective reality, this order of
things? What if participation in Christ proves the foundational concept of Ordnungen? What
if the self-understanding readiness of the self-revealing God to give and to receive revelation
is not only included within this objective reality, but is the very ontological reality which
takes priority over all ontological realities? Here might be the means to resolve the
difficulties encountered in O’Donovan’s articulation of ontological priority—to affirm the
priority of participation in Christ as the event in which moral knowledge occurs. Indeed, we
are claiming that evangelical ethics proceeds from, and coheres in, nothing less than the
miracle of faith. This amounts to a claim that the ontological reality of the created order,
together with knowledge of the moral content of that order, is a miraculous event. As Barth
recognized early on, comprehension of moral knowledge, theologically speaking, is a
miracle. In order for our “moral view of the universe” to correspond to divine truth, rather
than to the many and varied logoi of human vanity, our comprehension of the cosmos must
subsist in the event of hearing God.58 For a person to rightly hear this Word,
…a sheer miracle must happen to him, a second miracle in addition to the miracle of his
own existence, if his life shall be a true Christian life, which is a life within the hearing of
God’s Word. This miracle is the office of the Holy Spirit… In the Holy Spirit he hears
God’s Word, far above any ethical reflection…59
Here is the distinction demanded by Jüngel’s more natural theology. Apart from the
miracle of faith in which God provides the epistemic event of comprehension, there may
indeed be knowledge of moral order, but it will derive its moral authority from some source
other than God. It will bear witness therefore, not to the Logos of God, but to the logoi of
57 R&MO, 17.
58 Similarly, Webster characterizes conscience as an “encounter with the viva vox Dei” experienced by “the
community of faith”; Webster, ‘God and Conscience’, Calvin Theological Journal 33 no 1 (1998): 104-24, 123.
59 Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life: The Theological Basis of Ethics (Louisville, KY:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993) 11.
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human conception.60 This witness to other sources of authority, distinct from the
miraculously delivered and received Word of God, is precisely the danger which motivates
the affirmations of the Barmen Declaration, and which provides Jüngel’s impetus to seek a
more natural theology.
Thus, to affirm the priority of participation in Christ, and thereby avoid the dangers of
natural theology, is to give overarching priority to faith as the epistemic event in which
knowledge of the moral order occurs. Here the conflict with the ontological priority of
O’Donovan’s realism becomes clear. If Offenbarungsmächtigkeit is to be understood in terms
of participation in Christ, it seems the epistemological issues cannot be so neatly put off until
after the ethical content of the Ordnungen has been perceived.61 The only way to affirm both
priorities at the same time is to recognize them as inseparable expressions of a singular
reality—in other words, to recognize the epistemic event of faith as the ontological reality in
which moral knowledge occurs. We find this unity proclaimed in the trinitarian doctrine of
the Word as existing in the beginning with God.62 Jüngel asks the pointed question:
If in Jesus Christ election is really to be understood as history between God and
humanity then must we not speak of faith, too, along with the being of the man Jesus, as
in the beginning with God?63
Here is the epistemic reality which rules over all human conceptions—His name is Jesus.
This is the epistemic reality to which evangelical ethics will bear witness if it is to be
evangelical.64 Apart from this reality, ethics may indeed bear witness to a “moral order”, but
in doing so it will be bearing witness to some logoi of human conception, rather than to the
one who is “the original pattern of the believer.”65 Trinitarian dogmatics then, provide the
venue in which to address the conflicting epistemological and ontological priorities which we
have surfaced in our analysis of evangelical ethics, if there is to be any hope of resolving
them. The direction forward is to understand participation in Christ as the event in which
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit is actualized. The perichoretic innertrinitarian being of God thus
60 A.J. Torrance relates Barmen to “Bonhoeffer’s lectures on Christology where he emphasises that we must
never interpret the Logos or the Word as the divine endorsement of any prior, human programs (logoi); Jüngel,
Christ, Justice and Peace, xii-xiii.
61 R&MO, 76.
62 John 1.
63 God’s Being, 97.
64 In this sense, the denial of the witness of the Holy Spirit to the Gospel is the one unforgiveable sin, as per
Mark 3:29; Matt. 1:31.
65 CD II/2, 198.
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proves to be the foundational subject of evangelical ethics; both the ontological and
epistemological issues are grounded therein.66
In this sense, we may say faith is sacramental—it occurs in and through the real
presence Christ.67 This aspect of evangelical ethics follows directly from understanding
revelation as the divine self-witness of God, as Barth puts it:
We can say quite simply that revelation means sacrament, i.e., the self-witness of God,
the representation of His truth, and therefore of the truth in which He knows Himself, in
the form of creaturely objectivity and therefore in a form which is adapted to our
creaturely knowledge.68
Jüngel links this insight to the epistemic implications of God’s lordship:
We have seen that, for Barth, the category of the lordship of God expresses the capacity
for revelation, the possibility of revelation which is grounded in the being of God.69
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit belongs to God; the humanum may participate, but not claim
possession. The innertrinitarian life of God thus represents both the epistemic possibility as
well as the ontological fulfillment of knowledge of God.70 Christ is both the origin [John 1;
Col. 1:15ff] and the perfection of faith [Heb. 12:2].
This understanding of participation in Christ raises the issue of subordinationism as a
potential stumbling block to the doctrine of God; for the question is how Christ can be
obedient to God if he is God. As we have already noted, obedience is fundamental to faithful
knowledge of God as the self-revealing One. Barth recognizes the offence in the notion of
66 Tim Dearborn follows J.B. Torrance in demonstrating the role that perichoresis (περιχωρησις) plays in
understanding “the distinctive pattern of grace”. Dearborn, ‘God, Grace and Salvation’, in Christ in Our Place;
the Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World: Essays Presented to James Torrance, eds.
Trevor A. Hart and Daniel P. Thimell (Exeter: Paternoster, 1989) 265-293, 285.
67 We might similarly describe faith as being an anhypostatic-enhypostatic reality, in agreement with
McCormack’s observations that this “the anhypostatic-enhypostatic model” is “built into the very structure of
[Barth’s] Christology”, and that this structure permits Christology to avoid the problems inherent in the time-
eternity dialectic; McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology (Oxford: Clarendon,
1997) 327f. I would not however follow McCormack’s description of Barth’s Christology as “dialectic”, as
should be apparent from my analysis of the problems encountered in dialectical epistemology.
68 CD II/1, 52; cf. 47 regarding “the truth of his self-demonstration [which] judges other supposed truths”.
69 God’s Being, 62-3.
70 Jüngel finds this to serve as “an ontological axiom” in Barth’s thought, “which is itself grounded in
revelation: ‘Where the actuality exists there is also the corresponding possibility.’[CD II/1, 5]”, God’s Being,
63. Similarly, Richard B. Hays argues that πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is better rendered “faith of Jesus Christ” than
“faith in Jesus Christ”, in order to convey the “deep connection in Paul’s thought between Christology and
ethics”; Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996) 31-32. This
exegetical insight helps interpret the transformational significance of Gal. 2:20 as it relates to Christian ethics.
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subordination,71 yet the offence pertains to human categories of superiority and obedience
(hence, subject to the risks of analogia entis) and not to the essential and self-demonstrating
unity of the innertrinitarian life of God. Within the mysteriously perichoretic life of God in
which the economic and immanent trinities are one trinity, intrinsic, and ineluctable, the
obedience of faith is grounded and provides the only context in which to ground the doctrine
of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit as participation in Christ:
Is it a fact that in relation to Jesus Christ we can speak of an obedience of the one true
God Himself in His proper being? … it is plain that we not only can do so but have to
do so, that we cannot avoid doing so either on the one side or on the other. … We have
to reckon with such an event even in the being and life of God Himself. … His divine
unity consists in the fact that in Himself He is both One who is obeyed and Another
who obeys 72
Evangelical ethics thus requires expression in terms of the faith event grounded in the
innertrinitarian life of God:
God’s innertrinitarian being-as-object is fulfilled in the act in which God knows himself.
In revelation God gives the human person a share in this event of the knowledge of God
and of his truth.73
By articulating Offenbarungsmächtigkeit on the grounds of faith, the errors of analogia entis
may also be avoided. The alternative, analogia fidei, replaces ontological priority with the
inseparable synthesis of faith as the embodied reality—the actualized event—in which
knowledge of God and the moral order occur. This shift in focus brings with it a new
challenge, however, in that the paradox of faith remains inscrutable to explanation by any
other analogy.74 Thus, conflict arises from attempts to explain the paradox of faith, as we
71 “We have not only not to deny but actually to affirm and understand as essential to the being of God the
offensive fact that there is in God Himself an above and a below, a prius and a posterius, a superiority and a
subordination. And our present concern is with what is apparently the most offensive fact of all, that there is a
below, a posterius, a subordination, that it belongs to the inner life of God that there should take place within it
obedience.” CD IV/1, 200-1.
72 CD IV/1, 200-1.
73 God’s Being, 64.
74 Von Balthasar rightly notes the premium this places upon action, with the concomitant challenge for
dogmatics that God’s being-as-action is “inaccessible to all theory”, The Theology of Karl Barth, 108; cf., 163.
Similarly, Hauerwas explains: “Barth’s appeal to the analogia fidei … is his way of exploring the inseparable
connection between God’s being as act and our ability to speak of God”; S. Hauerwas, With the Grain of the
Universe (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2002) 186. McCormack judges correctly the implications of analogia
fidei in terms of (1) its focus on the concrete event of revelation; (2) the impossibility of human capacity or pre-
understanding; (3) its continuous operation as a sovereign act of revelation; and (4) the challenge this presents
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have seen above. Similarly, the motivation to eliminate the arbitrariness which stems from
unbridled voluntarism also encounters this same conflict, if the solution is presumed to lie in
the explication of a paradox.
The Great Epistemological Presumption
The concept of analogia fidei thus emerges as the great epistemological presumption of
our thesis. It presumes that only a Christological view of the personal capacity for moral
knowledge will suffice. Furthermore, it presumes that the innertrinitarian life of God is the
premise for dogmatics and ethics. As Jüngel discovered in his search for a Christological
natural theology: “We are, indeed, working with a presupposition here.”75 Precisely. This is
the presupposition which makes evangelical ethics evangelical. While this presupposition
entails the miracle of faith, it does not imply that theological knowledge is either impossible
or inaccessible. It does not even deny the possibility of a point of contact; to the contrary, as
we have seen, the point of contact is given in the faith of Christ, and we can therefore arrive
at a coherent statement of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit based in the miracle of faith. Barth states
as much in his definition of “the real point of contact”—
The image of God in man of which we must speak here and which forms the real point
of contact for God’s Word is the rectitudo which through Christ is raised up from real
death and thus restored or created anew, and which is real as man’s possibility for the
Word of God. The reconciliation of man with God in Christ also includes, or already
begins with, the restitution of the lost point of contact. Hence this point of contact is not
real outside faith; it is real only in faith. 76
The real point of contact occurs not as a characteristic of the “formal” imago, but rather as the
epistemic event of God’s self-revelation in which human understanding is transformed by the
miracle of faith. It is a self-actualizing possibility:
for the capacity of human language to communicate (“bear witness”). I take exception, however, to
McCormack’s conclusion that “The analogia fidei is itself an inherently dialectical concept”, on the grounds
that this interpretation may invite the same conflicts we have already encountered with dialectical epistemology.
McCormack does not, however, intend to impute such a form of dialectical epistemology to Barth’s theology—
hence, his phrase “critical realism” is an attempt to avoid confusion over his use of the word “dialectical”; Karl
Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 16-7.
75 Jungel, ‘Extra Christum…’, 180.
76 CD I/1, 239.
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We can establish it only as we stand fast in faith and its knowledge, i.e., as we turn away
from ourselves and turn our eyes or rather our ears to the Word of God. As we hear it,
we have the possibility of hearing it.77
“Turn” and “hear” are the effective verbs in this understanding.78 These are personal actions
which involve the person-as-knower in the event of moral knowledge. This follows sensibly
from the ineluctable mutuality of ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi. Knowing and Being
are combined in the reality of God as self-demonstrating event, knowledge of which is
grounded in personal participation in the concurrent movement of faith, guided by the Holy
Spirit. Knowing-as-Being leads therefore to Knowing-as-Acting through a person’s
participation in the process of knowledge. This is the epistemological corollary to the
ontological actualization of being-as-knowing.79 In this sense of understanding what it means
to be a person-as-becoming, we see that the meaning of the self is grounded in the self-
determining event of God as eternally “Becoming-Who-I-Am”.80 Knowledge is thus not an
objectifiable reality per se, for it has no existence outside the person-as-becoming, but is
rather a consequence and aspect of a person’s relationship with the source of knowledge.
What does this mean for our understanding of the person as a knower of moral knowledge?
Metanoia & moral knowledge
Turn and hear. These are the essential verbs for knowledge of God, and hence for
theological knowledge of the moral order. In the New Testament metanoia (μετάνοια) is of
course the word which conveys this sense of turning, or repenting, in the context of faith,
truth and discipleship. Metanoia is the event, action and process in which a person’s
understanding and knowledge are transformed.81 This event is the existential human reality
77 CD I/1, 236.
78 This language echoes the parabolic teaching of Jesus and the prophets [Matt. 13:10-17, Mark 4:12, Luke 8:10,
John 12:40; cf. Isa. 6:9-10]. The function of the parables is to bring about a transformation in understanding—to
turn and to hear.
79 Michael Polanyi develops this concept in Personal Knowledge; he puts it aptly: “Knowledge is an activity
which would be better described as a process of knowing” (The emphasis is mine.) Knowing and Being: Essays,
ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press 1969) 132.
80 Hence, Jüngel’s title, Gottes Sein ist im Werden.
81 Murray Rae says it well: “The result is that the knower is not left as she was but is transformed through the
knowing process. The knower is made a new person under the impact of the new relation…”; Rae, ‘“Incline
Your Ear so that You May Live”: Principles of Biblical Epistemology’, in The Bible and Epistemology: Biblical
Soundings on the Knowledge of God, eds. Mary Healy and Robin Parry (Milton Keynes, U.K.; Paternoster,
2007) 161-180, 161.
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which corresponds to the epistemic miracle of faith in which the human person participates in
the self-revelation of God. Metanoia thus refers to the transformation of the human person in
the actualization of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit as an epistemic event. Metanoia is the human
side of what it means to “participate in Christ”—a continual event in the life of faith. This is a
continual relationship, and not a once-and-for-all moment which a person can set aside and
“get on with life”.
Because the Christological source of this relationship does not change from one moment
to the next, so also it would be a mistake to presume that Offenbarungsmächtigkeit becomes
something other than the miraculous event in which God’s Being-in-Becoming is continually
and always the life-giving reality of revelation. To shift the hermeneutic focus to a singular
“moment of conversion”, would be to reject the very premise of the analogia fidei, and to
reintroduce the problems inherent in the concept of the bifurcated imago.
The transformation (metanoia) of the person-as-moral-knower is thus a concomitant
reality of moral knowledge. This is why we have paid so much attention to the meaning of
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit for theological anthropology. If we get this concept wrong, we run
the risk of embarking upon some other route to evangelical ethics which presumes to bypass
the miracle of faith. The possibility of a point-of-contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) simpliciter, is
not the problem. Even the “formal” imago, simpliciter, is not the problem. Even Barth is
willing to admit that “a man is a man and not a cat.”82 The problem arises when these
concepts are given force to present other possibilities for real knowledge of God by
discerning the meaning of the orders of creation, through other epistemological routes apart
from the event of participation in Christ, i.e., apart from the relational event of faith. The real
problem is when Offenbarungsmächtigkeit is construed as a human capacity, because that
idea imports moral significance into the natural humanum. Up to this point, Brunner’s
dialectical theology is unproblematic.83 Past this point lies the abyss of which Barth warned.
This is why evangelical ethics, when speaking of human understanding of moral knowledge,
will ground that understanding in terms of participation in the self-revealing, innertrinitarian
life of God. 84
82 Nein!, 88.
83 Joan O’Donovan sees the flaw in Brunner’s importation of “revelational content” into his dialectical doctrine
of the “formal” imago, concluding that this “functional deflation of the “formal factor” signals the collapse of
the nature/grace dialectic in its epistemological and ontological aspects.” Joan O’Donovan, ‘Man in the image of
God: the Disagreement between Barth and Brunner Reconsidered’, Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 433-
459, 441.
84 Ethics, 461. Bruce McIntyre offers helpful insight, in understanding the criterion to define “the imago Dei, the
humanum, not in substantialist terms at all, but relationally… One could call it the “addressability” of
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Transformation vs. Conversion
O’Donovan acknowledges the importance of repentance and conversion as essential
events in the process of moral learning—“one can only repent false perceptions of the moral
order and turn to truer ones.”85 Thus, his epistemological realism easily accommodates the
view that “moral illumination” comes through a transformational experience of conversion.86
Furthermore, he recognizes faith as an on-going reality.87 Even though “moral learning [must
begin] with the initial conversion of the mind in repentance… it must be constantly renewed
in repentance as well.”88 This need for renewal leads him to describe the whole process of
moral learning as one of “continual conversion”—
Faith, therefore, is always open to repentance, able to relax the compulsive grip of self-
justification upon the past. Love which is qualified by faith is free from ‘self-love’ … It is
renewed and sustained, not out of the agent’s established character but by continual
conversion.89
This sounds congruent with the conclusions we have reached with respect to the
significance of metanoia as a continual reality of the relationship of faith; yet upon closer
reading we see that the role signified here by the event of “conversion” does not express the
same thing as metanoia. The difference between conversion (as stated in R&MO) and
metanoia becomes clear in his explanation of conversion as a “moment”, as opposed to an
on-going relationship. The former is a singular event, and the latter is an on-going
relationship. Each has epistemic significance, but with vastly different implications for
Offenbarungs-mächtigkeit and the objective reality of the moral order. O’Donovan takes up
this issue in the closing pages of R&MO, in a section titled most aptly, “Conversion and the
meaning of life”, where he comments here on the example given by the contrast between the
wicked and the righteous in Ezekiel 18:21ff—
humankind by God”; McIntyre, Theology After the Storm: Reflections on the Upheavals in Modern Theology
and Culture, ed. Gary D. Badcock (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977) 77f.
85 R&MO, 92.
86 Ibid.
87 O’Donovan reiterates the role of faith in his later works, e.g. in commentary on Col 1:28 and Eph. 4:24,
regarding the “subjective experiences that draw the one affected into a new objective reality”; WJ, 314f.
88 R&MO, 93.
89 R&MO, 256.
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The turn that each has taken… has marked his life and imposed a shape upon it which is
decisive for the whole. There has been a formative moment, a moment of conversion
from which the rest of the man’s career has taken its meaning for good or ill.90
This stands in contrast to his preceding description of “continual conversion”, due do the
dialectical opposition of the “continual” and “momentary” aspects. Analogically speaking,
the moment of conversion is the moment of resurrection into new life. This is certainly a
biblical concept, which can be inferred from Paul’s metaphorical descriptions of “putting on
Christ” or “the new man”. In this context, the “moment of conversion” might be seen to serve
as a dividing line which partitions moral knowledge into two camps—one occurring before,
and the other after, the moral agent’s “conversion”. This provides an analog to the bi-
directional perspective of the resurrection, from which we can look backwards to see
continuity with the created order, and simultaneously look forward toward the eschaton to see
its vindication and redemption. On this view, O’Donovan explains, the conversion moment
“happens not once but many times”, yet in the end, “it is always the one eschatological
reality” which subsumes everything within “the one decisive transformation; so that we may
say, and more profoundly, that conversion happens only once”.91 Thus, the significance of
“continual conversion” differs decidedly from our concept of metanoia.
The problem is that this invites the possibility of an analogia entis, for the reason that it
objectifies the relationship of faith. Once the relationship of faith is captured, so to speak, in a
life-changing moment of conversion, it can be applied as a transformational function to affect
a person’s entire understanding of reality. If faith is objectifiable in this manner, it invites the
possibility that the transformed humanum may now possess capacities that did not exist prior
to the conversion moment. This is not to suggest that a unique conversion moment may be
identified as a turning point and repentant act of discovering faith. Our concern is rather with
the implications of conversion for the hermeneutic of doctrine. The risk here is to infer that
the new perspective gained through a momentary instance of conversion bestows upon the
person a new capacity to discern revealed knowledge. Such a concept would lead back to the
same difficulties we have seen in definitions of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit which are not
90 R&MO, 257. O’Donovan goes on to reiterate this meaning of conversion as a “moment of recognition” in his
exegesis of Jesus’ dialog with the thief on the cross, and the parable in Luke 7:42.
91 R&MO, 258 (emphasis added).
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grounded in participation in Christ.92 The “moment of conversion” does not put an end to the
on-going relationship in which the miracle of epistemic access subsists.
That this section near the conclusion of R&MO is titled, “Conversion and the meaning of
life”, draws attention to the hermeneutical significance of conversion with respect to
knowledge acquired in the event of God’s revelation. If, as Jüngel says, “The being of God is
the hermeneutical problem of theology”, then it follows that the knowledge of any and all
forms of God’s self-revelation, including the witness to God which comes through the orders
of creation, will entail the dynamism of transformation, regardless of whether transformation
is construed as a moment of conversion or an on-going process of metanoia. There are
significant differences, however, between the hermeneutical implications of these two
different understandings of transformation, and I shall conclude this chapter by examining
this issue.
The Cosmology of Faith
The hermeneutical significance of conversion is simply this: the meaning of moral
knowledge is interpreted within the ‘cosmology’ of one’s beliefs. Cosmology here refers to
the totality of one’s context of meaning, incorporating world-view and faith. In other words,
‘cosmology’ is the universe comprised of personal awareness and comprehension.93 As
Wittgenstein put it, language works within a home setting or a “language game” that provides
meaning. If it is to function properly, and communicate meaning, language will not “go on
holiday” from that setting, but rather will remain within the home or ‘cosmology’ within
which it derives its meaning.94
92 A.J. Torrance notes that the objectification of knowledge corresponds to a “supposition of criterial immanence
[which] inevitably leads to the material identification of God's self-communication with the universalization and
absolutization of our own interpretative criteria and self-understandings”, citing Strauss as an example.
Torrance, ‘“Auditus Fidei”: Where and How Does God Speak?’ in Reasons and the Reasons of Faith, eds. Paul
J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter (New York: T&T Clark, 2005) 27-52, 32.
93 I follow A. J. Torrance in this use of the concept ‘cosmology’: “that to which we require to pay attention in
these debates concerns not the terms we use but the nature of the cosmology or ontology underlying the theory
of analogy operative in any particular theology; Torrance, Persons in Communion (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1996) 129; cf. 143. Since language derives meaning by analogy, a hermeneutical ‘cosmology’ will be defined by
the analogies employed. Thiselton expresses the same idea with the phrase, ‘horizon of understanding’; The
Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 177). See also Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007) 60, on the
“idea of the totality of existence [which] contains the sense of ordered whole… a humanly meaningful one.”
94 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sect. 38. Cf. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 177.
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The hermeneutical issue with respect to moral knowledge is this: Conversion and
metanoia, representing substantive changes in one’s cosmology, present a prima facie
challenge to any claim for ontological priority of the object to be known (the moral order, for
example). If knowledge is inextricably tied to a dynamic process in which the knower is
being transformed, how then is the ontological priority of the moral order to be understood?
To which cosmology would such knowledge pertain? Would it be proper to describe such
knowledge as occurring pre-conversion, or post-conversion? If this knowledge pertained to a
pre-conversion cosmology—that is to say, within the understanding of the person in an
‘unconverted’ state—then its “home” setting would lack the content and context of faith. On
the other hand, to claim that such knowledge occurs only within a post-conversion
cosmology—that is to say, within the context of faith—would seem to refute the claim that
the ontological reality takes priority over the epistemological conditions in which the
knowledge occurs. This poses a problem for the dogmatic assertion of ontological priority.
The concept of a static cosmology, which does not accommodate the transformational aspect
of metanoia, is unable to account for the epistemic access which faith provides to moral
understanding. A coherent cosmology will thus be one which integrates the epistemic aspects
of faith with the ontological reality of the moral order. There is a circle of “reflexive
contextualization”95 at work here, in the dynamism of faith, which refuses to be broken. The
person-as-moral-knower cannot extract herself from the hermeneutical contingencies of faith
which make her cosmology a dynamic one. A cosmology which admits to the consequences
of metanoia will be a cosmology which remains ever contingent upon the dynamism of a
relationship which retains the freedom to be prior to any other priority, ontological or
otherwise. This dynamic aspect of a properly evangelical cosmology follows directly from
the understanding of God as self-revealing.96 And because this understanding itself is arrived
at through the transformative relationship of faith, there is an inescapable hermeneutical
circularity to the resultant cosmology, which runs counter to the prevailing inclinations of
metaphysics.97
95 To use O’Donovan’s phrase, WJ, 19.
96 A.J. Torrance (1996: 90) expresses this dynamism in terms of a “radical and irreducible intrinsicity”
grounded in Barth’s interpretation of God as “the Revealer [who] is identical with His act in revelation and also
identical with its effect”; Persons in Communion, 90 (cf. CD I/1, 296; cf. 298). This radical intrinsicity describes
well the hermeneutical circularity which I have attributed to the K2. Torrance describes the circularity implied
by Barth’s doctrine of revelation, Persons in Communion, 92.
97 Murray Rae analyzes the epistemic significance of faith with valuable insight into Kierkegaard’s thought: “in
Kierkegaard’s view faith and knowledge are not two separate tasks, indeed they are not tasks at all, but are
received as a single gift of grace in that “Moment” of encounter which is both ontologically and
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O’Donovan identifies the dilemma of hermeneutical circularity in R&MO,98 and pursues
it further in The Ways of Judgment: “The undisclosed aspect of the new creation means that
our judgments cannot achieve a completely self-contextualizing truth.”99 This is true indeed;
for human judgment per se does not contain within itself an Archimedean point capable of
proscribing a hermeneutical horizon capable of anticipating the transformative aspect of new
creation; i.e., human judgment does not contain the impetus of its own metanoia. For this
reason, the search for a completely self-contextualizing truth fails the test of coherence in
evangelical dogmatics. The possibility and actuality of new creation means that the
hermeneutics of moral knowledge remain contingent upon the dynamism of faith as a
relationship: a person participates in moral reality, and derives meaning from that
relationship, rather than from the application of some innate human capacity to comprehend a
pre-existent and objective moral order within the universe. The boundaries of one’s
hermeneutical horizon remain contingent upon the miraculous activity of the Holy Spirit.100
O’Donovan expresses this boundary condition as a limitation in the capacity to apprehend
truth (and hence, to make judgments on the basis of moral discernment):
Our judgment is never more truthful in its correspondence to God’s judgment than
when it acknowledges its own severely limited capacity for truth.101
Thus, that what appears to be a limitation upon truth from one point of view is seen from a
diametrically opposed point of view to be a freedom for truth, viewed from within a
epistemologically transformative”; Rae, Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation: By Faith Transformed, 2.
This leads to what Rae calls, “a relational epistemology”, based on Kierkegaard’s understanding of the
“individual” (“Den Enkelte”), 144-5. Vernard Eller defines this epistemology in terms of the helpful synonym:
“life in communion with God.” Eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship (Princeton.: Princeton University
Press, 1968) 107.
98 Commenting on the shift in cosmology brought about by conversion, O’Donovan says that, absent the context
of faith, “the order of reality is not truly known at all”, R&MO, 88. Cf. “The fact that moral illumination does, in
its fundamental form, involve conversion… should alert us to the inadequacy of the accumulative model to
express our experience of moral learning”, 92. Hence, conversion transforms one’s ‘cosmology’, and requires
moral meaning to be construed within a cosmology which is dynamically renewed during the event of learning.
99 WJ, 87. Cf. R&MO, 250 re “the self-involvement of the subject from within” which can prevent moral
discernment from ever breaking free of “the circle of self-reference”.
100 And thus, knowledge of truth pertaining to the presence and activity of the living God remains contingent
upon the miraculous power of God. The apprehension of truth is an event which “does not happen in the
actualising of our capacity, but in the miracle of His good-pleasure”, CD II/1, 182.
101 WJ, 22.
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cosmology grounded in the dynamism of faith. After all, the alternative amounts to
misunderstanding, mis-knowledge, and un-truth.102
There is a perennial pressure to defend both these opposing cosmologies in order to meet
the need for apologetics within the context of the many and varied cosmologies of modern
society.103 As we have seen, O’Donovan employs a dialectical epistemology as a means to
sustain both of these cosmological perspectives, and thus to meet the demand of apologetics
to provide a point of contact for engagement with a variety of hermeneutical horizons of
understanding. He is careful however, to avoid the accusation which Barth leveled at Brunner
regarding “another task of theology”;104 rather, O’Donovan defines apologetics as a task not
in addition to, but rather within theology:
Now apologetics is not a distinct genre of religious thinking. There are no apologetic
reasons and arguments that do not belong in the ordered exposition of Christian belief
traditionally known as “doctrine.” The only satisfactory reason to believe is the reason of
belief .105
Thus, “apologetics is… a distinct genre of exposition.”106 From this it follows that the
impulse toward apologetic engagement with varying, non-theological cosmologies will be
constrained to unfold within the theological cosmology of faith. Here the nub of the problem
becomes clear—can the dialectically opposed directions of these two cosmological poles be
integrated within the cosmology of faith (and hence, within the hermeneutical circularity
entailed by metanoia)? Or do these dialectically opposed perspectives need to be exposited as
two (or even more) separate and mutually exclusive cosmologies? There is a fine line to be
drawn here. Any exposition which proceeds via competing cosmologies will necessarily
encounter friction with evangelical affirmations, cut the K2, and ultimately suffer the
accusation of incoherence as a statement of evangelical dogmatics and ethics.107
102 O’Donovan states this dialectical reality: “Knowledge of the moral order is a grasp of the total shape in
which, if anything is lacking, everything is lacking.” R&MO, 89. Thus, lack of faith means “that the order of
reality is not truly known at all”, 88.
103 Thiselton notes well the need to identify the hermeneutical horizon of doctrinal statements, due to the variety
of alternative horizons which will lead to different understandings: “in exploring Christian doctrine we are
obligated to engage with a multiplicity of varied horizons in the public world”; The Hermeneutics of Doctrine,
178.
104 Cf. CD II/1, 128 re Barth’s rejection of “‘another’ task of theology besides that of explaining the revelation
of God.”
105 WJ, xiii.
106 WJ, xiii.
107 Barth anticipates the shortcomings of apologetics: “[T]heological ethics must not and will not disarm its
distinctive Whence? and Whither? in order to assure itself a place in the sun of general ethical discussion… The
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We have seen several instances in which O’Donovan’s dialectical approach appears to
shift back-and-forth between cosmologies (or hermeneutical horizons).108 Evidence of this
shift can be found in the statements which explain knowledge of the moral order as requiring
no revelation. While O’Donovan states that fulfillment of this possibility requires
participation in Christ, there is apparently a shift at work in the movement from the “pre-
conversion” cosmology of the “natural” person, sans metanoia, to the post-conversion
cosmology of Christian belief. Is this shift illusory merely, or does it indicate a profound
discontinuity between evangelical and non-evangelical cosmologies? There is a certain lack
of clarity around this issue in some of the doctrines articulated within O’Donovan’s outline
for evangelical ethics. As we have seen, the assertion of ontological priority suggests at least
the possibility, if not the endorsement of, a cosmology incompatible with the dynamics of
faith. The risk is to cross between incompatible cosmologies in the process of pursuing a
dialectical epistemology. If we posit a cosmology based upon the pre-supposition of
ontological priority for the moral order, then we are entertaining a cosmology in which the
meaning of the moral order is not contingent upon the epistemic reality of faith. A cosmology
based upon the dynamic event of faith, on the other hand, is well capable of sustaining the
reality of moral order within the creation.109 This cosmology discerns meaning in the moral
order through “the form of faithful Nachdenken”, which sustains the hermeneutical circle of
faith.110
apologetic orientation of theological ethics is false. The apologetic attitude must be completely abandoned.” CD
II/2, p. 524.
108 O’Donovan is not alone in skirting this fine line. Moltmann also makes a very similar move, as he suggests
that a “Christian theology of nature” can “lead to just such a natural theology as a cosmological and biological
interpretative suggestion. It cannot remain within the closed Christian circle”; Moltmann, Experiences in
Theology: Way and Forms of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000) 69ff. The problem derives from
the suggestion that the hermeneutical horizon of Christian faith may be transgressed or linked up with
alternative cosmologies.
109 From this perspective, O’Donovan sees that “The gospel is not indifferent to its own communication; it has
its dynamic of self-communication within itself”; 39 Articles, 114.
110 A.J. Torrance, Persons in Communion, 88. Torrance elaborates the function of Nachdenken: “This involves
the metanoia of our noiein in such a way that the pressure of interpretation, reinterpretation and reordering
involves a directionality which is from Gods’ Word… to humanity and not the other way round”, 100-101. “In
offering a "church dogmatics," he seeks to establish the nature of theological knowledge by way of a
Nachdenken or a "backward look"—outlining the methodological, criterial, and epistemological conditions of
God's self-communication to human creatures, where these are conceived as postsuppositions" carried and
established in, through, and with the event of the divine address itself”, A.J. Torrance, “Auditus Fidei”, 40
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Dynamics of Trinitarian Theology
We turn our attention now to the doctrinal implications of our thesis. As we have seen
from our analysis of O’Donovan’s evangelical realism, doctrinal challenges arise from a
dialectical movement between cosmologies. These challenges pertain to a certain lack of
rigor with respect to the contingencies of fides quaerens intellectum. What is the doctrinal
substance of our conclusion that an evangelical doctrine of ethics and moral discernment
operates within a cosmology based upon the dynamic event of faith as sustained in
relationship with the Triune God?
This seems not to be a question of great concern in O’Donovan’s ethics;111 but rather, he
seems to avoid the issue out of concern to prevent the dynamics of the faith experience from
being interpreted in the form of an over-enthusiastic pneumatology. This concern inspires his
energetic defence of the concept of moral order as a bulwark against voluntarism and
arbitrary spiritual experience. His pursuit of realism by means of self-described practical
theology seems intent on avoiding and denying any doctrinal excesses leaning in the direction
of unpredictable and unreasonable charismatic experience in moral discernment.112 This
impulse seems aimed at the target of what might be caricatured in terms of a Spirit-olatry. We
have seen already how O’Donovan’s polemical stance against voluntarism works to mitigate
against subjective experience as a basis for moral authority. Be that as it may, our present
concern is to identify the doctrinal implications of his ethics and epistemology. To apply the
label “practical” or “pastoral” to theology in no way excuses the theologian from being held
accountable to the doctrinal implications of Trinitarian theology. Theology is not beholden to
labels such as “practical”, “pastoral” or “systematic”, but rather to the reality of the Triune
God who holds theologians accountable to present a faithful witness through the integrity of
their theologein, and all the more so when we focus on the explicitly evangelical aspect of
doctrine.
I shall offer a six-fold answer to the question of doctrinal substance which derives from
an evangelical doctrine of moral discernment based upon the dynamic event of faith.
111 McIlroy also assesses the need for a “more complete trinitarian analysis” in O’Donovan’s thought; David H.
McIlroy, A Trinitarian Theology of Law: In Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann, Oliver O’Donovan and
Thomas Aquinas (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009) 108f.
112 “I am a practical theologian, a moral theologian, a political theologian, or whatever other title anyone thinks
suitable to describe an enterprise with a deliberative rather than a theoretical goal. I would even like to say, I am
a pastoral theologian.” O’Donovan, ‘Deliberation, History and Reading: a Response to Schweiker and
Wolterstorff’, Scottish Journal of Theology 54 (2001): 127-144, 127-8.
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First of all, the cosmology of faith calls for a holistic theological anthropology which
grounds the understanding of the imago Dei in the relationship between God and human,
Creator and creature. The bifurcation of the imago, as seen in Brunner’s dialectical
construction of “material” vs. “formal” moments, engenders conflict with evangelical
affirmations, as we have seen. Furthermore, this same conflict arises in the case of a
dialectical approach to epistemological realism.
Gunton is right to warn of the challenge to Trinitarian theology which emerges from
dualistic cosmologies because they entail dualistic anthropologies: “Overall, the message is
clear: with a dualistic cosmology, a dualistic anthropology is likely to be correlative.”113 This
corresponds precisely to the problems we have discovered in the dualistic ontology implicit
within Brunner’s bifurcation of the imago. Although O’Donovan sidesteps neatly the inherent
dualism of Brunner’s ontology, in the process he opens the door to a bifurcation of
cosmology.114 That is to say, there arises a bifurcation in the hermeneutical direction at work
in O’Donovan’s pursuit of evangelical realism. The bifurcations of cosmology and
anthropology are mutually indicative; their similarity can be seen in the dogmatics of Brunner
and O’Donovan. Even though O’Donovan avoids the ontological problems of Brunner’s
theologia naturalis to which Barth objects, there remains a troubling bifurcation of moral
reality which impinges the dynamics of faith in unfortunate ways.
Second, we need to remember that the immanent and economic Trinity cannot be
separated. The dialectical aspect of these concepts, useful as they are when their
complementarity is understood in terms of mutual qualification,115 devolves into a
problematic discussion of the metaphysical attributes of God if ever they are taken to be
ontological descriptions of God. Gunton is helpful when he points out the need to
113 Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 2nd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 1997) 104. Hereafter,
Promise.
114 Colwell diagnoses the problem with O’Donovan’s affirmation of continuity in the objective moral goodness
of the created order, which is both complete, and yet fallen, and therefore represents also a discontinuity: “It is
difficult to see how Professor O’Donovan’s affirmation of continuity can be maintained without more explicit
reference to this underlying continuity of all reality and of all knowledge of reality. The alternative to such a
foundation for ethical continuity is epistemological dualism…”; John E. Colwell, Living the Christian Story: the
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001) 243. What Colwell calls “epistemological
dualism” corresponds to the bifurcation of cosmology.
115 Christoph Schwöbel, God: Action and Revelation (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992) 61; cf. 46.
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“understand the relation of economic and ontological Trinity more systematically than seems
to be the case in much recent theology.”116
This relates directly to O’Donovan’s emphasis upon the priority of ontological
description of the moral order, because this conceives of the moral order as a static,
immanent reality to be expressed in ontological terms without recognition of the activity of
the Triune God in the events of faith and revelation.117 To separate the ontology of the moral
order from the dynamic movement of the Spirit which brings epistemic access is to invite an
implicit consideration of the immanence of the Creator God apart from the necessary
recognition of the activity of God in the dynamic of faith. There emerges in O’Donovan’s
doctrine an emphasis upon the immanent Trinity at the expense of the economic, because the
ontological priority of the objective moral order correlates to an objective capacity of the
humanum to discern that moral order. This sounds an echo of Augustine’s implicit
presumption of the capacity of reason as an indication that “knowledge of God is to be found
primarily in the mind”, as Gunton notes.118 This draws “attention away from the concrete
historical events in which God is present to the world in the economy of creation and
salvation”.119 The objective reality of the moral order cannot be split apart from the dynamic
economy of the Trinitarian God who reveals himself to be its sole authority, through the
dynamics of faith. Thus, there is a need to cast moral reality in “dynamic as well as
ontological terms”, just as there is a need to hold the aspects of the immanent and economic
Trinity in a mutually contingent unity.120 Evangelical ethics must speak of the one Trinity,
not multiple trinities.121
116 Gunton, Promise 178. Gunton diagnoses the difficulties which pertain to theology pursued as though it were
a “quest for ontology …an understanding of the kind of being that God is” (emphasis added); Promise, xi. He
traces the roots of this issue in Act & Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2002). Similarly, T.F. Torrance exposes the dangers of the quest for the ontological attributes of God
in Chapter 8, “Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy”, in Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (London:
T&T Clark, 1990).
117 McIlroy diagnoses the problem accurately when he identifies the need for a “more complete trinitarian
analysis” in O’Donovan’s thought; Trinitarian Theology, 108f.
118 Gunton, Promise, 48.
119 Gunton, Promise, 48.
120 T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (London: T&T Clark, 1990) 172.
121 Gunton shows how this problem stems from an uncritical acceptance of Augustine’s Neo-Platonism, which
“introduces a tendency to draw apart the being of God—what he is eternally—and his act—what he does in
time”; The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 2nd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 1997) 4. Cf. McIlroy, Trinitarian
Theology, 10.
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The third doctrinal implication of evangelical ethics, closely related to the second, is this:
the universal subsists in the particular. In support of his claim that the moral order is an
objective reality, prior to the conditions of epistemic access, O’Donovan endorses the idea
that the created order comprises universal moral truth. Yet, in cognizance of the evangelical
witness to the specific moral authority of the historical Christ, O’Donovan must propose an
answer the big question, as to how the universal comes to be recognized in the concrete,
specific historic reality of Jesus of Nazareth. How indeed, he asks, is it “that universal justice
has become concrete”?122 In seeking an answer to this question in terms of political theology,
he proposes that the criteria of justice should uphold the concept of “universal flourishing”.123
Indeed, this strikes a sensible chord for the evaluation of public policy, and resonates with
our contemporary culture’s esteem for human flourishing. We are not concerned here to
argue against the merit of this concept for public policy, but rather to inquire after the
theological basis for such a criterion. The point is that the universal subsists within the
particular. That is to say, the particular, singular, historic event of Christ is the foundation of
theological understanding of humanity, morality, ethics, justice, political theology and every
search for universal truth. Justice occurs not in the universal, but rather in the specific.
Justice does not happen in the domain of abstract noetic notions, but rather in the real lives of
persons who long for justice—specific persons created and loved and known by the Father,
Son and Spirit who make atonement for sin a reality. Justice occurs in the flesh, ensarkos.
Justice, when it occurs, is recognized in an ontic-noetic event. Jesus is the singular exception
who bears the weight of the universal upon his individual human-divine shoulders. For this
reason we recognize that evangelical ethics operate from within the dynamic epistemology of
faith. This recognition provides a corrective to the tendency of O’Donovan’s dialectical
realism to seek validation of concepts of truth and justice as though they could be located in
the abstract universal.
Of course O’Donovan can defend his endorsement of concepts such as “universal
flourishing” as being evangelical on the basis of his witness to the concrete historical Jesus;
however, this defense falls short of rigorous evangelical dogmatics if it opens the door to a
dialectical endorsement of both evangelical and non-evangelical streams of hermeneutical
thought in the development of dogmatics. We can see just such an incipient movement in the
122 O’Donovan, ‘Deliberation, History and Reading: a Response to Schweiker and Wolterstorff’, Scottish
Journal of Theology 54 (2001): 127-144, 131.
123 O’Donovan, ‘Deliberation…’, 132.
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direction of universal concepts in O’Donovan’s exposition of justice in terms of universal
law:
The law of creation is the reality that determines our ways. Justice, or right, is essentially
responsiveness to the universal law, the successful determination of our ways under the
authority of the law. … Justice is the correspondence of our self-determination to our
determination by the law it is, in fact, obedience to the law. This is ‘general justice’ as
Plato and Aristotle conceived it. Its ways are the ways of life. And at the level of general
justice there are no ‘principles of justice’ other than the law of life itself, the order of
things as they are.124
This endorsement of ‘general justice’ as Plato and Aristotle conceived it would seem to come
at the expense of the singular exception of Christ, his atoning death and resurrection as the
basis for understanding justice.
In an earlier essay O’Donovan attempts to explain the connection between the conceptual
universal and the concrete specific—
I have made a suggestion how we move from the one pole to the other. I have proposed
that ‘concepts’ authorised from the narrative of Israel and Christ govern our
deliberations about political ethics. This proposal has created a flutter of alarm.125
Perhaps our current analysis is but one more example of the alarm O’Donovan would
denigrate. Yet, the basis for alarm is not the use of concepts such as “peace”, but rather the
tendency to move quickly past the concrete, specific source of authority in Christ, in the
effort to endorse the moral authority of the orders of creation. That source of alarm seems to
be ignored in O’Donovan’s apology:
But do I scandalise the faithful by calling peace a ‘concept’—as though I were to refer to
the Body and Blood of our Lord as ‘bread and wine’?... it certainly looks like a concept,
too, when you see the function it performs in justificatory arguments, and I don’t see
what is lost by calling it a concept, in that context and without prejudice…126
Furthermore, it is worth noting that ‘bread and wine’, like ‘blood’ and ‘Lamb’, are not
concepts, but rather analogies. It is not the analogia fidei which stirs the “flutter of alarm”,
but rather the alarming misrepresentation of concepts as authoritative or sacramental truth.
124 Royal Priesthood, 310.
125 O’Donovan, ‘Response to Respondents: Behold the Lamb!’, Studies in Christian Ethics 11 (1998) 91-110,
93. Hereafter, ‘…Behold the Lamb!’
126 O’Donovan, ‘…Behold the Lamb!’ 94.
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On this score, Barth’s doctrine of the Ordnungen and their claim to universal truth upholds
the evangelical understanding of moral authority more robustly:
They are not universal ethical truths, but only the general form of the one and supremely
particular truth of the ethical event which is inaccessible as such to the casuistical
grasp.127
Precisely because the universal subsists within the particular, Barth rejects the abstraction of
Brunner’s concept of ‘orders of creation’ as a plurality of truths (which might correspond to
O’Donovan’s concept of “moral bricks”), while remaining amenable to a singular statement
of an ‘order of creation’.128 That singular order finds its authority in Christ as it bears witness
to him as its source and ground of being.129
This leads us to the fourth doctrinal implication, which is to see how the concept of
moral order requires narrative, and not merely ontological description. For as much as we
might appreciate the apologetic capacity of O’Donovan’s realism to engage in metaphysical
dialog concerning moral ontologies, we cannot ultimately escape the narrative basis of moral
authority, as Colwell rightly points out: “The Gospel is a living narrative; it is only truly
heard by being indwelt through the indwelling presence of the Spirit.”130 The gospel narrative
consists in the proclamation of Christ in history, which pertains to both the historical Jesus as
well as his relationship with his followers. This is the narrative which takes the form of
Paul’s testimony, “it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I
now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for
me” [Gal. 2:20]. Of course O’Donovan insists that Christian ethics cannot set itself “loose
from the historically concrete figure of Jesus of Nazareth”, and thus, evangelical ethics are
tied inextricably to the historical person of Christ, and faith has roots in narrative.
Nonetheless, O’Donovan’s inclination to defend ontological priority leads him to reply by
way of explanation, “I will only insist that thought cannot live sola narratione.”131 He thus
127Barth, CD III/4, 29.
128 Paul Nimmo, ‘The Orders of Creation in the Theological Ethics of Karl Barth’, Scottish Journal of Theology
60.1 (2007) 24-35, 29.
129 Cf. John 1:1-3; Col. 1:16.
130 John E. Colwell, Living the Christian Story: the Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2001) 252.
131 O’Donovan, ‘…Behold the Lamb!’ 94.
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argues that “What is needed is an account of the logic” underlying the concept of moral
order.132 In defense of this logic he cites the educative value of
…analogies between the shape of the Christ-event and the shape of the church, and even
the shape of liberal political order and its corruption. They describe an unfolding logic in
the liberal order which imitates the logic of the narrative of Christ…133
This logic is not problematic so long as it explicitly recognizes the narrative of epistemic
access to moral knowledge and the process of discernment which accrues through the agency
of the Holy Spirit. When it departs from the narrative of the Gospel, however, and ventures to
find a basis for morality in “natural” orders such as the logic of political order, for example, it
strays from the Trinitarian basis for understanding moral authority. The movements of
dialectical epistemology cannot redeem the implications of such a non-evangelical
cosmology, as we have seen.
This highlights the crucial importance of the Holy Spirit for the doctrine of moral order,
for the Spirit is the agent who initiates and sustains faith. This leads to the remaining set of
implications each which identifies a pneumatological implication for ethics. While numerous
references to the work of the Spirit can be found in R&MO and many other works of Prof.
O’Donovan, there remains also a curious silence of pneumatology in much of his realism.134
We might presume the Holy Spirit is not absent from those works, but rather tacit. However
that may be, the point here is to identify the doctrinal implications of this silence. In this
regard, there remain two significant implications to be considered.
The fifth implication of our analysis concerns the role of the Holy Spirit in history. The
tension between “already” and “not yet” is a well-known aspect of life in Christ. Where this
tension draws the most extensive consideration form O’Donovan is in the matter of the
completeness of the moral order within the creation. This raises the issue as to just how
complete the creation may be considered to be, in light of its longing to be released from the
bondage of corruption and its groaning, with pangs of labor, toward redemption [Rom. 8:18-
132 O’Donovan, ‘…Behold the Lamb!’ 94.
133 ‘…Behold the Lamb!’ 98-9.
134 As Colwell notes, with respect to The Desire of the Nations: “Professor O’Donovan’s own work appears to
be less than fully formulated: throughout the book there is minimal reference to the Spirit and, in particular, to
the dynamic by which this kingdom authority of the risen Christ might e known ‘generally’ among the
‘nations’.” John E. Colwell, Living the Christian Story: the Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 2001) 243. In a similar vein, McIlroy notes “One of the striking features of the selections in that volume
[O’Donovan’s From Irenaeus to Grotius] is the relative absence of reflection on the Trinity.” McIlroy,
Trinitarian Theology, 17.
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25]. This is yet another paradox of life in Christ. Difficulties arise for pneumatology and
eschatology if we presume to overstate the case for the completeness of the creation. Is the
Holy Spirit rendered superfluous to ethics if we presume the moral order to be an
ontologically complete and timeless whole? Is the Spirit of Truth [John 16:13] to be
constrained by a pre-existent construction of morality? Likewise, how are we to interpret the
freedom of the living Christ and the Spirit [cf. John 8:32-36] if the morality is self-contained
in the timeless reality of the cosmos? Would that not render the agency of the Holy Spirit an
after-thought, as though he were a mid-wife to the moral education of the children of God, as
opposed to the creative force of God in redemption and atonement? Gunton is right in this
assessment: “attention to the pneumatological dimensions enables the development of a more
truly trinitarian construction of the matter… [which] places the atonement in the broader
context of God’s plan for the whole created order.”135 For this reason, O’Donovan’s emphasis
upon the completeness of moral order is problematic:
That which most distinguishes the concept of creation is that it is complete. Creation is
the given totality of order which forms the presupposition of historical existence. …
Because created order is given, because it is secure, we dare to be certain that god will
vindicate it in history.136
This tends toward a weak, if not eviscerated, interpretation of the agency of the Holy
Spirit.137 We see this in O’Donovan’s definition of redemption as the “recovery of something
given and lost”,138 although he quickly adds the caveat: “we must go beyond thinking of
redemption as a mere restoration”.139 Here again we can see a dialectical movement—
redemption is a recovery of a pre-existent created order; yet it is also a transformation of that
same created order.
This points to the need for Trinitarian theology to face the reality that the creation is not
static, but rather unfolding in time, and to correspondingly understand the work of the Spirit
as an agent of that movement. Gunton perceives the challenge inherent in O’Donovan’s
135 Gunton, Promise, 179.
136 R&MO, 60f.
137 McIlroy surmises correctly how this results from “the domination of O’Donovan’s view of the objectivity of
the created order”, which leads him to “attribute too much self-evidence to creation and not enough activity to
the Holy Spirit”; Trinitarian Theology, 112-3. He tends to overstate his case however when he concludes that
O’Donovan “has not articulated the Spirit’s involvement in the exercise of political authority”, 117, the reason
being that McIlroy has failed to appreciate O’Donovan’s efforts to balance statements of ontological priority by
means of dialectical epistemology.
138 R&MO, 54.
139 R&MO, 55.
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statement, and offers a corrective when he calls for Trinitarian theology “to speak of the
relative perfection of creation in the beginning to make the point that creation is not a
timeless whole, as it was made in Augustine, but has a temporality and a directedness to an
end which is greater than its beginnings, and that they belong to its nature as creation.”140
Based on this assessment, we can discern an echo of Augustinian Neo-Platonism in the
attributes of timelessness and transcendent wholeness for the moral order, as though it were
an ideal to be accessed by the mind and restored in the eschaton.141 The corrective to this
static and weakened doctrine of the Holy Spirit is to “recover the notion of creation as
project”, as Gunton surmises.142 This does not endorse the ideas of God which result from
“process theology”, but rather affirms the evangelical witness to the Holy Spirit in the
dynamics by which faith and moral order occur in concert within the agency of the living,
loving Triune God. Are we to proclaim that this providential work of God is not exercised in
complete freedom, because it must remain beholden to the established completeness and
timelessness of the moral order as conceived at the original moment of creation? Surely not.
Thus we conclude that a Trinitarian understanding of moral reality leaves space for the
human-divine relationship in which the dynamics of faith occur. This dynamic aspect of
moral knowledge, as pertaining to real events in time and space, undermines O’Donovan’s
statement of teleological completeness in the creation,143 and thus he rejects it as being a form
of ‘historicism’, which in his view “denies that such a universal order exists.”144 The
difficulty arises from O’Donovan’s perception that the hermeneutics of doctrine require an
either-or choice to be made in answer to the epistemological question: “Is cosmic order really
present in the world, or is it imposed upon reality by the human mind?”145 The question
however is seen to be spurious in light of a Trinitarian theology which incorporates the
dynamics of faith.146 The risk in O’Donovan’s approach to avoid ‘historicism’, as he calls it,
140 Gunton, Promise, 180-1.
141 Cf. McIlroy, Trinitarian Theology, 111.
142 Gunton, Promise, 181.
143 “Creation is not a process which might be accessible through the backward extrapolation of other processes.
Creation as a completed design is presupposed by any movement in time. Its teleological order … is not a
product of the historical process”; R&MO, 63.
144 R&MO, 67.
145 R&MO, 67.
146 In his disagreement with Wolterstorff O’Donovan posits a similar either-or between “moralistic”
(Wolterstorff’s) and “non-moralistic” (O’Donovan’s) accounts of Heilsgeschichte. This misses the point that
creation and providence are mutually interdependent notions. They do not represent an either-or duality of
moral order as being either transcendently complete, on the one hand, or arbitrarily shaped by the whims of
human history on the other. O’Donovan, ‘Deliberation, History and Reading: a Response to Schweiker and
Wolterstorff’, Scottish Journal of Theology 54 (2001) 127-144, 139.
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is to posit a concept of moral order as though it could be ontologically independent and
untouched by the ever-present hand of the living God who is shaping history and fulfilling
the order of creation.147 For this reason, we see that O’Donovan’s either-or view of
historicism tends to speak against the mutuality of providence and creation, the co-existence
of the creature and the Creator, as Barth would have it.148
The sixth and final implication inspires the title of this dissertation—the transformation
of persons. Simply put, our thesis is that the concept of moral order, evangelically speaking,
is inextricably bound up with the transformation of persons. This is the dynamic of faith. It is
the doctrinal recognition of metanoia as concomitant with moral discernment. By faith we are
transformed.149 By faith we receive epistemic access to the concept of moral order. This is the
heart of an evangelical understanding of ethics.
Having set forth these implications for doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity, we
may ask how they might be critiqued. I shall therefore evaluate the following potential
counter-arguments as a test of the robustness of the analysis presented here.
Kingdom and Creation
A potential counter-argument might stem from the very pragmatic concern with which
O’Donovan opens his outline for evangelical ethics—to avoid the twin temptations of
antinomianism and moralism.150 I can imagine a potential counter-argument might derive
from the concern that we have landed too near the dangerous pole of ‘kingdom ethics’, and
thereby given too little shrift to the ontological reality of ‘creation ethics’.151 By now it
should be clear that such a counter-argument lacks warrant for evangelical ethics, if it
147 Cf. Calvin: “We mean by providence not an indolent God looking down from heaven on what is happening
in the world, but God ruling the world He established, so that He is not to be understood as a craftsman who
completed His work at some particular moment but rather as the world’s perpetual governor. In this way, the
providence that we attribute to God pertains to the hands no less than to the eyes”; quoted in CD III/3, 10.
148 CD III/3, 12.
149 Habgood sums up our reason for choosing to demonstrate this truth means of the K2: “Kierkegaard in his
famous exposition of the story makes the point that faith is the highest virtue, because it is only by faith that we
can be transformed… only by giving ourselves unreservedly to God—not because it makes moral sense to do
so”; John Stapylton Habgood, Varieties of Unbelief (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000) 54.
150 R&MO, 12.
151 Regarding the false dichotomy “between the so-called ‘ethics of the kingdom’ and the ‘ethics of creation’”,
see R&MO, xv, 15.
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proceeds via a dialectical epistemology to hold ‘creation’ and ‘kingdom’ in tension.152
Furthermore, our thesis does not denigrate the ontological reality of creation ethics, but rather
understands the moral significance of that reality within the cosmology of faith. Thus, if there
is to be a complaint against our thesis on the basis of an underdeveloped creation ethic, that
complaint will be undone by its own doctrinal implications with respect to the capacity of
human beings to discern the evangelical content of the moral order. That capacity for
evangelistic insight is lacking within the humanum apart from the presence and power of the
Holy Spirit. This follows from our analysis of the hermeneutics of the doctrine of
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit. The counter-argument is thus unfounded.
Moral bricks vs. living stones
Another potential counter-argument might suggest that our thesis leaves the content of
the moral order unnecessarily vague and underdetermined, on account of our critique of the
premise of ontological priority. That argument might go something like this: If we begin from
the presumption that the moral order exists, does that not mean that its ontology precedes
knowledge of it, even if that knowledge induces personal transformation? The thrust of this
counter-argument can be expressed in terms of O’Donovan’s concept of “moral bricks”:
The items in a code stand to the moral law as bricks to a building. Wisdom must involve
some comprehension of how the bricks are meant to be put together.153
The image of ‘bricks’ conveys graphically the hard common-sense reality of ontological
priority which suits O’Donovan’s doctrine.154 This is a clearly different sense of moral
content from that developed in our thesis. A strictly rigorous idea of ontological priority
might lead to the following assertions with respect to “the moral law”: (a) moral bricks could
be viewed as static, free-standing ontological realities, independent of obedience and faith;
152 Similarly, we can see this dialectical presumption at work in echoes of Brunner’s doctrine of the capacity of
the “formal” imago to discern moral reality.
153 R&MO, 200. There is an apologetic value to the concept of moral “bricks” in that it seems more compatible
with the “Modern Moral Order” than do the precepts of faith, divine command, and religious truth in general.
Taylor, Secular Age, shows how the “social imaginary” has moved in this direction.
154 These bricks would seem to correspond to the “the truths of Christian faith”, the “truths that govern action”,
as the subject matter of ethics; O’Donovan, Common Objects of Love (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002) 3.
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(b) the content of these ‘bricks’ could, to some degree, be presumed to be available
immediately to human perception; and finally, (c) these bricks might well be described as
metaphysical truths, existing apart from and independent of personal participation in Christ.
None of these assertions can be sustained within evangelical ethics, as we have seen by the
foregoing analysis. Moral reality is not well described as a metaphorical set of bricks, which
conveys a sense of inert material objects; but rather, the transformational event of faith which
occurs in ‘living stones’ [1 Peter 2:4-5] provides the setting for development of a doctrine of
evangelical ethics. Moral knowledge cannot be conveyed apart from, or outside of, the
relational context of the innertrinitarian life of God. Theologically speaking therefore, moral
bricks are not free-standing entities to be grasped by the natural capacities of the humanum.
Our analysis rules out that implication of ontological priority, and in the following statement
O’Donovan would seem to agree:
We read the Bible seriously only when we use it to guide our thought towards a
comprehensive moral viewpoint… We must look within it not only for moral bricks, but
for indications of the order in which the bricks hold together… But in truth there is no
alternative policy if we intend that our moral thinking should be shaped in any significant
way by the Scriptures.155
The point is that the moral code is not contained within the bricks themselves. The moral
code is rather discernable only within the cosmology which gives meaning.156 O’Donovan’s
caveat brings into play, implicitly, the other arm of his dialectical realism—faith. This
becomes quickly apparent in the attempt to exegete a “moral brick”. For example, is “do
justice” [Micah 6:8] a moral brick? How about “love mercy”? How are these commands to
carry any weight unless we know what “justice” and “mercy” mean? And how are we to
know justice and mercy apart from the scriptural witness to them? And how are we to hear
that witness, let alone understand it, except for the feet of the messenger [Rom. 10:15]? And
so on. It seems pointless to seek moral significance in the free-standing bricks themselves.157
The meaning is to be found only in the life of faith—i.e., “in relation to all other aspects of
human response to God’s grace.”158 Thus, in terms of developing a hermeneutic of doctrine,
155 R&MO, 200.
156 R&MO, 203.
157 An interesting exercise in exegesis of scriptural references to stones, for which we lack space here to pursue,
would be to consider Jesus’ statement in Luke 19:40, “I tell you, if these were silent, the stones would shout
out”, as a witness to faith and life as being the essential cosmological conditions for the proclamation of truth,
even truth written in stone.
158 R&MO, 203.
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we conclude that the idea of ontological priority possesses no warrant to drive out or
supersede the relationship of faith in which moral meaning is apprehended.
Apologetics
Another line of counter-argument might originate from the pressing need for ethics to be
not merely evangelical, but practical and relevant also. This pressure becomes all the more
acute in the prevailing mindset of our secular age which seems less interested in theological
discourse than in the pragmatic pursuits of humanism. We have seen how this pressure
presents a risk to theological interpretation. By choosing to focus on teaching “Christian
moral concepts”, O’Donovan aims to allay this risk.159 In Ways of Judgment, he states more
explicitly his commitment to the cosmological perspective of fides quarens intellectum:
I make no claims for my train of thought other than the claim proper to every work of
theology: here faith seeks understanding.160
While this stance is evident within R&MO, it becomes more explicitly clear in Ways of
Judgment, where he describes apologetics as being “not a distinct genre of religious
thinking”, but rather “a distinct genre of exposition.”161 In other words, he is careful here to
express the task of apologetics as being subsumed within the task of theology as a whole—as
being the “ordered exposition of Christian belief traditionally known as ‘doctrine’.”
Apologetics is thus not to be considered another task in addition to dogmatics, but rather, a
form or type of dogmatics per se. This would seem to address adequately Barth’s concern to
avoid the type of apologetics which, motivated by a desire to engage with the secular, departs
from the path of fides quarens intellectum and thereby leads into the “temptation to enter into
159 O’Donovan acknowledges candidly the humbling experience of “deep frustration” encountered in classrooms
where Christian moral concepts suffer the withering critique of “anti-foundationalism”, and the traditional
“apologetic strategy” fails to impress due to its irrelevance with respect to the moral issues of the day. This
experience provides some impetus toward apologetic effectiveness in R&MO, vii-viii. While our analysis has
identified some points at which this didactic goal may have been breached due to the inconsistencies of a
(tacitly, at least) dialectical epistemology, I do not mean to suggest that O’Donovan is motivated by the goal of
developing an apologetic strategy to address the secular concerns of moral philosophy. He obviously intends to
avoid any such strategy, as that would merely propagate the errors inherent in approaches which earn his
disdain.
160 WJ, x-xi.
161 WJ, xiii.
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debate with [philosophical ethics] in the form of apologetics”, and results in “un-theological
thinking”.162 Indeed, O’Donovan’s definition of apologetics seems consistent with Barth’s
view that the only good apologetic is the one which is unapologetically theological, holding
firmly to the Word of God—
The words of Psalm 127:1–2 are quite decisive here: “Except the Lord build the house,
their labour is but lost that build it…” Good apologetics is distinguished from bad by its
responsibility to these words.163
By holding apologetics subject to the discipline of theological doctrine, O’Donovan
intends to engage in good apologetics, in agreement with Barth—that is to say, apologetics
conducted within the explicit context of faith seeking understanding. Apologetics is thus no
more and no less than a form (genre) of faithful theologein. Therefore, if there is to be any
counter-argument to our thesis on the basis of apologetic strategy, it will be seen to arise from
a motivation that differs markedly from the didactic priorities of Professor O’Donovan.
Ghosts of Voluntarism
Finally, we shall consider whether a counter-argument could arise out of concern to
expunge voluntarism from the habits of theological ethics.164 As we saw in O’Donovan’s
rebuttal of Kierkegaard’s “teleological suspension”, his concern is that personal faith not be
used as a “trump card” to obfuscate or overrule the objectivity of the moral order. We can see
this concern in O’Donovan’s reference to the “mediaeval ghosts” of voluntarism which he
finds to have survived the Tudor Reformation and taken up residence in much modern
theology:
He [Cranmer] appears to say simply that God looks on good deeds as sinful if they are
not performed by believers—a curious attribution of arbitrary willfulness to the divine,
itself reminiscent of late-mediaeval voluntarism. Thus Cranmer failed quite to lay the
mediaeval ghosts to rest, and they have continued to live their shadow-life, both among
162 Ethics, 21.
163 CD II/1, 9. For Barth, any other approach to apologetics, other than that which operates explicitly with the
horizon of faith, commits inevitably the sacrificium intellectus by attempting to reason from the “dialectic of
unbelief”, which equates of course with nonsense. CD II/1, 8, 94; cf. CD IV/.1, 75.
164 Hans Burger notes insightfully that in R&MO O’Donovan “uses the concept of moral order to correct the
modern voluntarist climate”; Being in Christ, 454.
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Protestants at large and among the Anglicans who looked specifically to him for
guidance.165
What is the curious life-force which sustains the ghosts of voluntarism? Arbitrariness,
says O’Donovan.166 A bitingly rhetorical question lies implicit in O’Donovan’s critique: If
God calls a believer’s “good deed” righteous, yet judges the same “good deed” sinful when
done by a non-believer, does that not force us to assign the attribute of arbitrariness to God?
By implication, the argument is that we must avoid conceiving of morality as though it were
contingent upon personal faith; otherwise we shall have unwittingly assigned the attribute of
“arbitrary willfulness to the divine”. The problem with this type of reasoning is that it reduces
dogmatics to a treatment of the ontological attributes of God—a proposition that leads into
serious conflicts with the evangelical affirmations of faith, as we have seen above.
The notion that good deeds are good, regardless of who performs them, or what they
believe, appeals to the sentiments of our secular age.167 After all, the whole world seems to
think in terms of ethics.168 There are indeed ethical principles to be found in every
cosmology, and there are people in every cosmology who believe in those principles and
strive to live by them.169 We may rightly call them, “a law unto themselves” [Rom. 2:14].
But the question at hand is this: from whence comes their morality, their “law”, their
authority for ethical judgment? Is it “natural”? From whence do they derive their authority
for ascribing goodness to their behavior? For if their self-imputation of goodness comes from
165 39 Articles, 82.
166 It is fair to ask whether this is a case of seeing ghosts that are not really there. To affirm the connection
between morality and faith (as per the K2) is not to endorse abject voluntarism. Cranmer, for one, might have
been quick to see this point. O’Donovan treats Cranmer with deference here, reminding that the 39 Articles were
written in the context of a medieval understanding of voluntarism. My point here is not to evaluate the 39
Articles, or Cranmer’s sense of voluntarism, but rather to notice O’Donovan’s interpretation of them.
167 See Chapter 1 for discussion of the Modern Moral Order (MMO) on view here. Cf. Taylor, A Secular Age.
We might well address this conjecture that good deeds are good no matter what you believe, by referring to
Jesus’ reply, “Why do you call me good?” [Luke 18:19]. The point is that goodness is not discernable apart from
personal knowledge of the authority of the One who makes it good. That is, of course, a matter of faith seeking
understanding, and not a matter of metaphysical definitions of ‘good’, as Jesus’ question drives home the point.
168 James Q. Wilson exemplifies the argument that there exists a common moral sense within human nature,
which has emerged through evolutionary, developmental and cultural origins; Wilson, The Moral Sense (New
York: Free Press, 1993) 26. This concept finds support in the speculative suggestion that there exists a “god-
gene” which leads some people to choose faith. On that view, the choice would not be voluntaristic, but rather
deterministic. Such determinism would be no more palatable within O’Donovan’s doctrine than voluntarism.
169 Acts 17 has sometimes been claimed in support of the idea that competing frames of reference can be
reconciled apologetically. This interpretation is highly problematic. To see the prima facie evidence of the
problem with the view that Paul is somehow validating a pagan cosmology by quoting one of its poets [17:28],
we need look no further than the content of his proclamation [17:24-31]— the Gospel of Jesus and the
resurrection, and the call to repent [v. 30]. There is no moral validation of any aspect of pagan religion,
philosophy or ethics to be found anywhere in the Areopagus proclamation; nor is there any validation of pagan
cosmology as a source of truth. It is rather named by Paul as a source of human ignorance [v. 30].
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a source other than the divine Father God, will they not stand in need of correction through
the rhetorical question posed by the Son, “Who is good other than God?” [Mark 10:17-22].
Evangelical ethics is not founded upon the premise that the ethics of non-believers are
“bad”. The evangelical foundation of ethics resides rather in the affirmation of the
transforming relationship in which the true source of good becomes known.170 Does the
personal experience of transformation somehow overrule the premise of ontological priority
and lead to antinomianism? That would seem to be the overarching concern which drives
O’Donovan’s effort to expunge the ghosts of voluntarism, and we can address the claims
implicit therein by considering his disagreement with Barth over the issue.
Human freedom in light of the burning bush
O’Donovan expounds the connection between voluntarism and antinomianism in a
recent essay where he takes up his “disagreement with Karl Barth” over divine command
theory.171 This disagreement suggests one final direction from which a counter-argument to
my thesis might emerge. Basically, O’Donovan objects to Barth’s “lack of any universal
rules”, an alleged consequence of Barth’s desire to step back from Kantian universalism.172
Barth refutes the idea of universal rules, saying they are “not to be found” in the Bible:
For, as the Lord of this history, God seems hardly to be interested at all in general and
universally valid rules, but properly only in certain particular actions and achievements
and attitudes, and this in the extremely simple and direct way of desiring from man (as a
father from his child, or a master from his servant) that this or that must or must not
happen. Nothing can be made of these commands if we try to generalise and transform
them into universally valid principles 173
170 There is no cause for surprise in noticing that secular and Christian judgments of moral behavior often align
well. Paul makes much the same observation in his admonition to refrain from judging other people’s behavior
[Rom. 2:1f]; yet the point is that faith, not ‘ethics’, is the source of righteousness—“the one who is righteous
will live by faith” [Rom. 1:17; cf. Habakkuk 2:4]. Rather than showing the uncircumcised to be exemplars of
ethics, Paul shows that those who possess the law (Torah) are on a par with the uncircumcised, for all of them
alike are under the power of sin—“there is no one who is righteous” [3:9-20]. This explains the imperative, “do
not judge”, which occupies the entirety of Romans 2.
171 Oliver O’Donovan, ‘The Moral Authority of Scripture’, in Scripture’s Doctrine and Theology’s Bible, eds.
Markus Bockmuehl and Alan J. Torrance (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008) 165-175, 169.
172 O’Donovan, ‘The Moral Authority of Scripture’, 169.
173 CD II/2, 672.
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The concern is that if we cannot explicitly endorse the concept of universally valid rules, then
the ontological priority of the moral order is called into question, leaving us with only the
vagaries of a sheer and individualistic human will as recourse to moral deliberation. In this
vein, O’Donovan accuses Barth of espousing a form of theological ethics based not upon any
divinely instilled order, but rather upon an existential “burning bush” mode of perception,
with the result that
…the divine command in the Bible is, like the burning bush, a wonder that at certain
unrepeatable points in history has unexpectedly invaded and taken control of the life of
some agent, leaving only the choice to obey or to rebel.174
O’Donovan amplifies this idea of “invasion” of the moral agent’s mind by means of the
example of a soldier trained into “implicit obedience”, in which there is no rationality, no
reason, no deliberation, but only an unthinking response to command.175 This seems to me
not to capture the deeper significance which Barth attaches to hearing and obeying in the
context of a biblical witness which attests to the moral agent’s relationship with “God as the
Father, or Lord” who orders or forbids “in the process of the revelation and embodiment of
His grace, hic et nunc.”176 It is the concreteness of God’s being and the concreteness of
relationship, which Barth here affirms as the context of fides quaerens intellectum within
which we may read the Bible as being “replete with ethics”.177 Barth is not espousing here a
voluntarism which strips ethics of meaning, but rather he is affirming the concrete reality of
the living God as being: (1) beyond the capability of any universally valid rules to contain;
(2) more real than the precepts of any abstract moral code; and (3) prior to and above any
human judgment or conception of any such moral code. To suggest that Barth’s ethics
prescribes an “invasion” of the moral agent by a power that shuts down the individual
person’s will and rationality, obviating moral thinking in the process, and denying human
freedom of participation in the moral reality, is to side-step the evangelical affirmations of
Barth’s doctrine by ascribing voluntaristic tendencies to them. Voluntarism is indeed a
ghost, as O’Donovan has called it; it has no life of its own, and survives only as a shadow of
the real life of the moral order. That real life from which light radiates, and from which the
shadows run, is the personal relationship which is inextricable from the moral order. The
174 O’Donovan, ‘The Moral Authority of Scripture’, 169.
175 Cf. O’Donovan’s concern to not interpret “[m]oments of fear and trembling” in opposition to “reflective and
considered thinking, the ‘rational worship’ … [of] Rom. 12:1-2”; ‘The Moral Authority of Scripture’, 175.
176 CD II/2, 673.
177 CD II/2, 672.
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ontic reality of personal relationship will not be expunged without doing grievous damage to
the affirmations of evangelical ethics regarding theological anthropology and the cosmology
of faith.
Prayer at the Heart of Evangelical Ethics
Accordingly, O’Donovan looks to the Lord’s Prayer [Matt. 6:9-15] as the centre, both
structurally and thematically, of the moral teaching of the Sermon on the Mount.178 The
Prayer serves to transform the ethical teaching of the Sermon, to render it in the context of the
transforming work of the Father in the lives of the faithful, rather than in a context of
moralistic prescription. The Prayer thus occupies the place of prime importance in the center
of the chiastic structure of the Sermon, in order to transform what might otherwise be
received as a set of ethical principles or a rules-based prescription for moral behaviour, into a
witness to the faith relationship which provides access to moral truth.179 It sets morality in
the context of the moral agent’s relationship with the living God, which relationship alone
creates the possibility for ethics to become more than a heap of empty phrases [Matt. 6:7].
O’Donovan highlights this transformative impact of the Prayer by viewing it exegetically as
the centre of a dialectical contrast between the desire for the treasures of earth vs. those of
heaven:
… the lynch-pin which holds the prayer in place at the centre of the Sermon is the little
group of sayings which contrast two possible orientations of the heart: seeking treasure
on earth and seeking treasure in heaven… the decision between two competing frames
of reference for our action.180
On O’Donovan’s view this prayer “unites the religious with the moral” by providing a sense-
giving structure which places parameters around desire in order to direct it toward the proper
178 Cf. O’Donovan, ‘The Sermon on the Mount and Christian Ethics’, Society for Study of Christian Ethics
Conference (Jesus College, Cambridge: 2008), which captures the content of his keynote address at the Society
for Study of Christian Ethics conference, “The Sermon on the Mount and Christian Ethics”, held at Jesus
College, Cambridge (September 2008). Barth also emphasized the centrality of the Lord’s Prayer and the
“invoking” of God as “the basis of all Christian ethos”, with reference to 1 Peter 3:19-20; CD IV/4, 211.
179 O’Donovan alludes to the transformative power of relationship, achieved through prayer, as a core reality of
the universe: “The Lord’s Prayer… inducts the worshipper into the elementary relations of the universe…These
relations link God the Father… with ourselves”; ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon on the Mount’, Studies in
Christian Ethics 22.1 (2009): 21-33: 30. Hereafter, ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon…’.
180 DN, 107.
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object of desire; this structure frames the worshiper’s petition within the structure and order
of “the elementary relations of the universe”.181 Furthermore, the Prayer has the ability to
“control our imaginative enthusiasms… and focus our desires”, thus constraining and
organizing what would otherwise be misguided natural passions and idolatrous desires.182 In
this sense, O’Donovan finds prayer to be the reconciling link between a natural ethic and a
Christian ethic—an idea of utmost interest given our analysis of the idea of a point of contact
for ethics. How could it be possible for the Lord’s Prayer (or any prayer, for that matter) to
merge competing “frames of reference”, if one frame of reference contains evangelical faith
and the other does not?
We might rephrase the concern by asking: of what significance is a prayer uttered from
within a cosmology which lacks evangelical faith? There would seem to be reason for some
concern in this regard, given O’Donovan’s expression of “pagan” prayer as a possibility to be
held in relationship with Christian prayer:
The pagans pray, even those who doubt the reality of what they pray to… But Christians
are taught to call God ‘Our Father in heaven’, for this brings to clarity the truth of the
dimly discerned relation between human agency and the government of the objective
world…183
Though it is clear from O’Donovan’s statement that pagan prayer and Christian prayer
operate from opposing cosmologies, with the latter being the one in which truth comes into
clarity, there lingers within his statement the suggestion that pagan prayer and Christian
prayer are parallel paths, each aligned with the same objective reality of moral order,
determined by the will of God the Father who is “the source of ordered and intelligible
governance of the universe.”184 We are assured that God can hear even inarticulate prayers,
181 He interprets all the dichotomies of the Beatitudes as representative instances of “the contrast between the
ages”, between the now and the then, [which] lies at the heart of all other contrasts. Given this pivotal position,
sitting at the fulcrum as it were, between off-setting “frames of reference”, O’Donovan interprets the Prayer as
an endeavor which sorts out and reconciles the panoply of contrasts exhibited in the now vis-à-vis then duality
of the moral order; ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon…’, 22- 30.
182 O’Donovan, ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon…’, 30.
183 O’Donovan, ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon…’, 30-31. O’Donovan goes so far as to suggest that
“Barth’s reference to invocation as ‘the basic act of the Christian ethos’” supports the notion of Christian prayer
“[not] as a sublimation of natural ethics, a replacement of the moral enterprise by one on a higher and more
Christian plain, but as its fulfilment”, 30.
184 O’Donovan, ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon…’, 30. David Crump offers a helpful analysis of pagan
prayers which confirms the plausibility that they may align with Christian prayers in terms of a structure fitting
with Paul’s exhortation of Phil. 4:6. He attributes this alignment in structure to “the unquenchable human
impulse to implore divine intervention…”, Crump, ‘Are Practical Prayers Pagan Prayers?’ Expository Times 5
(2009): 231-235, 232. Structural alignment does not however carry over into either cosmological alignment or
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and the Holy Spirit can intercede with sighs too deep for words [Rom. 8:26]; but what moral
significance can be gleaned from a prayer which has faith not in Christ, but in some other
reality?185 What does it mean to call this a prayer?186 To suggest that the naturally
existential and intellectual longing of the human heart for truth is to be held together in
dialectical tension with the evangelical understanding of prayer as embodying a relationship
with God the Father, would seem to invite those same difficulties we have already identified
in the implications of a dialectical epistemology. For this reason, we would endorse
O’Donovan’s conclusion that the Lord’s Prayer “constitutes the very heart of moral
teaching”187 but not the suggestion that pagan prayer might be considered as a viable and
parallel path toward ethical understanding.
This primacy of prayer leads to a serious admonition for the teacher of ethics, as
O’Donovan recognizes rightly:
The teacher who will teach us to act and to live our lives before and for God, will teach
us, as the ‘basic act’ of our living, how to pray.188
The teacher of ethics is therefore admonished to pay as much attention to the ethos of faith
and the object of prayer as to the content of moral principles. This is a ringing endorsement
of the cosmology of faith. O’Donovan closes his commentary on the Lord’s Prayer with this
affirmation of faith at the heart of ethics; however, there remains in his closing statement on
the subject a noticeable silence with respect to the Gospel. The innertrinitarian life of God at
work in the act of prayer and the awareness of the moral agent remain tacit in O’Donovan’s
statement, as do the transforming agency of the Holy Spirit and the actualization of metanoia
realized in those events. Perhaps there is no need for O’Donovan to emphasize here yet again,
as he has done so well elsewhere,189 the importance of the Gospel and the prime place of the
content alignment, as Crump points out. By my question here regarding the comparison and potential alignment
of pagan vs. Christian prayers I do not mean to suggest that pagan prayers are ungodly; rather, the question
remains whether and upon what basis such prayers—being directed as they are to idolatrous gods—might be
considered to be aligned with Christian prayer.
185 Paul makes no allowance here for a “pagan” form of prayer. There is a difference between a prayer rendered
inarticulate due to a depth beyond the reach of words, and a prayer rendered incoherent due to a lack of faith.
186 Barth’s comments on the ‘little lights’ is helpful here. These “prayers” may indeed express the existential
desire of the human heart to seek God’s truth, even without knowing God; nonetheless, these lights do not, in
and of themselves, express or teach the truth of the moral order or bear witness to the triune God.
187 O’Donovan, ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon…’,33.
188 O’Donovan, ‘Prayer and Morality in the Sermon…’,33.
189 As O’Donovan has taught elsewhere with respect to the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus’ question, “Why do you
not judge for yourselves what is right?” [Luke 12:57; cf. Matt. 5:25] might better be translated, “judge of
yourselves”, WJ, 293. Apart from prayer our judgments will be distorted and even incapacitated by the “log in
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Resurrection at the heart of evangelical ethics. The more substantive concern lies not with the
perception of the degree to which O’Donovan either does or does not adequately emphasize
evangelical affirmations in his commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, but rather with the
suggestion that competing frames of reference—pagan and Christian—can be considered as
viable modalities of moral discourse capable of reconciliation with one another.190 What
would such a reconciliation of cosmologies look like? Upon what epistemological premise
could it proceed? The idea that these competing cosmologies might be reconciled raises the
question of what it means to say that prayer, as the invocation of God, “constitutes the very
heart of moral teaching”.191 To suggest that moral learning could proceed apart from and
outside the event of transformation within the faith of the moral agent would be to hold to a
doctrine of morality that engendered friction with the affirmations of evangelical ethics. This
point is perhaps best seen through the exercise of a case study; so I offer the following
illustration.
Case Study: Reconciliation of a “Natural” Ethic
The dire implications of an attempt to validate a natural ethic, as being a parallel
approach to moral knowledge aligned with Christian ethics and doctrine, come to the fore in
Patricia Williams’ attempt to reconcile Christianity with “evolutionary ethics”.192 While
Williams does not explicitly define evolutionary ethics in either phenomenological or
ontological terms, it is clear from her explanation that she uses the idea in a manner typical of
our own eye” [Matt. 7:3]. Thus the authority and rightness of Christian ethical judgments will rely upon the
work of the Holy Spirit in our self-examination. As O’Donovan says rightly, this prayerful approach to morality
is conditioned upon “hopeful attention to the inner dialogue with God” which takes place in response to “the
evangelical summons to be judge of ourselves”, WJ, 309, 312.
190 We may include contemporary versions of “modern paganism”, rooted in secular humanism, along with the
classical, historical varieties of paganism without departing from our line of inquiry here. For inasmuch as our
culture has moved beyond the old paganism of pre-Christian roots, never to return, our present age of post-
Christendom persists in embracing anti-Christian values of “paganism” or “polythesism” as Taylor attests; A
Secular Age, 770-1. David Bentley Hart agrees, concluding that although “We are not pagans” as of old, “we
live after the age of Christendom, and cultures do not easily turn back to beliefs of which they have tired or with
which they have become disenchanted”; Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable
Enemies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 240. And thus the gods of antiquity have been merely
replaced in some sense by new gods conforming to “the moral metaphysics of modernity”, 228.
191 After all, as O’Donovan concludes regarding moral behavior: “acting and living cannot be self-aware and
self-possessed without prayer; and therefore they cannot ultimately be acting and living to good effect”; ‘Prayer
and Morality in the Sermon…’, 33.
192 Patricia A. Williams, ‘Christianity and Evolutionary Ethics: Sketch Toward Reconciliation’, Zygon 31, no. 2
(1996) 253-268. Hereafter, “Williams”.
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various attempts to explain ethics as an emergent characteristic of human behavior which
arose naturally through the process of evolution, as the human creature developed a
sufficiently complex social mind as to become aware of possessing moral consciousness. For
Williams, this is common sense: human beings have evolved dispositions including a bias for
rules, along with an acquired habit of judging in terms of right and wrong.193 Based on this
view of morality, she arrives at the conclusion that “most of the ancient doctrines [of the
Church] are either factually or morally unacceptable to those who live on the threshold of the
twenty-first century.”194 This is a common refrain among advocates of evolutionary ethics,195
and understandably so, for in order to rationalize the claim that ethics is grounded in, and
determined by, “natural” evolutionary process (i.e., interpreted as being determined by non-
teleological process), it becomes essential to deny the Gospel as the source and ground of
ethics; otherwise, the so-called “natural” processes would be found to lack authority as a
hermeneutical path to meaning.
The doctrines of Atonement and sin are called immediately into question in any attempt
to reconcile Christian and evolutionary ethics; for if nature is the determinant of our morality,
then how are we to understand the human need for a Savior to save us from our sin?196 We
are not surprised therefore to hear Williams argue that that “the logic of the Christology of
Chalcedon requires an incarnation but not an Atonement.”197 In the same manner she rejects
doctrines of original sin which would suggest humans might be “naturally indisposed to obey
God”.198 In lieu of these doctrines she suggests that there is only one interpretation of
Atonement that conforms to “modern scientific thinking, namely, the educative
interpretation.”199 Though she does not develop a clear statement of this educative doctrine
of the Atonement, she makes it clear in her conclusion that we are not saved through the
passion and resurrection of Christ—these being unnecessary and troubling artifacts of
outdated mythically inspired doctrines200—but rather, we are saved by education, with Christ
193 Williams, 257.
194 Williams, 263-4.
195 E.g., Melvin Konner, Francis Ayala, Frans Van de Waal, Richard Dawkins, Michael Gazzinga.
196 Sir Alfred Ayer anticipates proponents of evolutionary ethics when he justifies his contempt for Christianity
on the basis of “the allied doctrines of original sin and vicarious atonement, which are intellectually
contemptible and morally outrageous.” Guardian Weekly, August 30, 1979, quoted by John Stott, Evangelical
Truth (Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 1999) 84.
197 Williams, 263.
198 Williams, 258.
199 Williams, 264.
200 Williams, 256, quotes Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (1958)— “The course of history has refuted
mythology”—in support of her argument that older Christian doctrines need to be reoriented to a modern
scientific worldview.
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being the principal teacher who sets an “example of how human beings should live with one
another by serving the stranger and the outcast even unto death.”201
So much for the doctrine of Atonement. What of the doctrine of sin? Concomitant to the
view that salvation comes not through the presence of Christ the Savior, but rather through
the perfection of human nature, Williams describes original sin as an outdated and spurious
doctrine.202 She suggests sin would be better understood as “an acquired taste”, rather like
the taste for bitter, and that “like acquired tastes, it might be passed from generation to
generation through familial, clan, or national culture.”203 By recasting the doctrines of sin
and Atonement in this fashion, Williams can proceed with her case for reconciliation by
arguing that any moral lapses in human behavior are not due to any original sin, nor
indicative of a need for a Savior, but rather they illustrate the wide range of moral and
immoral behavior exhibited in human beings which are “not part of God’s teleological plan
but an unforeseen result of evolution”.204
What are the implications of this reconciliation for theological anthropology? We can
hear a distinct echo of Emil Brunner’s doctrine of the “formal” imago and the cognitive
capacities implicated therein—
[I]n high human moments, in the human ability to think abstractly and logically about
moral questions and to apply that thought to human lives, people see that the strong
interpretation of the Love Command is a logical extension of natural morality.205
My final observation on Williams’ approach to reconciliation is this: she avoids
discussion of relationship with Christ, choosing rather to focus on the attributes of God, in
parallel with the attributes of the humanum, which she takes of course to be outcomes of the
201 Williams, 266. In support of her educative doctrine of Atonement she names Confucius, Buddha, Jesus,
Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa in the same sentence as illustrative moral leaders (260).
202 Gregory Peterson makes essentially the same claim in his pursuit of an evolutionary ethic: “the origins of
sinfulness... are rooted not in the act of an original, historical couple, but in the complicated evolutionary
process itself”, and admits this “may seem to be at odds with a genuinely theological account of human nature”;
Peterson, ‘Falling Up: Evolution and Original Sin’, in Evolution and Ethics, Philip Clayton and Jeffrey Schloss,
eds. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004): 268-286, 283.
203 Williams, 260.
204 Williams, 264-5.
205 Williams, 261. Although Williams reaches conclusions similar to Brunner’s, she does not develop any
dogmatics to support them. Apparently, she considers it sufficient to claim that the materialistic presumptions of
her cosmology are obvious. We may also detect in Williams’ epistemological arrogance a fainter echo of
O’Donovan’s concern that ethics not be construed as operating in the “burning bush” modality; O’Donovan,
‘The Moral Authority of Scripture’, in Scripture’s Doctrine and Theology’s Bible, Markus Bockmuehl and Alan
J. Torrance, eds. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008) 165-175, 169. Williams echoes this aversion to
domination by the Holy Spirit when she cautions that theologians should be careful to avoid characterization of
moral agents as “God’s robots acting out of character and against human inclination”; Williams, 261.
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evolutionary process.206 I would suggest that this preoccupation with the attributes of God is
an unavoidable corollary to the denial of the real saving presence of Christ in the
transformation of persons as being of the essence in Christian ethics.207
Reconciliation in Christ
What lessons may we draw from this case study? My purpose here is not to make eristic
sport of Williams’ doctrine, but rather to demonstrate what happens when the implications of
a dialectical epistemology are fully played out with respect to evangelical ethics. Williams’
approach to reconciling the competing frames of reference in this case—the one based in the
strictly non-teleological materialism of evolutionary theory, and the other in theological
knowledge of revealed truth—functions essentially as a dialectical epistemology based upon
the presumption that each avenue of ethics derives its moral authority from the same ontology
of the moral order. As we have seen, this presumption leads, via the relentless logic of
metaphysics, to non-evangelical doctrines.
We might excuse Williams for not having recognized the ramifications of her
epistemological approach to reconcile naturalistic and Christian ethics. After all, she seems to
ignore the issue of epistemic access altogether. Yet the same difficulties can also arise even in
carefully studied approaches to evangelical ethics, such as that of Luke Bretherton, who
offers “extensive exegesis of O’Donovan’s theologically grounded conception of ethics.”208
Like Williams, Bretherton seeks a path toward reconciliation (“commensurability” is his
term) “between Christian and non-Christian approaches to moral problems”,209 and he claims
to have found one in O’Donovan’s “eschatological teleology.” We find Bretherton to be
making systematically inconsistent statements, however. He argues that on the one hand,
206 Williams finds it necessary to admit to “the logical requirement to weaken one of God’s traditional
attributes”, and she chooses omniscience as the culprit, because on her view morality is non-teleological, and sin
is “an unforeseen product of evolution”; Williams, 258.
207 For this reason, Barth concludes simply that there are irreconcilable differences which do not permit
evangelical ethics to begin from the materialistic presumptions of a theologia naturalis: “The distinction
between this order” [i.e., order defined by relationship with God the Creator and Redeemer who commands]
“and what is customarily called ‘order of creation’ elsewhere is clear and irreconcilable. To be aware of this
order we do not leave the closed circle of theological knowledge.” CD III/4, 45
208 Luke Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness: Christian Witness Amid Moral Diversity (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
2006) 64.
209 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 88.
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“Jesus Christ is ultimately authoritative for morality because he constitutes the ontological
ground of morality”, and therefore, “anything that does not conform to Christ must be judged
as not moral”210; and yet, on the other hand, “O’Donovan understands nature to have an
unmediated authority”, and therefore, “Morality of itself is grounded in the creation or natural
order.”211 Can these conflicting statements be held together in a coherent doctrine of moral
knowledge? Bretherton claims to have found a way to do so within a “distinctively Christian
cosmology”,212 but he has not noticed that his dialectically opposed statements pertain to
competing frames of reference.
Does this mean that natural theology must be rejected out of hand as either incoherent or
inane? No, to the contrary, its prevalence and cultural vitality make it a driving force to be
reckoned with. It is incumbent upon the Church to provide theological answers to the
questions raised by evolutionary ethics and all forms of natural ethics.213 The question is not
whether to seek a reconciliation of natural and Christian ethics; but rather, the more insightful
question is: upon what grounds shall such reconciliation be sought?
Reconciliation takes place in witness to the crucified and resurrected Christ [2 Cor. 5:14-
21]. Whether we are seeking to reconcile cosmologies or the persons who inhabit them, the
witness of evangelical faith proves essential if ethics are to be expressed and enacted with
coherence to the Gospel of Christ. Thus, Ray Anderson is correct when he points the way
forward toward reconciliation:
A natural theology which does not have at the center a cross sunk deep into human flesh
will not find transforming love at the center of human moral action.214
210 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 73.
211 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 70.
212 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 88.
213 “In our modern era, the lack of a natural theology which speaks for and from the perspective of the concrete
and actual humanity of every human person, has left the evangelical church ethically hesitant, if not ethically
impotent”; Ray S. Anderson, ‘Barth and a New Direction for Natural Theology’, in Theology Beyond
Christendom: Essays on the Centenary of the Birth of Karl Barth, May 10, 1886, ed. John Thompson (Allison
Park, Penn.: Pickwick, 1986) 241-266, 257.
214 Anderson, ‘Barth and a New Direction for Natural Theology’, 262. O’Donovan makes a similar affirmation:
“In light of the resurrection the cross is seen to be a judgment which is, at the same time and completely, an act
of reconciliation”; DN, 256f. Moltmann likewise arrives at the cross in his desire to reconcile natural theology
with the cosmology of faith: “If natural theology is not to lead the sinner astray through pious illusions about
himself and his God-like capacity for knowledge, then the theologia crucis, the theology of the cross, must first
put the person who has gone wrong right, and must justify the sinner—make the sinner just.” Moltmann’s
proposal that natural theology be considered “After the analogy of faith” sounds remarkably similar to Barth’s
Nachdenken; Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Way and Forms of Christian Theology (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 2000) 78, 79.
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The meaning of the cross, revealed in the event of faith, transforms our understanding of
moral authority; moral metaphysics are transformed by the transcendent reality of the Triune
God of Grace.215 This transformation does not validate the authority of “evolutionary” ethics,
or any other materialistic “natural” ethics;216 but rather, this transformation provides the
meaning and coherence lacking in those explanations of the moral order. At the same time,
this transformation provides a rationale to explain why human beings for the most part have a
sense of right and wrong that aligns well with the moral content of biblical faith.
For the doctrinal and hermeneutical priorities of the Gospel to be maintained, in pursuit
of an evangelical expression of ethics, there can be no “reconciliation” of cosmologies in
which the evangelical confession of Jesus as the one who says “I am the Truth” co-exists on
an equal footing with an autonomous source of meaning derived from some other non-
evangelical idea.217 So long as we conceive of natural theology as being devoid of this
witness, if not in outright denial of it, there can be no possibility for reconciliation with
evangelical ethics.218
In conclusion, we see that the meaning of moral order obtains through participation in
the event of the self-revealing God as being-in-becoming. The doctrine of
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit presented here corresponds to the dynamic cosmology of faith. To
suggest that moral meaning and the ethical content of knowledge could be ascertained from
outside the relation of faith is to presume some other basis of reality, some other cosmology
devoid of the witness to the moral significance of the triune God of grace. The risk is to
presume that the meaning of life can be had apart from living in faithful relationship with
215 J.B. Torrance, Worship, Community & the Triune God of Grace (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press,
1996).
216 As examples of ethicists claiming to find moral authority in denial of the cosmology of faith, we can repeat
the list compiled by David Bentley Hart: Joseph Fletcher (who advocates forced abortions); Linus Pauling (who
proposed “genetically engineering a subhuman caste of slave workers”); Peter Singer (who advocates
“prudential infanticide”); James Rachels (who advocates for more expansive and flexible euthanasia policies”);
and Lee Silver (who exemplifies the label “transhumanist” for his prognosis that “humanity will take
responsibility for its own evolution, by throwing off antique moral constraints and allowing ourselves to use
genetic engineering in order to transform future generations of our offspring into gods”. Hart, Atheist Delusions:
The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 234-8.
217 This speaks to Barth's reason for locating “the basis of all Christian ethos” in the evangelical witness of 1
Peter 3:18-20; CD IV.4 (211). Cf. Hans Frei, et. al., Types of Christian Theology (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992) 154f: “No natural theology, no anthropology, no characterization of the human condition, no
ideology or world view can set the conditions for theology or knowledge of God. Autonomous anthropology and
Christian theology cannot be understood as mutually implicated.”
218 Alister McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2009), tries the path of
fides quaerens intellectum, as he pursues a doctrine of “Trinitarian natural theology”. Other attempts to redeem
natural theology from Barth’s critique include Del Ratzsch and Alan G. Padgett, both in Faith and Philosophy
(2004). These efforts proceed by qualifying the term “natural theology” so that it stands for something other the
traditional sort of natural theology which drew Barth’s polemical fire.
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God. Like the self-revealing event of the Gospel itself, evangelical ethics interrupts any and
all hermeneutic methodologies. Like the Gospel, evangelical ethics breaks through into our
experience of Jesus Christ as “an intrusion upon or interruption of the coherence of the
world.”219 This understanding of Jesus is the cosmological constant of the New Testament.
The transformational aspect of faith which accompanies this intrusion shows up also in
O’Donovan’s observations when he gives countenance to the subjective experience of faith,
and operates from within the cosmology of faith:
These are subjective experiences that form the goal of the apostolic ministry, but
subjective experiences that draw the one affected into a new objective reality: “to be
renewed in the spirit of your mind, to put on the new man which has been created in
God’s fashion in righteousness and holiness of truth” (Eph. 4:24).220
The issue at stake in his epistemology is whether this personal transformation can be held to
be a foundational component of the concept of moral order. Our thesis maintains that the
“new objective reality” on display in the Pauline language about “renewal”, putting on the
“new person” and living “in Christ” cannot be divorced from the dynamic of faith. The
transformation of persons thus requires to be included in any hermeneutical development of
an evangelical concept of moral order. Trinitarian theological ethics is dynamic because truth
is a person. The dynamism is revealed in the self-revelation of God, which becomes
meaningful within the faith experience of persons being transformed; that is to say, persons in
communion whose being is in becoming.
219 Jüngel, Theological Essays II, trans. and ed. John Webster (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) 89-90. Webster
offers insightful analysis of Jüngel’s statement of Christ as “interruption” in ‘Jesus in the Theology of Eberhard
Jüngel’, Calvin Theological Journal 32 no 1 (1997): 43-71.
220 WJ, 315.
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7 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL
KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL ACTION
The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflection.The first task of Christian ethics is to invalidate this knowledge.Bonhoeffer, Ethics1
The transformation of persons forms the heart of evangelical ethics. This thesis has been
borne out by our analysis, and we have concluded that whatever we know of the moral order,
if it is to be an expression of evangelical ethics, it will accrue as transforming knowledge
accompanied by the metanoia event which pertains to faith in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Now
we ask: what difference does this make? In this regard I should aspire to meet the challenge
issued by John Stott at the conclusion of a conference on evangelical ethics: that our theology
should provide more answers, actions and passion in ethics.2 In order to develop further the
practical implications of my thesis therefore, I offer some closing thoughts on the practice of
moral deliberation as it pertains to worship, teaching and preaching. I then turn to consider in
depth one practical example of moral discernment as it relates to our thesis—the bio-ethical
1 Bonhoeffer, Ethics (London: SCM, 1955) 21.
2 John R. W. Stott, ‘Epilogue: Tasks Which Await Us’, Essays in Evangelical Social Ethics, ed. by David. F.
Wright (Exeter [Devon]: Paternoster Press, 1978) 179-83, 179.
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issues of reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) and artificial
insemination by donor (AID). This topic has been well studied by O’Donovan, notably in his
monograph Begotten or Made?,3 and thus provides a suitable case study in which to apply the
doctrinal implications of our thesis, and to evaluate their significance in a most practical and
contemporary example.
Lex orandi lex credendi: Evangelical ethics as doxology
What makes evangelical ethics evangelical is its proclamation of the gospel of Jesus
Christ.4 Moral deliberation and action are thus acts of worship taking place in relationship
with the Triune God of Grace.5 Colwell identifies relationship and worship at the heart of
evangelical ethics:
Biblical morality is not so much about obedience to an external law, as living in the
light of a relationship already established by God’s grace. It is an aspect of belonging
and a fruit of worship. 6
There is a profound difference between this Trinitarian worship which proclaims Christ, and
other sorts of non-evangelical “worship” which can be inspired by awe at the grandeur of
nature or other sources of ecstatic experience. God’s creation does indeed inspire worship of
the Creator, as attested by the Psalms and God’s rebuke of Job in [Job 38-41]. As
O’Donovan says, reflecting on God’s speech to Job, “nature excites a palpable sense of our
human contingency and teaches us to worship”.7 We must be careful however, to distinguish
between these forms of worship as equally valid sources of moral discernment, lest we slip
into a worship of the creation, rather than the Creator. Such is the risk inherent in any
movement between cosmologies. Evangelical ethics is thus bound inseparably with worship
of the Triune God. We may identify several implications of this conclusion:
3 O’Donovan, Begotten or Made? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
4 John Webster establishes the crucial “doxological dimensions” of the “moral field”, and establishes helpful
boundaries around the notion of “sacramental ethics”; Webster, ‘God and Conscience’, Calvin Theological
Journal 33 no 1 (1998): 104-2, 114.
5 Biggar’s reading of Barth’s dogmatics on this score is accurate: “it brings worship and prayer right into the
very heart of Christian ethics.” (CD III/3:89); Reckoning with Barth: Essays in Commemoration of the
Centenary of Karl Barth’s Birth (Oxford: Mowbray, 1988) 105.
6 John Stapylton Habgood, Varieties of Unbelief (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000) 55-6.
7 O’Donovan, ‘Where were you…?’, in The Care of Creation: Focusing on Concern and Action, ed. R.J. Berry
(Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2000): 90-93, 90.
Chapter 7: Moral Knowledge and Moral Action 189
First, we see that evangelical preaching and teaching share a common struggle—
wrestling with the text. In the pursuit of evangelical ethics, the theologian and teacher will
each proceed in prayerful engagement with Scripture.8
Second, we realize that the teacher of evangelical ethics will attend to, and trust in, the
transforming power of the Holy Spirit to be at work in the students.9 There is even a kind of
playfulness here, as Moltmann recognizes—
The word ‘play’ does not mean something superficial or casual. It is the profound,
unreasoning pleasure in God’s presence, which goes far beyond all the purpose-and
profit rationality of instrumentalized human reason.10
Third, transformation (metanoia) of persons entails new creation. Evangelical ethics is
rather more than a subject to be taught. It is an endeavor which proceeds by the power of the
Holy Spirit. As one participates in the event of revelation which brings transformational
understanding, metanoia occurs. This is a new creation ex nihilo, and not merely a new
understanding generated within the natural capacity of humanum.
Fourth, doxology happens in freedom.11 An evangelical understanding of freedom is
therefore essential within a doctrine of evangelical ethics. An un-evangelical emphasis upon
duty and human responsibility to discern right and wrong, relying upon an un-evangelical
doctrine of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, moves in the opposite direction from the freedom
realized in participation in Christ [cf. Gal. 2:20].12
Fifth, we may look for the transformation of persons, both incipient and actualized, as a
guide to morality. This transformation may become a visible actuality in the concrete present,
or it may remain mysteriously hidden until the hoped-for redemption of the eschaton. This
8 M. Craig Barnes, The Pastor as Minor Poet (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), makes this point eloquently.
9 Zizioulas describes what happens when ethics is cut off from the life of the gospel—it turns into a dead
“untouchable” dogma, buried in a dead orthodoxy, rather than what it truly is in reality: a living doxology,
realized in the person of Christ and inseparable from his body. Thus, dogma is a living act of worship, and not a
dead “relic” from the past; Being in Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 2004) 191.
10 Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Way and Forms of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress,
2000) 25.
11 “The event of man’s freedom is the event of his thankfulness for the gift, of his sense of responsibility as a
receiver; of his loving care for what is given him…. This event alone is the event of freedom.” Barth, Humanity
of God (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960) 76.
12 In chapter 4 we saw how the theme of responsibility emerged in Brunner’s bifurcated doctrine of the imago.
As an additional example of the sense of moral duty that departs from the evangelical doctrine of
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit as I have developed it, I cite Swinburne: “Although all action in accord with
conscience is good, it is better…if it is done contrary to desire.” Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and
Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) 31. This is notably different from the sense of freedom found in Barth’s
ethics: “The gift of freedom makes man free to be not more and not less than human”; Humanity of God, 80.
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transformation takes place in prayer and worship, as the moral agent experiences communion
with Christ. The reality of transformation (metanoia) suggests that moral deliberation seeks
to discover possibilities that might bear witness to the transforming power of the Gospel, and
thus to create opportunities for self and others to experience that transformation.13 This
suggests a prescriptive appeal to seek moral actions that trust in the redeeming power of
atonement, and to evaluate moral choices on the basis of their opportunity to bear witness to
new creation in persons.
Implications for moral knowledge
Our view of personal transformation as being essential to both the acquisition of moral
knowledge as well as the shape of the moral order raises serious implications for teaching,
preaching and education. It means that the didactic content of ethics, in a theological sense at
least, cannot be separated from the event in which learning takes place in the psyche of the
learner.14 The meaning of moral choices and behaviour is acquired in moments, and through
events, which are theologically, ontologically and epistemologically inseparable from the
ontic encounter in which they derive evangelical significance.
Thus if we aim to guide students into awareness and understanding of evangelical ethics,
we shall be well advised to treat the Bible as something much more meaningful and powerful
(transformative, even) than a field to be mined for “moral bricks”. This approach to the
subject matter of ethics is peculiar to our evangelical cosmology. Moral philosophy and
metaphysics can proceed apace without such concern for revelation and personal
transformation. This is not to disparage secular classrooms as places where virtue is sorely
lacking. On the contrary, there is remarkable alignment of moral statements to be found
between places where faith is absent, marginal or tacit, and those where it is robustly
evangelical and voiced. O’Donovan has demonstrated convincingly how this alignment of
moral teaching ensues form the ontological reality of the moral order. Still, the implication of
13 Alan Torrance shows that “epistemic at-one-ment and the metanoia intrinsic to the reconciling event of
revelation” are intrinsic to God’s creation ex nihilo; Torrance, Persons in Communion (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1996) 64. Thus, theological expression of ethics will pertain to persons-in-communion and metanoia.
14 Here we hearken once again to the imagination of Kierkegaard’s Climacus (Concluding Unscientific
Postscript) who boldly replays the opening gambit of Socrates’ Meno Paradox beginning with the simple
question, “Can the truth be learned?” and comes to the conclusion that the learner could only learn by way of
transformation at the hands of the ‘Teacher’, this being of course a euphemism for God.
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our thesis should remain clear, that this alignment does not, in and of itself, grant authority to
moral truth, nor do the principles themselves contain moral truth.
The teacher of evangelical ethics accepts a task both more daunting and more care-free
than the teacher of moral philosophy—more daunting, because in teaching evangelical ethics,
one must be concerned not only with the content of the subject matter, together with the
ethos, pathos and logos of the appeal, but must also bear the additional burden of intentional
seeking after faith. To focus merely on the content of moral principles is to miss the essential
place of transformation in the life of a person who gains or discovers a conviction which
imbues the moment of learning with an understanding of moral reality.15 At the same time,
the task of teaching evangelical ethics is the more care-free, because we recognize Jesus as
the Teacher who makes our burden light and easy by taking upon himself the responsibility
of being both Teacher and Logos.16
Begotten or Made?: Implications for Moral Action
Begotten or Made? represents O’Donovan’s prompt response to the Warnock Report of
1984,17 which has gone on to became one of the most authoritative and widely referenced
policy statements of the past 25 years with respect to emerging technologies pertaining to
human reproduction.18 As a member of the Working Party of the Board of Social
Responsibility for the Anglican Church, O’Donovan had concerns over the tendency of new
reproductive technologies to skew moral discourse in the direction of treating fertilization,
15 James Loder offers an incisive analysis of knowing as a transformational event: “all transformational knowing
participates in the knowledge of Christ as its norm and paradigm”; The Transforming Moment, 2nd ed.
(Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1989) 33. He develops a Christological understanding of knowledge as
being inseparable from the order of creation itself: “As ‘the Logos’ (John 1:1), he is the ultimate ground for all
order and so also the order of transformation” (64). Parker Palmer illustrates the paradoxical freedom
experienced by a teacher who is cognizant of the contingency and real presence of transformation in the moment
of learning; Palmer, The Courage to Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a Teacher's Life (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1988). Ford and Hardy also appreciate this paradoxical freedom, and counsel wisely that to focus
on moral principles as the heart of Christianity is “perhaps the most devastating perversion of all”; David Ford
and Daniel Hardy, Living in Praise: Worshipping and Knowing God (London: Darton Longman, 2005) 180.
16 Matt. 11:25-30; John 1:1; 14:6.
17 This being the report to the UK government commissioned under the chairmanship of Dame Mary Warnock
in 1982, M. Warnock (chair), Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology
(London: HMSO, 1984). Cf. Begotten or Made, v.
18 The impact of both the Warnock Report and Begotten or Made? continues to be noticed in recent monographs
such as: Agneta Sutton, Christian Bioethics: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2008); and Celia
Dean-Drummond, Genetics and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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pregnancy, and reproduction as manufacturing techniques in which the child to be born
would correspondingly come to be thought of as a “product” of human making, rather than a
gift of divine providence.19 This tendency of our contemporary western society to view
ethical decisions from a technological point of view leads to a “blindness in the realm of
thought [which] is the heart of what it is to be a technological culture.”20 Once we fall into
the habit of evaluating every activity in terms of technology, ethics becomes a commentary
on how best to use our manufacturing capability to achieve the greatest good. O’Donovan’s
fear is that this moral blindness brought on by the pervasive demands of technology for our
attention “imperils what it is to be human, for it deprives human existence itself of certain
spontaneities of being and doing”.21 This is a dire situation indeed, for if this blindness were
to foreclose the opportunity to see the theological significance of choices to employ
reproductive technologies, “the last shreds of a connection between procreation and being
will be torn asunder”.22 Ever vigilant, therefore, to prevent evangelical ethics from being
sidelined into an ineffectual, esoteric and closed circle which has no impact upon the broader
cultural discourse,23 O’Donovan states his goal for Begotten or Made?—
A Christianity which will bear witness to God’s Word in Jesus will be a speaking,
thinking, arguing, debating Christianity, which will not be afraid to engage in
intellectual and philosophical contest with the prevailing dogmas of its day.24
Following this call to engage the prevailing dogmas of our day, beholden as our culture
is to technological prowess, O’Donovan sets out to analyze the bio-ethical concerns
associated with in vitro fertilization (IVF), artificial insemination by donor (AID), surrogate
motherhood (aka “womb leasing”), insemination by husband, embryo experimentation and
related technologies.25 He does not dwell on the biological science related to these
19 Begotten or Made?, 1, 73f. O’Donovan reacts against the suggestion of the Warnock Report that “the child
born as a result of in vitro fertilization” would “tend to be assigned ‘to the same status as other objects of
acquisition’…”; p. 74. Sutton says that this concern placed O’Donovan in the conservative minority of the
Working Party of the Board of Social Responsibility; A. Sutton, Christian Bioethics, 75.
20 Begotten or Made?, 3.
21 Begotten or Made?, 3.
22 Begotten or Made?, 47.
23 Thus the problem O’Donovan wishes to avoid is that “all Christian moral duties become analogous to such
ecclesiastical house-rules as respect for the clergy … duties which presuppose membership of the church
community and lay no claim on those outside it”; R&MO, 16.
24 Begotten or Made?, 13.
25 O’Donovan addresses all these technologies in Begotten or Made?
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procedures, but rather moves quickly into consideration of the moral significance of
marriage, sex, parenthood and relationship as the definitive factors for moral discernment.26
Given the weight of ontological priority in O’Donovan’s concept of the moral order, it
might seem surprising that he does not delve further into the biological science of these
issues. After all, he expresses sympathy for “the natural ethic”, which has led him to chastise
Christian ethicists for a form of “theological weakness which has led to … a failure to reckon
with creation, and so with the reality of a divinely-given order of things in which human
nature itself is located.”27 If human nature could be discerned through the scientific study of
the biological human organism, then it would seem prudent to extend that study to the earliest
beginnings of human life, even in utero. But this quest to discern human nature and hence,
the foundations for morality, in the material, bio-physical realm of creation using the tools
observational tools and methods of the physical sciences, does not yield ethics in form
recognizable as evangelical. True, the physical realm exists in congruence with the moral
order of God’s creation and the outworking of God’s providence, and scientific study of the
created order yields much data of immeasurable value when it comes to interpreting the
theological significance of the moral order. Yet for as much as the physical, biological and
behavioral sciences have a great wealth of knowledge to offer with respect to human nature
and human flourishing, they fail utterly to impart theological significance to morality. They
stand accessible to evangelical ethics, but evangelical ethics is not disposable to them.
The force of this asymmetry in the relationship between the bio-physical realm of the so-
called “natural ethic” and the faith-embodying realm of evangelical ethics becomes quickly
apparent in O’Donovan’s treatment of the bio-ethical issues. He recognizes immediately that
it will not do define the ontological status of the embryo, gamete or zygote in terms of bio-
physical attributes. The crucial question is “who is a person?” and this question defies
resolution in the phenomenological realm of scientific observation.28 To answer this question
26 The biological evidence for the hominization in terms of discernment of the personhood of the early human
embryo is profitably surveyed in Benny Phang Khong Wing, The Contributions of Oliver O’Donovan and
William Werpehowski to the Current Debate Over the Personhood of the Early Human Embryo, Licentiate
thesis, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 2005. Cf. Germain Grisez, When Do People Begin?’,
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63 (1990): 27-47.
27 R&MO, 16; cf. 19.
28 Habgood is right to see this as the crucial distinction between Christian and non-Christian approaches to the
questions at hand: “Christian attitudes towards such medical issues as abortion, euthanasia and genetic
engineering, for instance, are often distinctive, not as is sometimes claimed because Christians value human life
whereas others do not, but because Christian beliefs about what a person is, and when human life begins and
ends, may differ from the beliefs of non-Christians”; John Stapylton Habgood, Varieties of Unbelief (London:
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in the context of mere biology simpliciter, would be to run afoul of that danger to be found in
a “philosophy bred by a scientism liberated from the discipline of Christian metaphysics”.29
The discipline of Christian obedience to the new-old love command taught by Christ moves
the discussion of morality to its proper realm—the dynamics of Trinitarian faith. Thus,
O’Donovan begins his essay on the sanctity of human life and the nature of the love
command by recognizing the impossibility of answering “who is a person?” apart from faith:
In the first place, then, there are no ‘criteria of personhood’ by which a person could be
recognized independently of, or prior to, personal engagement… And the point I wish
to make is that no conceivable set of purely observational criteria can answer that
question positively or negatively for us.30
It is one thing to say there are no biological or physical or phenomenological “criteria of
personhood”, but this does not answer the question; rather, it rules out certain epistemological
presumptions which would fail to reach an answer. And so, O’Donovan identifies the parable
of the ‘Good Samaritan’ [Luke 10:29-37] as the paradigmatic approach to the question of
personhood. To ask “who is a person?” is equivalent to asking “who is my neighbor?” [Luke
10:29].31 And since there are no phenomenological criteria with which to answer this
question, we are left standing in the only place where an answer may be sought: face-to-face
in an ontic encounter. The priest and the Levite, who passed by the injured man on the road,
might represent those conceptual “criteria of personhood” which fail to recognize the other as
a person or neighbor. But the man on the side of the road does not fit their conceptual
categories, as the parable demonstrates. He is not an abstraction; he is not defined by a
metaphysical concept of what makes a person or neighbor. We discover in the parable the
ontic reality which forces an answer upon us from outside our conceptual apparatus. Thus,
O’Donovan says rightly: “All we can do is act personally, as person or as friend.”32 Lest we
stray into the ontological abstractions of a bifurcation of the imago Dei, or inadvertently fall
into the error of analogia entis, we have only one place to stand as we answer the question,
and that is in the presence of the other, who is defined not in terms of our concepts, nor by
Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000) 57. Cf. Habgood, Being a Person: Where Faith and Science Meet (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1998).
29 R&MO, 52.
30 O’Donovan, Oliver, ‘Again: Who is a Person?’ in Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life, ed. J.H. Channer,
(Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1985): 125-37, 127-8.
31 O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who is a Person?’, 125f. Cf. Begotten or Made?, 60.
32 O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who is a Person?’, 130.
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means of projecting our notions of self-hood, but rather in the mystery of personal
engagement. And so in the final analysis, the mystery of this encounter is inescapable as we
seek to discern what makes a person a person, and O’Donovan closes his essay on this note:
It is true, as we have emphasized, that the human person resists exhaustive analysis,
that it has its root in the mystery of divine vocation whereby God confers our
individual existence upon us as he calls us by our names.33
This insistence upon ontic encounter between persons, together with the mystery of divine
vocation wherein we recognize our existence as a person defined as one whom is known and
loved by God, are the epistemological good news of the Gospel, and the essential foundation
for an evangelical answer to the question, “who is a person?” Thus, Jesus’ parable teaches us
to recognize one another not in terms of biological or ontological criteria, attributes or
substances, but rather in compassion: “when he saw him, he had compassion.”34
We may contrast O’Donovan’s treatment of the mystery of personhood with others’ who
seek to align their answers more rigorously with the epistemological presumptions of a
“natural ethic”. Germain Grisez, for one, argues for a dogmatic link between biological
criteria and the metaphysics of person attributable to Boethius:
I think that all whole, bodily, substantial individuals of any species having a rational
nature are persons, and that most human individuals begin at fertilization. On this
notion, most human people begin when a human sperm and ovum fuse.35
In so doing, he refutes the conclusion of Mary Warnock that “one can handle the relevant
moral issues without settling the question of personhood”.36 Along the same lines, we would
expect Grisez to take exception to O’Donovan’s conclusion that there is “no conceivable set
of purely observational criteria can answer that question”.37 Grisez’s analytical method
illustrates how the epistemological presumptions of a “natural ethic” move the ethical issue
of personhood quickly into debate over which bio-physical criteria are determinative. He thus
takes exception to the argument that the onset of personhood is best determined by the
33 O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who is a Person?’, 137.
34 O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who is a Person?’, 137.
35 Germain Grisez, ‘When Do People Begin?’, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
63 (1990): 27-47, 28.
36 Grisez, ‘When Do People Begin?’, 29.
37 O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who is a Person?’, 127-8.
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biological phenomenon of the appearance of the “primitive streak” at about day fourteen of
the embryo’s life.38
Christian ethicists Agneta Sutton and Celia Deane-Drummond also seek to establish the
biological onset of personhood, and their efforts illustrate the nature of the debate which
evolves from the attempt to define personhood in bio-ontological terms. Sutton evaluates the
arguments based upon the pluri-potentiality of early embryonic cells, twinning and the
formation of the primitive streak.39 She finds the twinning argument the most substantial. In
none of these arguments does she cite the relationship of persons with God as an ontological
determinant of personhood, although she identifies the familial relationships between persons
as the being essential in the definition of human personhood. Nonetheless, her definition is
constrained by biological physicalism, and fails to take into consideration the relational
aspect of the Trinitarian God.
Deane-Drummond draws upon Aquinas, and bases ethics upon “principles [which] are
set in the first place by synderēsis, which in turn arises from natural law, the most general and
naturally understood principles of ethical conduct.”40 She endorses a “natural ethic” and gives
O’Donovan credit for setting out to establish Christian ethics in concert with a “natural
ethic”. In this regard she affirms O’Donovan’s ethics as being superior to the “Barthian view
of ethics” which she attributes to Michael Banner:
In this respect Oliver O’Donovan’s position is far more successful, since it tends
toward a strong affirmation of the natural order while insisting on the distinctive
contribution of theology.41
The interesting conclusion to be drawn from such bio-ontological approaches to the debate
over the onset of personhood is that they each seek to affirm a “natural ethic”, and they find
O’Donovan helpful in this regard.42 Despite the support for their views which Sutton and
38 Grisez, ‘When Do People Begin?’, 35-40. The ethical significance of the “primitive streak” is maintained by
Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin?: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
39 Agneta Sutton, Christian Bioethics: a Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2008) 19-22.
40 Celia Deane-Drummond, Genetics and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 16.
41 Celia Deane-Drummond, Genetics and Christian Ethics, 36. Cf., Michael Banner, Christian Ethics and
Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Deane-Drummond goes on to
interpret O’Donovan’s ethics as being an example of how, in contradistinction to Barth, “there is no reason why
dogmatic ethics has to be deontological”; Genetics and Christian Ethics, 37.
42 Deane-Drummond offers the clearest commentary on O’Donovan pertaining to this point: “…he argues that
we are in an unfortunate position between having to choose an ethic that is revealed and has no ontological
grounding, and one that is based on creation and naturally known. He argues, instead, for an intermediate
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Deane-Drummond claim to find in O’Donovan’s ethics, he seems to rise above the fray of
their debate when it comes to the matter of the biological foundations of human personhood
which can be discerned through scientific study of the early embryo. He does not become
embroiled in the technicalities of biological observation of embryonic cells, but rather bases
his rationale of personhood, as well as the ethical significance thereof, upon the ontic,
relational and ultimately mysterious divine vocation which defines what it means to be a
called a person. Hence, his argument throughout Begotten or Made? never strays far from the
conclusion that “the Christian thinkers of the patristic age learned that no qualitative term
would ever do to express Christ’s individual identity, and so (by implication) that no simply
qualitative term would ever do to express identity as such.”43 By this insight, he seems to
avoid the unrelenting tendency of such debates to descend into a never-ceasing discussion of
the biological and phenomenological boundary conditions which obtain at the boundaries of
life. As with other boundary issues, we discover that these boundaries are like the
mathematics of fractals and the geography of coastlines—no matter how fine the observation
becomes, the boundary itself continues to require discernment from a transcendent, or higher,
perspective.44 The person is not determined by the protoplasm, or the border contained in
the grain of sand. Personhood is not to be discerned by testing for it on the basis of biological
or ontological attributes, capacities of the humanum, behavioral phenomenology or “the most
sophisticated biological test”,45 but rather:
We discern persons only by love, by discovering through interaction and commitment
that this human being is irreplaceable... If we assert that it is true of all human beings,
we do so by a kind of faith (not unrelated to Christian faith) that the significance we
have discerned in those we have loved is a significance which God attributes to all
members of Adam’s race.46
Here O’Donovan is clearly developing his ethics within a cosmology of faith. This
seeking after an understanding of what it means to be a human person is clearly an act of
fides quaerens intellectum. There is no dialectical shift of cosmological stance here. There is
position, one that begins from revelation, while not excluding “natural knowledge”. Such view might suggest
some lines of continuity between those Roman Catholics following natural-law ethical traditions, and Barthian
ethics”; Deane-Drummond, Genetics and Christian Ethics, 35-6.
43 Begotten or Made?, 53-4.
44 As O’Donovan concludes rightly with respect to the biological boundaries of personhood in the early embryo,
it is not possible to avoid the “ambiguity of the status of the embryo research subject”; Begotten or Made?, 65.
45 Begotten or Made?, 59.
46 Begotten or Made?, 59.
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no bifurcation of the imago Dei. There is no hint of the controversy to which those
movements lead regarding the dogmatics of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit. For when it comes to
the practical application of evangelical ethics in this case, driven by the need to avoid the
unfortunate conclusions which spring from a “natural ethic”, we see that O’Donovan holds
fast to the cosmology of evangelical faith.47 I take this as confirmation of my thesis regarding
the dynamics of faith as the providing essential epistemic access to moral knowledge.
Correspondingly, we see that O’Donovan frames the ethical issues of personhood, marriage
and parenthood in terms of relationships, and the significance of these relationships is found
not in the biological, phenomenological realm of natural law, but rather in the realm of faith
in the Trinitarian God whom we know through Christ.48 These are transformational
relationships, outside of which the concept of moral order fails to convey evangelical truth.49
Support for my conclusion regarding O’Donovan’s display of faith in Begotten or Made?
comes from Benny Wing, who sums up O’Donovan’s position on the status of the early
human embryo as a “relational paradigm”.50 While demonstrating O’Donovan’s paradigm,
based in biblical faith, to be superior to the biologically-based paradigms of Ford and others,
Wing has but one critique of Begotten or Made?—namely, that O’Donovan should pay more
attention to the “need to develop a method within [his] paradigm to address the public square
with [his] Christian values.”51 Wing seems not to notice the irony in this conclusion—
evangelical ethics proves superior to the naturalistic ethics of the public square precisely
because it holds true to the cosmology of faith, without presuming to accept the task that it
47 This is not to say that O’Donovan abdicates his defense of the value to be derived from the “natural ethic”, or
that his affinity for it in R&MO lacks continuity with the practical matters of Begotten or Made? To the
contrary, we can see his affinity for the idea of natural access to the moral order in the present work as well; to
wit, his admonition to Christians to confess “faith in the natural order as the good creation of God”; Begotten or
Made? 12; and similarly: “In the natural order we were given to know what a parent was” (p. 48). The point is
that when it comes to the practical ethical questions pertaining to IVF and AID, the cosmology of faith shines
through as the essential cosmology.
48 John Jefferson Davis affirms the personal dimension, and the impossibility of severing it from the biological
dimension, in consideration of reproductive technologies; Davis, Evangelical Ethics (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1985) 72f. Cf. O’Donovan’s evangelical insights on the subject of
human dignity as being defined in terms of the event in which “God speaks in the second person… We are no
longer merely instances of homo sapiens: we are—as we say, for want of a better term—persons”; O’Donovan,
The Word in Small Boats: Sermons from Oxford, ed. Andy Draycott (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010) 137.
49 Support for this conclusion comes also from Edwin C. Hui, At the Beginning of Life: Dilemmas in
Theological Bioethics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002). Hui develops an “ethic of personhood” and applies
it profitably to the ethics of reproductive technologies, coming to conclusions which are very sympathetic to
O’Donovan’s.
50 Benny Phang Khong Wing, The Contributions of Oliver O’Donovan and William Werpehowski to the Current
Debate Over the Personhood of the Early Human Embryo, Licentiate thesis, Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C., 2005: 65.
51 Benny Wing, The Contributions of Oliver O’Donovan, 91.
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should somehow validate the cosmology of the public square. Wing’s observation, based on a
close and insightful reading of Begotten or Made? confirms my conclusion that the
cosmology of faith proves to be the dominant voice in O’Donovan treatment of the bio-
ethical issues.
When we examine the train of thought on display in O’Donovan’s grappling with the
fractious issues surrounding reproductive technology, therefore, we see that the cosmology of
evangelical faith proves decisive, and he must move beyond any dialectical epistemology,
and rely upon the relationships discerned through a living faith, in order to rise above debate
over bio-ontological boundary issues. We discover through the deliberations of evangelical
ethics that the moral order is not discernable apart from the transformation of persons. I
endorse both the evangelical faith on display here, as well as O’Donovan’s conclusions for
practical ethics, as he warns against the experimental use of human embryos, and the
unfortunate implications it holds for the science of reproductive technologies—
If we should wish to charge our own generation with crimes against humanity because
of the practice of this experimental research, I would suggest that the crime should not
be the old-fashioned crime of killing babies, but the new and subtle crime of making
babies to be ambiguously human, of presenting to us members of our own species who
are doubtfully proper objects of compassion and love. The practice of producing
embryos by IVF with the intention of exploiting their special status for use in research
is td clearest possible demonstration of the principle that when we start making
human beings we necessarily stop loving them; that that which is made rather than
begotten becomes something that we have at our disposal, not someone with whom
we can engage in brotherly fellowship.52
This admonition is based in the evangelical affirmation that our humanity is defined in
terms of our relationship the Triune God. To be aware of this relationship is to live in
obedience to God who “calls us through the resurrection of Jesus Christ… to become
precisely what he made us to be.”53 It is in our awareness of this call, and our concomitant
call to brotherly love, that we discern the evangelical basis of our humanity. Our humanity
and loving fellowship are based in the mediation of Christ.
These practical conclusions regarding Begotten or Made? bear out the doctrinal
implications surveyed in the previous chapter regarding a holistic theological anthropology
which understands the imago Dei in terms of the relationship between God and human
person. Of particular importance is the implication that the universal subsists in the particular,
52 Begotten or Made? 65.
53 Begotten or Made? 66.
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when it comes to human dignity. General, abstract concepts fail to establish the moral reality
of living in relationship to the God who speaks to human persons. This is why it is not helpful
to proceed from general categorical statements of humanity, such as O’Donovan’s statement
that we relate “to one another as members of common kind, as man alongside man”54, in
“recognition of the supreme good”55 doesn’t work unless that love is mediated by Christ’s
love for us.
The moral significance of the person transcends general categories of the bio-ontological
debate, and resides rather in the particular relationship of a person who is created and loved
by God. If we fail to locate human significance in the individual event of human relationship,
we commit a category mistake by constraining the meaning of personhood to be defined in
conceptual categories, rather than to recognize the person of Christ as the basis for
understanding our humanity and our relationships. Thus, in order to avoid that mistake
O’Donovan notes the particular, individual aspect of what it means to be a human being:
He is not merely a chip off the block of total humanity, but someone who is human.
This perception has its roots in the biblical understanding of individual vocation. Prior
to those events, which bring our humanity to being, we are called by God; ‘Before I
formed you in the womb I knew you’ (Jer. 1:5)56
In order to arrive at a moral understanding of the person, of the human, or indeed any concept
of the humanum in general, the person must be known as an individual: a specific, unique
person with a history. Here is the implication for evangelical ethics, as spelled out in the
previous chapter, that the universal is true only in the particular. O’Donovan is right to name
this particularity as of the essence in the ethical considerations of the embryo, pregnancy and
begetting. Evangelical ethics is not beholden to be constrained by the general concepts of
those biological functions. To stay in the realm of the conceptual is to cede the moral field to
the physical and materialistic realm of experimental science. Theological ethics will not be
determined within the non-evangelical constraints of the biological realm. Those constraints
devolve into ever tighter circles of trying to locate where the boundary lines are to be drawn
54 R&MO, 228.
55 R&MO, 229. Cf. O’Donovan goes on to elaborate, “We are to love the neighbor ‘as our-self’ by losing all
sense of the distinction between him our our-self, expanding our self-consciousness to include him in radical
empathy…;’ it is about the full realization of individuality in a commonness of sharing and reciprocation.”
Similarly, to propose a loss of distinction between our-self vis a vis the other-self commits the same category
mistake if not mediated by the reality of Christ. Paul Ramsey proves the point when he explains that the basis
for being equal to the other is that we, both self and other, are God’s creatures; Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics
(New York: Scribner, 1950) 94. Cf. Benny Wing, The Contributions of Oliver O’Donovan , 73.
56 R&MO, 238.
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around meaning of life, and questions such as, “Who is a person?” Again, we see that when it
comes to the practical matters of an evangelical ethics of personhood, “Humanity meets us
already itemized and individuated; the sacred claim rests in the individual and not in any
other arbitrary division of humanity…”57 Thus O’Donovan points out the specificity required
to answer the question of personhood—
We met him—I say ‘the person’, but it is very important not to think that ‘the person’
is another kind of constituent,… a category mistake to try to demonstrate the presence
or absence of a person by proving that this or that biological or neurological function is
present or absent. It is a category mistake to say that a new conceptus cannot be a
person until there is brain activity; it is a category mistake to say that it must be a
person because there is an individual genetic structure. For, whatever criteria we take,
we end up by reducing the notion of personhood to that one constituent of human
functioning.58
Correspondingly, when arguing for the humanity of the embryo on the basis of love of
neighbor, it becomes quickly apparent that the ethical questions are inextricably bound to a
Christological understanding of theological anthropology. Christ is the basis for the love of
others; this neighbor-love is the basis for interpretation of the status of the relationships
which pertain to the status of the human embryo. This love is the foundation of the “true
moral life of the Christian community… and its love is unintelligible except as a participation
in the life of the one who reveals himself to us as Love.”59
Conclusion
We have pressed the point of asking what it means for ethics to be evangelical, and how
an evangelical ethics might properly speak of moral order when faced with the hermeneutical
pressures of present-day secular western culture. In so doing, we have found Prof. Oliver
O’Donovan to be a strong proponent for an approach to evangelical ethics which can hold its
own in the milieu of the modern moral imaginary. He works to establish evangelical ethics on
a footing that remains intrinsically and unabashedly evangelical while simultaneously
engaging in fruitful dialog with the ethics of our secular age. His desire is to present “a
57 O’Donovan, The Christian and the Unborn Child (Bramcote, UK: Grove Books, 1973) 10.
58 O’Donovan, ‘Who is a Person?’ 128.
59 R&MO, 246.
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speaking, thinking, arguing, debating Christianity, which will not be afraid to engage in
intellectual and philosophical contest with the prevailing dogmas of its day.” 60 He aims to
chart a course of well-balanced reason amidst the competing tensions within theological
ethics. We have discovered that O’Donovan’s desire to affirm the rational aspects of
theological deliberation, as opposed to the subjective aspects of faith, leads to him to give
priority to objective statements of ethics as though they could be separated from the
subjective experience of faith. Hence, in the course of R&MO, we learn that “a subjective
chapter of ethics which must follow (and must follow) from the objective chapter.”61 Based
upon this premise, O’Donovan gives priority to the deliberative powers of reason in the
pursuit of moral knowledge. His goal is to resolve the conflicts and paradoxes of theological
(and evangelical) ethics which he attributes to an unfortunate confusion over the relative
placements of subjective faith experience and objective moral deliberation. By defining the
problem of moral theology in these terms, he has set himself the goal of resolving the conflict
and dispelling the confusion—
…and that I attempt to do in conceiving of theology as deliberative reasoning,
encountering experience where philosophy has always encountered it, not as ‘source’
but as questio, as a puzzle that insists on being addressed. 62
His outline for evangelical ethics shows how he intends to solve the puzzle, as it were.
We have probed this puzzle-solving endeavor, paying particular attention to the doctrinal
implications of the outline for evangelical ethics as presented in R&MO. Our study
discovered a tendency within Prof. O’Donovan’s epistemological realism to employ a
dialectical opposition of cosmologies—sometimes building upon the witness of evangelical
faith, and sometimes upon the authority of an objectifiable natural ethic—as a means of
avoiding the paradox of evangelical faith, and thereby solving the puzzle as he has stated it.
The impetus for this dialectical epistemology stems from Prof. O’Donovan’s desire to
avoid the detrimental repercussions of voluntarism which he detects in contemporary
theology, and which he traces to Kierkegaardian existentialism. He attributes the problem,
and hence, the puzzle, to the “polarity between revelation in the particular and created order
in the universal”.63 His goal therefore, is to prevent the polarity from collapsing, for that leads
60 Begotten or Made?, 13.
61 R&MO, xix.
62 O’Donovan, ‘Deliberation, History and Reading’, 130.
63 R&MO, 85; cf. 87.
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only into the paradoxical aspects of faith. Seeking to maintain “the proper tension between
the transcendence and the incarnate nearness of God”,64 he looks back on the Tudor
Reformers with admiration for their diligence to hold the polarity together in “a very nearly
perfect balance.”65 This perfect balance he seeks to recover through a commitment to
evangelical and epistemological realism, and as we have discovered, that leads to an
endorsement of ontological priority for the creation of the moral order.
While arguing for the objective reality of the moral order as an ontological fact
independent of, and prior to, the conditions which grant epistemic access to moral reality,
O’Donovan develops dogmatic statements of theological anthropology which lead to conflict
with the affirmations of evangelical witness. The crux of the matter revolves around the issue
of immanent, natural access to moral knowledge, as we have seen in his support for the
concept of a “natural ethic” which affirms the objective reality of an objective “order of
things” within which Christian ethics has “an objective reference”.66 This emphasis upon the
objectivity of the moral order leads to the problematic assertion that the moral content of
creation, as an objective reality “remains accessible to knowledge in part. It requires no
revelation to observe the various forms of generic and teleological order which belong to it.”
Upon reaching this conclusion, O’Donovan turns immediately to the Barth-Brunner debate
over theologia naturalis, where he discerns correctly that the epistemological and ontological
issues pertaining to revelation of the moral order occupy center stage.67
With sympathy for Brunner and admiration for Barth, O’Donovan suggests that neither
of them was able to see how confused they each were over their need to separate the
epistemological and ontological issues. O’Donovan’s approach requires these issues to be
separated one from another, and considered as though they were distinct disciplines which
could be employed independently and in a sequentially in the pursuit of theological ethics.
Following O’Donovan’s reference to the Barth-Brunner debate as a seminal example of
this sort of confusion in modern theology, we probed that famous debate in order to discover
how it impinges upon O’Donovan’s evangelical ethics. Our analysis discovered how
Brunner’s dialectical approach to establish a point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) for the
divine-human encounter corresponds with O’Donovan’s desire to sort out the confusion
between the ontological and the epistemological issues pertaining to moral knowledge. In
64 39 Articles, 20.
65 39 Articles, 64.
66 R&MO, 17.
67 R&MO, 86-91.
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Brunner’s case, this leads to a dialectical bifurcation of the imago; whereas in O’Donovan’s
case, it leads to a dialectical approach to evangelical realism, and endorsement of both an
objectifiable “natural ethic” as well as a subjective faith as paths to moral knowledge. The
challenges inherent in this dialectical approach become clear in light of the doctrinal
implications of Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, which corresponds to the human aspect of the
elusive “point of contact” in which the event of revelation, the dynamics of faith, and
participation in the innertrinitarian life of God, all converge.
Thus we found that the Barth-Brunner disagreement over Offenbarungsmächtigkeit
provides a lens onto O’Donovan’s approach to solve the puzzle of theological ethics by
sorting out the confusion over the ontological and epistemological issues. Next, our analysis
of the “Kierkegaardian Knot” cast a spotlight upon O’Donovan’s approach to address the
paradox of faith. His polemical effort to avoid arbitrariness and voluntarism leads him adopt
an epistemological standpoint unconstrained by certain paradoxical aspects of faith. In
presuming to have access to such a standpoint, he cuts the Kierkegaardian Knot which binds
the concept of moral order together with the event of faith, and this leads him, whether
implicitly or explicitly, to develop a dialectical epistemology.
Based upon this analysis, we explored the hermeneutical significance of participation in
Christ and metanoia as aspects of the cosmology of faith. This analysis exposes the
challenges to evangelical ethics which arise from a dialectical movement between
cosmologies. We conclude that O’Donovan’s evangelical realism has difficulty sustaining
evangelical doctrines of Holy Spirit and the Trinity.
As a concluding application and test of our thesis, we delved into O’Donovan’s intensive
treatment of the practical ethical concerns related to new reproductive technologies such as
IVF and AID. Here we found his conclusions to be both worthy in light of evangelical ethics,
and consistent with our thesis that moral discernment occurs in faith and thus in relationship
with the triune God. Our analysis demonstrated, however, that the moral deliberations
involved and the conclusions he reaches are derived not from dialectically opposed
cosmologies, but rather from within the cosmology of faith.
In conclusion, we can affirm that evangelical ethics is inextricably bound up with faith; it
proceeds in the direction of fides quaerens intellectum which happens within the cosmology
of faith, and not along other directions, however parallel they might seem to run, however
pleasing they might be to behold in light of moral metaphysics and the modern moral
imaginary.
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By faith we are transformed. By faith we gain epistemic access to the moral order.
Ethics, evangelically speaking, is a movement of doxology, filled with life, and taking place
within the cosmology of faith. There is no other entrance to evangelical ethics; there is no
“backdoor” onto ethics opened by a dialectical epistemology. We must enter through the
“narrow gate” [John 10:1-6] of relationship with Christ. Whether we look back from the
resurrection to see the goodness of God’s created order, or forward to see his act of
eschatological transformation, and hence vindication, we are looking from within the vantage
of evangelical faith, not stepping outside of that faith in the presumption of standing on some
Archimedean point. God alone is “self-contained, self-containing reality”.68 There is no other
reality upon which to build either ethics or theology. To presume otherwise is an illusion—an
illusion destroyed by encounter with the self-revealing God.69 This may seem disconcerting if
we desire to find our footing in the realm of objective concepts, or to present our
deliberations in the clothing of objective reasoning, yet it is of the essence in faith and
evangelical ethics. Is there a moral reality to be found there, in the event of the self-revealing
God, and in the transformational agency of the Holy Spirit? Yes, there is. The moral order is
there—in that place, the place of God’s self-revelation. It will be found in and through the
encounter with the living God, which takes place as we participate in the innertrinitarian life
of God, in Jesus Christ, and by the movement of the Holy Spirit.
68 CD II/1 (271).
69 CD II/1 (271).
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